Community-Based Conservation in Tanzania: Discourses and Realities by Moyo, Francis
  
 
 
Fakultät Umweltwissenschaften • Institut für Internationale Forst- und Holzwirtschaft 
 
Community-Based Conservation in Tanzania: Discourses and Realities 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in the Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor 
Rerum Silvacarum (Dr. rer. silv.) 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by: 
Francis Severini Moyo 
MSc. Environmental forestry 
Born on 29.05.1976 
 
 
Supervisors: 
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Pretzsch 
Technische Universität Dresden, Institute of International Forestry and Forest Products 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Jens Friis Lund 
Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Müller 
Leibniz Institute of Ecological and Regional Planning - IOER 
 
 
 
Tharandt, September 2018 
 
i 
 
Declaration of conformity 
I confirm that this copy conforms to the original dissertation on the topic: 
 
“Community-Based Conservation in Tanzania: Discourses and Reality” 
 
Tharandt, 10. 09. 2018 
 
________________________ 
Francis Severini Moyo 
 
ii 
 
Preface 
The research for this dissertation was carried out from mid-2013 and to late 2015. The study 
applies mixed but primarily qualitative methods. Through theoretical and empirical analyses, 
the study contributes to the scholarly debates concerning the study and effects of community 
based conservation in the context of development interventions in the countries of the global 
south. The dissertation comprises an introductory chapter and the following three peer reviewed 
papers published in free access scientific journals: 
1. Jevgeniy Bluwstein, Francis Moyo and Rose Peter Kicheleri (2016). Austere Conservation: 
Understanding Conflicts over Resource Governance in Tanzanian Wildlife Management 
Areas. Journal of Conservation and Society 14(3): 218-231. doi: 10.4103/0972-
4923.191156. 
2. Francis Moyo, Jasper Ijumba and Jens Friis Lund (2016). Failure by Design? Revisiting 
Tanzania’s Flagship Wildlife Management Area Burunge. Journal of Conservation and 
Society, 14(3): 232-242. doi: 10.4103/0972-4923.191160. 
3. Francis Moyo, Sharissa Funk and Jürgen Pretzsch (2018). Between Policy Intent and 
Practice: Negotiating Access to Land and other Resources in Tanzania’s Wildlife 
Management Areas. Journal of Tropical Conservation Science, Volume 10: 1–17. doi: 
10.1177/1940082917744167. 
Additional publications during the course of the Ph.D. studies 
1. Jens Friis Lund; Neil D Burgess; Shabani A. O. Chamshama; Klaus Dons; Jack A. Isango; 
George C. Kajembe; Henrik Meilby; Francis Moyo; Yonika M. Ngaga; Stephen E. Ngowi; 
Marco A. Njana; Ezekiel E. Mwakalukwa; Kathrine Skeie; Ida Theilade and Thorsten Treue 
(2014). Mixed Method Approaches to Evaluate Conservation Impact: Evidence From 
Decentralized Forest Management in Tanzania. Journal of Environmental Conservation, 42 
(2): 162–170doi:10.1017/S0376892914000241. 
2. Jürgen Pretzsch, Francois Jost, Marolyn, Vidaurre de la Riva, Max Domke, and Francis 
Moyo. (2015). Endogenous Path Dependence of Tropical Forestry Development and Threats 
by Globalization. XIV WORLD FORESTRY CONGRESS, Durban, South Africa, 7-11 
September 2015. 
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Summary 
This dissertation focuses on understanding the socioeconomic impacts of Community Based 
Conservation (CBC) initiatives on rural livelihoods. CBC initiatives promise to abate the 
negative impacts of top down or centralised fortress conservation approaches that have for 
many decades, hindered rural people from accessing and benefiting from natural resources, and 
incited land-use conflicts. Yet, despite these promises, the inherently political nature of natural 
resource governance brings challenges to the implementation of the scientifically designed 
conservation interventions. It was in the interest of this dissertation, therefore, to compare and 
contrast the policy premises and the reality on the ground by analysing the socioeconomic 
impacts of CBC initiatives on rural livelihoods. The research explored Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs), a community based wildlife management initiatives in Tanzania, where the 
policy promises participating communities improved access to resources and better benefits 
retentions. 
Through political ecology lenses, the research collected and analysed both quantitative but 
largely qualitative data. Results show that WMAs foster a very limited ownership, participation 
and collective action at the community level. WMA governance continues to follow a logic of 
central government control over natural resources and the associated benefits. The WMAs are 
rife with conflicts and contestations over grievances that remained unsettled since its 
establishment a decade back. The grievances are accentuated by growing land pressure resulting 
from an increase in human, livestock and elephant populations, in combination with 
infrastructure improvements and support for agriculture-led development. Besides WMA 
governance offers very little or nothing to residents and village leaders in the participating 
communities who appear hostages in a situation where interests in human development and 
conservation are pitted against each other. Residents are not compensated for crops and 
livestock losses and/or human injuries and death caused by wildlife, while very little WMA 
resources and revenues are directed toward the protection of crops and livestock against 
wildlife. The current situation, therefore, not only makes a mockery of the notions of 
community-based conservation but also pinpoint to the tendency of global and national actors 
promoting conservation in Tanzania and elsewhere to misrepresent or ignore the local realities 
that defy official policy promises. 
Further, the results reveal that WMAs concentrate licit benefits to few elites and criminalises 
rural peoples’ customary livelihoods and claims of rights to natural resources. This leaves the 
majority of rural people who endure the cost of conservation in forgone individual livelihoods 
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interests, such as farmland and pasture for livestock, and wildlife damages on crops, livestock, 
and people, to rely on illicit access mechanisms. This has, in turn, led to violent confrontations 
between game scouts and people, and protests and struggles to re-gain legal access. But at a 
more general level, the conflicts created/exacerbated by the WMA regimes erode rural peoples’ 
trust and willingness to support conservation. 
It is difficult, therefore, to argue that WMAs are community-owned conservation initiatives 
until a genuinely devolved and more flexible conservation model is implemented to give space 
for popular participation in rule-making and resource allocation. This means, in order to 
advance conservation-development agenda, conservation policies need to understand rural 
peoples’ needs and address them not only as ‘add on’ but at their very core. CBC interventions 
must also recognise customary claims to land and use of natural resources, and make sure that 
benefits accrue from conservation activities trickle down to the household level. 
Thus, throughout the analysis of WMAs as a CBC interventions on human-dominated 
landscapes, this dissertation unveils the following key issues: i) property rights and rule 
enforcement agency, a persistence challenge in CBC interventions, and ii) governance 
rationality and limit to governance, a novelty field in policy sciences, focusing on the need to 
contemplate and synthesise in a more acute and systematic way of understanding the policy 
promise and human limits to govern ourselves out of environmental problems. To conclude, 
this dissertation proposes a logical framework for the analysis of CBC intervention through a 
landscape approach lenses and offer recommendations for development and research. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation untersucht sozio-ökonomische Auswirkungen von lokal verwalteten 
Naturschutzinitiativen (Community-based Conservation, CBC) auf die Lebensgrundlagen im 
ländlichen Raum (rural livelihoods). CBC Initiativen versprechen negative Auswirkungen von 
traditionellen top-down Naturschutzmaßnahmen zu vermindern. Diese traditionellen 
Maßnahmen, oft als fortress conservation bezeichnet, verweigern lokalen Zugang zu Land und 
Ressourcen und haben zu zahlreichen Landkonflikten geführt. Jedoch bringt auch CBC 
aufgrund der inhärenten politischen Natur von Naturschutz governance Herausforderungen mit 
sich. Diese Dissertation setzt sich mit diesen Herausforderungen auseinander, indem sie die 
Versprechen positiver sozio-ökonomischer Auswirkungen mit der Realität von CBC 
Inititativen vergleicht. Konkret werden dorfbasierte Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) 
untersucht. WMAs stellen in Tanzania eine zentrale policy für Wildtierschutz im ländlichen 
Raum dar, und versprechen den Menschen besseren Zugang zu Resourcen und verbesserte 
Einnahmequellen. 
Im konzeptionellen Rahmen einer politischen Ökologie wurden sowohl quantitative als auch 
qualitative Daten erhoben. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass WMAs nur bedingt zu Landbesitz und -
zugang, politischer Partizipation und kollektivem Handeln im ländlichen Raum beitragen. 
WMA governance ist weiterhin in der Logik zentralisierter Kontrolle von natürlichen 
Ressourcen und monetären Einnahmen verhaftet. Konflikte und Auseinandersetzungen über 
zahlreiche Missstände bleiben ungelöst und spitzen sich angesichts zunehmender 
Landverknappung zu. Viele Dorfbewohner und -vorsteher sehen sich als Geisel in einer 
Situation, in der – im Rahmen der WMA - die Interessen ländlicher Entwicklug gegen 
Naturschutz ausgespielt werden. Es gibt keine Kompensation für wildtierverursachte Verluste 
in Ackerbau und Nutztierhaltung, und für Körperverletzungen und Verlust von Menschenleben. 
Nur wenig wird in den Schutz gegen wildtierverursachte Schäden an Leib, Leben, und 
Eigentum investiert. Die gegenwärtige Situation stellt daher den Begriff und das Konzept von 
community-based conservation in Frage. Globale und nationale Akteure verdrehen oder 
ignorieren lokale Realitäten, die sich offiziellen policy Versprechen entziehen. 
Desweiteren zeigt diese Dissertation auf, dass im Rahmen der WMA die wenigen Eliten sozio-
ökonomisch bevorteilt werden, während die Lebensführung der Landbevölkerung zunehmend 
kriminalisiert wird. Durch das restriktive WMA Regime in Bezug auf Zugang zu Land und 
Ressourcen werden die Einnahmen und Kosten von WMA Initiativen ungleich verteilt und die 
Landbevölkerung in die Illegalität getrieben. Das hat zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen 
vii 
 
um Zugang zu Land und Ressourcen zwischen WMA Aufsehern und Anwohnern geführt. 
Darüberhinaus trägt das WMA Regime zu einer Erosion von lokalem Vertrauen in und 
Bereitschaft zu Naturschutzinitiativen. 
Es ist daher schwierig WMAs als community-based conservation Initiativen zu bezeichnen bis 
ein genuin dezentralisiertes und flexibles Naturschutzmodell implementiert ist, welches der 
Landbevölkerung weitgehende Partizipation in Regelwerksdesign und Ressourcenallokation 
ermöglicht. Um eine gemeinsame Agenda von Naturschutz und ländlicher Entwicklung 
voranzubringen bedarf es einer ernsthaften Auseinandersetzung mit lokalen Bedürfnissen im 
ländlichen Raum, und ihrer Anerkennung als ein zentrales Element von CBC Initiativen. Lokale 
Ansprüche auf Land und Ressourcen müssen im Rahmen von CBC Initiativen anerkannt 
werden und Einnahmen aus diesen Initiativen müssen bei den Menschen ankommen. 
Durch die Analyse von WMAs als CBC-Maßnahmen in ländlichem Raum zeigt diese 
Dissertation einige Problemfelder auf, so etwa hinsichtlich von i) Eigentumsrechten und CBC 
Regelwerksdurchsetzung, die eine stete Herausforderung in den CBC Interventionen darstellen, 
sowie in Bezug auf ii) Naturschutz governance und deren Grenzen, eine Problematik welche 
ein recht neues Feld in den Sozial- und Umweltwissenschaften von Naturschutzmaßnahmen 
darstellt und sich darauf konzentriert, systematische Wege zu finden, Regierungsführung zu 
verstehen und ihre Grenzen darauf auszuloten, inwiefern und wie kollektive 
Umweltmaßnahmen umgesetzt werden können. Zusammenfassend bietet diese Dissertation 
einen logischen Rahmen für die Analyse von CBC Interventionen auf Landschaftsebene und 
bietet darüber hinaus Empfehlungen für Entwicklung und Forschung. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
This dissertation focuses on understanding the socioeconomic impacts of Community-Based 
Conservation (CBC) initiatives on rural livelihoods. For many decades, natural resource 
management policies and governing structures in sub-Saharan Africa, and many other countries 
of the global south have hindered rural people from accessing and benefiting from natural 
resources. The adoption and implementation of top-down fortress conservation regimes have 
incited land-use conflicts and exacerbated degradation of rural landscapes. The injustices and 
unequal sharing of benefits derived from natural resources intensify poverty, and the inherently 
political nature of natural resource governance brings challenges to the implementation of 
scientifically designed conservation interventions. 
Efforts to arrest landscape degradation and resolve land-use conflicts have led to the 
introduction of CBC, an integrated conservation and development initiatives. CBC key goal is 
to incentivise and motivate rural people to participate in the management and protection of the 
natural resources. The initiatives are widely acknowledged in international conventions and 
agreements as the best approach for enhancing conservation and fostering effort to alleviate 
rural poverty (see WCED, 1987; IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991; UN, 1992a; UN, 1992b; MDG, 
2000). CBC promise rural people improved access to the natural resource and benefit retention. 
On the other hand, CBC receives considerable support and funding from international 
conservation NGOs and donor agencies that view the initiatives as a win-win solution for 
conservation and development goals (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012; Arriagada et al., 2012; Suich, 
2013). 
However, the effectiveness of CBC in abating landscape degradation and alleviate rural poverty 
remains largely hypothetical (Arriagada et al., 2012). The reported environmental successes 
occur at the expense of rural livelihoods, and therefore, short-lived (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 
2002; Ribot, 2002; Goldman, 2009; Dougill et al., 2012; Pascual et al., 2014). Yet, CBC 
initiatives remain highly supported by conservationist and development experts (Suich, 2013), 
mainly based on their ‘romanticised’ premises of its ability and potential to achieve the dual 
goals of conservation and poverty alleviation (Vette et al., 2012:122). 
As an integrated conservation and development initiatives, CBC draws from both neoliberal 
thinking and theories of decentralisation. Based on the neoliberal school of thought, CBC 
assumes that landscape degradation is a result of market failure, and therefore, solutions could 
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be found in market expansion and resource commodification (Arriagada et al., 2012; Pattanayak 
et al., 2010). Following decentralisation approach, CBC assumes that, by devolving natural 
resource management powers to local communities, the initiatives would enhance equity and 
effectiveness in service delivery (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Blomley et al., 2008), foster 
enfranchisement and legitimise management actions, especially the enforcement of access rules 
at the local level (Wily, 2001; Brockington, 2007). Thus, together, neoliberal and 
decentralisation are believed by its proponents to foster conservation and improve rural 
livelihood outcomes. 
The reality is, however different, the commodification of rural landscapes introduces property 
rights, and hence, privatisation of common property (Igoe and Brockington, 2007; Benjaminsen 
and Bryceson, 2012). This, in turn, alienates access rights for the majority of rural people whose 
very survival is highly depended on access to natural resources. On the other hand, through 
decentralisation processes, the central governments tend to give rural communities mainly the 
mandate to police the resource base, but largely retain resource ownership, and powers to 
control benefit distribution and rule making (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
It is in the interest of this dissertation, therefore, to compare and contrast the policy premises 
and the reality on the ground by analysing the socioeconomic impacts of CBC initiatives on 
rural livelihoods. The research explores Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), a community-
based wildlife management initiative in Tanzania. Where the WMA policy promise 
participating communities improved access to resources, and better benefits retentions. By 
analysing the distribution of powers over the disposition of resources among different actors, 
and how WMAs address the divergent interests of a host of actors to prevent (or accelerate) the 
costs of conservation to be disproportionately borne by any particular group or individuals, the 
study identifies winners and losers in CBC interventions, and explain the conditions under 
which the two groups are produced. This dissertation shed light on how conservation and 
sustainable development ideals and intentions succeed or fail to materialise in rural 
environments. 
1.2. The Origin of CBC Initiatives 
Historically, fortress conservation regimes dominated conservation policies, laws, and practices 
in colonial and post-colonial Africa. The colonial and post-colonial governments viewed rural 
people and their land-based livelihoods strategies as destructive and unsustainable. Colonial 
rulers thus hinged on strict access rules and penalties to protect natural resources and the 
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landscapes against the rural inhabitant. However, rural landscapes were (and still are) primary 
source of agriculture and livestock production (Kaoneka and Solberg, 1997; Kajembe et al., 
2000; Quinn et al., 2003; Mwampamba, 2007; Fischer et al., 2010; Kijazi and Kant, 2011; 
Sonwa et al., 2012; Rutt, 2014), rural energy, and are an important component of culture and 
social identities for rural people (Kajembe et al., 2000). The imposed access restrictions 
marginalised and detached rural people from their primary source of livelihoods, curtailed their 
development opportunities and exacerbated land-use conflicts (Wilfred, 2010). 
In the 1970s, thoughts of, and interests to involve local communities in the management of 
natural resources started to emerge (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). International organisations and 
donor agencies’ ideology and policy began to shift toward facilitating rural people to have a 
major role in their own development. The target was to empower rural people to sustainably 
manage and use locally available natural resources for poverty alleviation (Ribot et al., 2010). 
In the mid 1980s debates for the empowerment of local communities to champion conservation 
and development become more common in local and international forums. The same period 
saw an increase in poverty levels and a decrease in funding for conservation activities in the 
countries of the global south (Ribot, 2004). This intensified the political pressure on 
governments on those countries to adopt conservation policies that promote decentralisation of 
natural resources management powers to local people and improve their capacity to retain and 
use the benefits accrue for community development. 
In the late 1990s, most sub-Saharan African countries initiated natural resource management 
reforms to introduce collaborative or participatory conservation approaches that sought to 
directly or indirectly offer development incentives for rural communities (Ribot et al., 2010). 
The reforms were popular referred to as decentralisation of natural resource management 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The key goals were to vest natural resource management powers to 
the jurisdiction of local bodies to enhance efficiency and equity. Decentralisation policies and 
programs assumed that, by bringing decision making processes closer to the local people (more 
so than outside decision-makers) who feel the costs and benefits of decisions on local matters, 
local people would take over management activities, and therefore, operations costs would be 
reduced (Ribot, 2001; Kajembe et al., 2002). The policies also assumed that, when local people 
are fully involved in the formulation of management rules, compliance would increase 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Principally, because local needs are better discerned, and feedback 
from affected people are efficiently received when governing bodies are closer to the local 
communities (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983; Chambers, 1994). 
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Following, decentralisation policies and programs that promise to empower and incentivise 
local people to manage natural resources spread across countries in sub-Saharan Africa (World 
Bank/WWF Alliance 2002; Sunderlin et al., 2008). The programs were given names that reflect 
community engagement and participation, such as Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM), Participatory Conservation, Community-Based Conservation (CBC) 
and Co-management (Ribot et al., 2010). But their core policy premise remained the same, 
which is to decentralise powers to manage the natural resource to the local communities and 
improve rural people’s access to the resources. 
Decentralisation, however, occurs in many forms and in a broad spectrum; as deconcentration 
– where powers to manage the resources are redistributed among different tiers within the 
centralised regime, or delegation – when the central government transfers powers to semi-
autonomous organizations which are not completely controlled by central government, but 
ultimately accountable to it, and lastly as devolution – where powers are vested in 
democratically elected local governing bodies which have significant autonomy and are 
accountable to the local population (Ribot, 2004). This means that the expected livelihoods 
outcomes depend on the form and the domain on which decentralisation of natural resources 
management occurs. As the form and the domain of the decentralisation approach determines 
where and to whom conservation benefits are directed to (actors), whose voice matters 
(powers), and how different actors interact (accountability mechanisms) (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999). 
1.3. Local Context 
Like most of the colonised African countries, the evolution of natural resource management in 
Tanzania dates back from the pre-colonial to the colonial and post-colonial era. To document 
this, the dissertation describes natural resource management goals and approaches in each 
period but limits its focus and scope on the case of wildlife management, which is the main 
focus of the investigation in this study. 
1.3.1.  Wildlife Management in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Tanzania 
Before the arrival of the Arabs and Europeans in Tanzania1, the then Tanganyika, wildlife 
existence was never threatened by the existing local use trends and practices. Human 
populations were low and local people used simple and less destructive techniques and 
                                                 
1 Tanganyika (mainland) and Zanzibar (islands of Pemba and Unguja) united in 1964 to form the United Republic 
of Tanzania. For convenience the name Tanzania will be applied throughout this dissertation 
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technologies to collect plants and hunt wildlife for food (Baldus, 2001). Taboos and totemic 
beliefs controlled methods and harvesting practices by restricting the exploitation of certain 
species and landscapes (Kjekshus, 1996; Baldus, 2001; Mkumbukwa, 2008). However, the 
arrival of the Arabs in the 1500s disrupted the traditional management regimes (Vernet, 2009). 
The Arabs introduced ivory and wildlife hides trade and forced local people and slaves to hunt 
wildlife in large quantities to satisfy the demand for African wildlife trophies in Asia and 
Europe (Vernet, 2009). This led to the first major anthropogenic driven shock to African 
wildlife, which resulted in a sharp decline in elephant population (Iliffe, 1979). 
In 1885, the Germans declared Tanzania a colony but left the Arabs to continue with wildlife 
business. In 1989, rinderpest, an infectious viral disease of even-toed ungulate species, killed 
about 90% of east African big ungulates (Gichohi et al., 1996). The epidemic pushed the 
German colonial rulers to issue hunting regulations in 1891 to provide space for wildlife 
populations to recover (Baldus, 2001; Majamba, 2001). Five years later, in 1896, the German 
colonial rulers introduced the first wildlife hunting legislation, which prohibited customary 
hunting practices (Baldus, 2001). This time, the main target was to secure future hunting 
opportunities for wealthy Europeans elites (Nelson, 2007). This was followed by a series of 
decrees enforcing access restrictions in 1898, 1900, 1903, 1905 and 1908, which were 
consolidated to a wildlife Act in 1911 that declared certain rural landscapes a wildlife protected 
territories (Koponen, 1994). The Act allowed rural people to establish settlements in the 
designated wildlife protected territories but withdrew their rights to harvest wildlife resources 
(Nelson, 2007). 
In 1916, the Royal Navy and British Indian infantry seized Tanzania territory from the 
Germans. Yet the British rulers continued to build on the Germans colonial legacy of exclusion 
and extortion. In 1921, they enacted an ordinance, which prohibited people from settling in 
some of the wildlife protected teritories. This led to the eviction of rural people from their 
customary lands in areas such as the now Selous Game Reserve (Kjeckshus, 1996). In 1923, 
the British rulers declared all lands in Tanzania a property of the British kingdom, vesting 
powers and control over land and natural resources under the British monarch (Shivji, 1998). 
In 1940, 1951 and 1959 British rulers introduced wildlife ordinances that paved the way for the 
establishment of National Parks. This brought stricter access rules and punishments for rural 
people to access wildlife resources (Neumann 1998; Nelson, 2007), but created more 
opportunities for colonial government to generate income through tourism in the pristine rural 
landscapes. 
6 
 
The above historical time line reveals how colonial conservation laws and practices 
systematically excluded and curtailed rural peoples’ rights to access wildlife and natural 
resources in their landscapes. Colonial rulers focus and interest were to secure future hunting 
opportunities for wealthy Europeans elites and generate income for the colonial government 
(Baldus, 2001). They viewed wildlife resources as a source of wonder and admiration with the 
potential to generate income to fund colonial governments and pay for its own conservation. 
1.3.2.  Wildlife Management in Post-colonial Tanzania 
In 1961, Tanzania attained her independence. Straightaway, the independent government 
initiated governance reforms to abolish colonial structures that coerced and extorted local 
citizens. Yet, pertaining to natural resources management, colonial laws remained intact until 
in the 1974 when the government enacted a new wildlife Act. The new legislation, however, 
reiterated the colonial thinking and practices by vesting rights and ownership of wildlife on the 
domain of the central government. Lekan (2011:1) for example, show that just after 
independence, Tanzanian leaders who fought against colonial laws and extortion practices, 
continued to view wildlife as a source of wonder and admiration for wealthy Europeans and a 
potential source of foreign income to fund government activities. They, therefore, reproduced 
policies and laws that disenfranchise and alienate rural peoples’ access rights. 
“I am personally not very interested in [wild] animals. I do not want to spend 
my holidays watching crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favour of 
their survival. I believe that after diamonds and sisal, wild animals will 
provide Tanganyika [Tanzania] with its greatest source of income. Thousands 
of Americans and Europeans have the strange urge to see these animals 
[Italics, the emphasis is mine]” (Julius K. Nyerere: the first president of 
independent Tanzania, 1961). 
The 1974 colonial-like wildlife Act remained into force until in the late 1990s when 
decentralisation of natural resources governance, pushed by global north conservation NGOs 
and development agencies, become a new paradigm in the countries of the global south. In 
Tanzania, natural resource governance reforms were first implemented in the forest sector, and 
later, in the wildlife sector. Wildlife management reforms lagged behind largely because of the 
government of Tanzania reluctance to give up control over the resources deemed important for 
the generation of the foreign income (Lekan, 2011; Fridolin, 2014). However, lack of funds and 
human resources needed for the government to effectively secure the protection of largely 
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mobile and scattered wild animals, together with the international pressure for poor countries 
to empower local communities to manage natural resources, led to the introduction of Wildlife 
Management Areas (WMAs). WMAs seek to incentivise local people to participate in the 
management of wildlife, albeit outside the core protected areas. 
Tanzanian WMAs policy is celebrated as a major reform in the protection of wildlife and 
dubbed as one off technical measure for resolving land-use conflicts associated with Park 
systems and poverty alleviation (see WWF, 2014, AWF, n.d.). Tanzanian WMAs policy was 
inspired by Community Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) of Zimbabwe, Administrative Management design (ADMADE) of Zambia, 
Sustainable Environmental Conservation through Utilisation of Natural Resources (SECURE) 
of Botswana and Community Wildlife Service (CWS) of Kenya. These community-based 
wildlife management programs gained a wide support from conservationists and 
developmentalist who view them as tools for empowering local people to manage wildlife 
resources and use the associated benefits for poverty alleviation. 
The WMAs key goal is to incentivise and promote rural people to participate in the protection 
of wildlife. As a CBC, it seeks to devolve wildlife resource management powers to the local 
communities and enhance their benefits retentions. WMAs’ policy goals are thought to be 
achieved through its potential to make conservation benefits outcompete other forms of land 
use (URT, 1998). For this to be achieved, a series of reforms of laws governing the management 
of land and wildlife were made. In 1999, the Village Land Act was enacted. This gave the 
village governments powers to manage and decide how village lands and the associated natural 
resources shall be used (URT, 1999). In 2002, a wildlife Act and the corresponding Wildlife 
Conservation (Tourism Hunting) Regulations of 2002 (URT, 2002) was enacted. In particular, 
these repealed the non-inclusive 1974 wildlife Act and provided opportunities for rural 
communities to participate in wildlife conservation in their village lands. 
In 2003, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) issued guidelines for 
establishing WMAs. The guidelines describe the ecological requirement e.g. presence of 
wildlife and the legal procedures to be followed by villages wishing to establish a WMA (URT, 
2003). Thereafter, the Environment Management Act of 2004 (URT, 2004) and the associated 
regulations of 2005, which described rights and responsibilities of different levels of 
government, NGOs and the private sector in the management of environments in Tanzania were 
enacted. Following, the central government assumed more of the role of a regulator of 
environmental issues. NGOs inclined more into facilitation roles, such as capacity building and 
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funding. The private sector is encouraged to directly invest in environmental related businesses, 
e.g. in ecotourism. In 2007, 2009 and 2012 the wildlife policy, Act, and Regulations, 
respectively, were once again amended (URT, 2007; 2009; 2012). The amendments were 
ostensibly meant to foster the protection of wildlife and improve rural peoples’ capacity to 
capture and retain benefits derived from wildlife conservation. 
Since the WMAs policy was adopted in 1998, 19 fully operational WMAs have been gazetted 
and 19 more are underway. The fully operational WMAs cover about 2,743,000 hectares 
corresponding to about 3% of the country’s land and draw the participation of about 150 
villages (WWF, 2014). In total, the 38 would cover about 7% of the country’s land. WMAs 
proliferation, however, continues without empirical evidence to justify their effectiveness on 
rural peoples’ livelihoods and resource sustainability (Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Benjaminsen 
et al., 2013). Besides, many scholars have shown WMA to be top-down and inflexible 
conservation regimes (Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Baha and Chachage, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007; 
Schroeder, 2008; Sachedina and Nelson, 2010; Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Sachedina, 
2011; Benjaminsen et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, transnational conservation NGOs and environmental agencies that fund these 
CBC initiatives continue to view rural people as irresponsible and individuals who lack 
conservation motives (Neumann, 2001; Brockington, 2005). As a result, CBC initiatives remain 
focused on eliminating rural people from land targeted for conservation (Nelson, 2012). Thus, 
in spite of a series of legal and policy reforms in Tanzania, land and wildlife ownership remain 
exclusively centralised. The Village land Act No 5: URT, 1999, section 3 (1) b) for instance 
asserts that “all land in Tanzania is public land vested in the president as a trustee on behalf of 
all citizens”. This means the president of Tanzania holds discretional powers to allocate land 
and change land use. The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations of 
2012 section 26 (h) also centralise to the MNRT powers to approve both consumptive and non-
consumptive use of wildlife resources (see URT, 2012). 
This brings this dissertation to a host of questions about the effectiveness of CBC as an 
integrated conservation and development initiatives. In this particular case, interrogating the 
effectiveness of WMAs to empower and incentivise rural people to participate in wildlife 
protection. The main questions are: what type of powers has been transferred through WMAs 
processes and to whom? Who benefits from WMAs implementation practices and how? 
Through which accountability mechanisms do WMA actors interact? 
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1.4. Research Objective 
In the preceding sections of this introduction, a number of concepts pertaining to the 
relationship between changes in the environmental systems and power were used to sketch the 
empirical entry points for understanding the processes and outcomes of CBC initiatives on rural 
livelihoods. These concepts largely fall under the domain of political ecology, which focuses 
on the interactions between a host of actors with divergent interests, and their environments 
(Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Forsyth, 2008). The introduction shows a unique precedence and 
appearance of the interactions between various actors and environments in Tanzania i.e. actors, 
powers and accountability mechanisms pertaining to access to and use of natural resources 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
In the pre-colonial period, the interactions were regulated through traditional systems using 
taboos and totemic beliefs, but largely a de facto open access, which benefited all actors. In the 
colonial and postcolonial periods, centralised governing structures took over powers to manage 
natural resources. Coercive mechanisms were used to restrict customary use rights, and benefits 
were concentrated to the few elites and the state. Recently, Tanzania has introduced WMAs, 
which seek to abate the negative impacts of centralised regimes. The initiative is touted to roll 
back resource management powers to local people and enhance their capacity to retain 
conservation benefits and use them for community development. 
It is in this light, therefore, and the increasing need to find better, less coercive, less exploitative, 
and more sustainable ways of addressing conservation and development challenges, this 
dissertation sought to investigate the socio-economic impacts of community-based 
conservation initiatives on rural livelihoods. The study explores Burunge WMA, in Babati 
district, Northern Tanzania, as a case study. 
To achieve the main objective of this study, the following specific objectives were investigated: 
1. Examine to what extent local communities in WMAs villages participate in managing 
wildlife and natural resources. 
2. Understand how the implementation of WMAs changed the ways in which rural people 
access wildlife and natural resources. 
3. Determine how access to resources and livelihoods outcomes varies across different 
types of individuals, households, and groups. 
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The three specific objectives were set in such a way that, the study would achieve the three core 
steps in the analyses of impacts of a given policy, i.e. the contextualisation, diagnosis, and effect 
analysis (Robert and Zeckhauser, 2011; Campbell and Harper, 2012). The first specific 
objective was designated to contextualise WMAs settings and its implementation procedures. 
Specifically, to identify forms and nature of WMAs processes such as actors, formal and 
informal structures, power distribution, and participation and representation in decision-making 
processes. 
The second specific objective was designated to diagnose WMAs implementation, i.e. to 
examine how and why WMAs implementation continues the way it is. It was set to investigate 
how WMAs’ rules affect rural peoples’ access to land and natural resources, focusing on, 
among other things, what has changed and how? How do local people react to the changes 
(attitudes and compliance)? What products or services were (not) available are now (not) 
available? What individual or community losses/benefits are associated with the changes? What 
procedures did local people follow to access resources before WMAs and how has it changed? 
and how do local people view the changes? 
The third specific objective was designated to analyse the effect of WMAs implementation on 
rural livelihoods. The focus was to understand natural resources use histories and their influence 
on social relations and economic impact at households and village level. In particular, to 
distinguish the social and psychological impacts of WMAs implementation from the economic 
and well-being impacts on the participating communities. 
The outcomes reveal issues of WMAs rule enforcement efficacy and locally perceived 
legitimacy, equity (and lack of), patronage and accountability. These are major, and more 
common concerns in different forms of collaborative and decentralised natural resources 
management approaches. 
1.5. Dissertation Outline 
The remainder of the dissertation is organised as follows: Section 2 present theoretical analyses, 
section 3 describes the research design i.e. study site and data collection methods. Section 4 is 
designated for the three research papers that constitute the major results of this dissertation. 
Section 5 provides the synthesis and conclusions emerging from the three research papers. 
 
11 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1. Conservation in human-dominated landscapes 
Landscapes habited by humans host a diverse number of biological resources and provide a 
wide range of environmental and cultural benefits to people (Nelson et al., 2009). The 
landscapes are however under enormous pressure from rapid population growth and 
anthropogenic activities which modify the environments. The modification leads to habitats 
fragmentation and degradation (DeFries et al., 2010), making protected areas and biodiversity 
hot spots islands in a matrix of human-dominated landscapes (Nyhus and Tilson, 2004). In 
efforts to abate this situation, conservationists are increasingly targeting private lands (Rissman 
et al., 2007), agricultural lands (Fischer et al., 2006; Bhagwat et al., 2008) and communal spaces 
for biodiversity conservation (Moilanen et al., 2014). 
Restoration and prevention of landscapes degradation in areas dominated by human 
populations, however, requires a deeper understanding of the socioeconomic and ecological 
processes (Bengtsson, et al., 2003; Lamb, 2005). In particular, the historical and potential 
human-environment interactions as advocated in political ecology (see Bryant and Bailey, 
1997; Forsyth, 2008). Although the use of traditional and local knowledge and the advanced 
modeling technologies can facilitate the development of plausible conservation interventions 
that would ensure a sustainable supply of environmental goods and services i.e. achieve both 
conservation and development goals (Marzluff and Ewing, 2001). Yet, crucial information 
about actors’ divergent interests and powers, which is also contextual and place specific, that 
influence use and control of resources (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999) are currently accounting less 
in the designing of conservation interventions. As result, most conservation interventions 
continue to exclude people from the ecosystems and landscapes they have traditionally 
occupied and depended on. 
Most conservation interventions continue to view humans as ‘aliens’ to their landscapes and 
therefore, focuses on preventing them from disturbing the areas targeted for conservation 
(Bengtsson, et al., 2003). The interventions divide human-dominated landscapes into protected 
zones and general or production zones. Traditional land-based livelihoods activities such as 
agriculture and livestock grazing are prohibited in areas categorised as protected zones. 
Whereas in production zones, access is only permitted to limited types of resources. The 
categorisation of land use zones and the accompanying restrictions are justified based on the 
assertion that, the intensity and frequency of anthropogenic disturbances might have large scale, 
and irreversible ecological and socioeconomic consequences (Dupouey et al., 2002). 
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However, local people are part of ecosystems and the disturbances they cause are part of the 
ecosystem dynamics (Bengtsson, et al., 2003). Therefore, it is impractical and unrealistic to 
prevent all forms of anthropogenic nuisances in human-dominated landscapes. Besides, review 
of conservation interventions in human-dominated landscapes has demonstrated that increase 
in access restrictions goes hand in hand with an increase in land use conflicts between 
conservation and surrounding populations (Daily et al., 2001; Bennett, 2003; Igoe and 
Croucher, 2007; DeFries et al., 2010). This, consequently, makes the achieved environmental 
success (if any) short lived. 
Therefore, conservationists and developmentalist need to device a consensus approach that 
would simultaneously address conservation and development challenges. Currently, the 
consensus seems to have landed on CBC interventions. Which focuses on decentralising 
resource management powers to local people and improve their capacity to benefit from locally 
available natural resources. Although, there are some critics on whether the primary objective 
of CBC interventions is to really ameliorate the negative impacts of top-down conservation 
regimes on local communities. Yet the approach is widely accepted and supported by 
international conservation and development agencies alike (see WCED, 1987; 
IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991). 
WMAs are part of this global phenomenon of seeking biodiversity refuge on human dominated 
landscapes. WMAs seek to reconnect a matrix of protected areas and biodiversity hot spots to 
ensure their ecological integrity and sustainability (Sachedina, 2008). To garner the support of 
local communities in an effort to restore and prevent further degradation and fragmentation of 
wildlife habitats, WMAs promises a wide range of socioeconomic incentives to participating 
communities. It is in the interest of this dissertation threfore, to establish whether WMAs meet 
its intended conservation and livelihoods goals i.e. compare and contrast the policy promise 
and implementation realities, and identify potential areas for policy and practice improvement. 
2.2. Conceptual framework 
WMAs policy design and implementation targets conservation on human-dominated 
landscapes. It operates on the assumption that local people and the state will share powers, 
responsibilities, and benefits associated with the conservation activities. Thus, although WMAs 
are referred to as community-based wildlife conservation, its arrangements fit well in the 
Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004:878) co-management conceptual framework, which assert that, 
“co-management is the distribution of rights and responsibilities pertaining to a particular 
resource”, mainly, between local users and the state (Berkes et al., 1991). Besides, it is 
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increasingly becoming difficult for academic papers to draw a clear line of distinction between 
CBC and co-management. Because both approaches involve some degree of community 
participation and distribution of rights and responsibilities between communities and the state 
(Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004). This dissertation, therefore, adopts Plummer and Fitzgibbon 
(2004) co-management conceptual framework (Figure 1), as its organisational tool to structure 
the research problem and identify its various components for investigation. The thesis also 
borrows from Agrawal and Ribot (1999), actors, powers, and accountability framework to 
analyse the distribution of real powers among different actors in a co-management arrangement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Co-management conceptual framework (modified from Plummer and 
Fitzgibbon, 2004) 
Figure 1 simulates the ideal situation and conditions in areas where powers to manage natural 
resources are shared between local communities and the state. The framework shows the 
context, components and linking mechanisms that have the potential to influence conservation 
and livelihood outcomes. The context presents the resource base (land and natural resources) 
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and a host of actors with their divergent interests and behaviour. Different actors, such as state, 
NGOs, the private sector, and local users often have competing claims of use rights and 
interests. Thus, to understand how WMAs distributes conservation costs and benefits among 
actors with divergent interests and use rights claims, this dissertation employed Agrawal and 
Ribot (1999), actors, powers, and accountability framework to analyse whether the costs of 
conservation are not disproportionately borne by any particular group or individuals. 
Components and linking mechanisms present prevailing situation and conditions that could 
determine conservation intervention success or failure. The preconditions, which include real 
or imagined crisis, local user’s willingness to participate, forums for participation, actors’ 
legally or mandated incentives and power distribution, provide useful information about 
existing conditions, and threfore, the opportunity for improvement. Idenfication of how and 
who defines a real or imagined crisis, for example, reveals who have real power to make 
decisions. As an actor(s) who have power and voice to define real or imagined problems are 
more likely to have the power to define interventions’ goals and rules, such as mandated 
benefits and access restrictions (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). In turn, this affects other actors 
willingness to participate. 
The characteristics block presents potential solutions or attributes that could remedy or facilitate 
alignment of actors’ competing interests to a common goal. It offers a number of mechanisms 
through which actors’ perception can be shaped to have shared actions and commitments. 
Pluralism for instance, which is the need to think and act in an inclusive manner, addresses the 
necessity to consider the diverse interests as expressed by different groups and individual actors. 
Such as subsistence needs and social identities for local people, and restoration and 
reconstruction of ecological ecosystems (ecological memory) for conservationist and state 
actors. Social learning, on the other hand, is a process of continuous communication and 
negotiations between and among actors. It provides opportunities for actors to identify shared 
interest and align their goals and commitment. 
The framework also presents a linking mechanism as an inter-organisational structure (in the 
case of this dissertation, the WMA initiatives). It links the attributes in the precondition and the 
potential solutions to produce desired outcomes, such as improved conservation efficiency, 
equity in benefit distribution, the legitimisation of action at the local level and improved 
livelihoods. The linking mechanisms, therefore, is a collection of formal and informal 
institutions that mediate the interaction and relationships between individuals, groups of actors, 
communities and their physical and social environment. 
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Issues pertaining to actors’ interactions and practice of power are, however, multidimensional, 
interlinked and unpredictable (Cleaver and Koning, 2015). Thus, although the co-management 
framework seems to present a straightforward causal - intervention - outcomes, a successful 
hypothetical scenario of governing the socioecological environments (Figure 2). The reality is 
complex and multifaceted (Agrawal and Waylen, n.d.; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Cleaver and 
Koning, 2015). Actors’ interests might change following changes in technology, knowledge, 
and market among many other socioeconomic aspects. Advancement in technology and 
knowledge, for example, remove old barriers and increase interaction between actors and their 
environments (and vice versa). What happens at the point of interface, therefore, determine the 
outcomes. This might in turn change power symmetry, in which real powers to command action 
might be reinforced or shift from one actor to another - the issues around dependence and 
bricolage. 
 
Figure 2: A simplified representation of governance and social-ecological outcomes 
(source: Agrawal and Waylen, n.d.) 
By situating WMAs interventions in the co-management framework and analysing the 
distribution of real powers to influence the flow of benefits through Agrawal and Ribot (1999) 
actors, powers and accountability lenses, this dissertation acquires a greater advantage to unveil 
the complexity of institutions involved in day-to-day WMAs management and the power 
relations that are involved (Cleaver and Koning, 2015). Precisely, in the analyses of i) real 
powers that influence changes between formal institutions that are based on western science 
and rules which seek to advance conservation agenda, ii) informal institutions that focus on 
locally evolved traditions and customary experiences, and iii) the local, regional and state 
political formation that seek to maintain political influence and power. 
Following, this dissertation describes the main concepts and terminologies used to structure the 
main research problem, and explain how they are used to achieve the overarching research 
objective. 
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2.2.1.  Access 
According to Ribot and Peluso (2003:153), “access is the ability to derive benefits from things”. 
Access to natural resources is regulated through property rights rooted in customary and/or 
formal state-led legal systems and on the structural and relational mechanisms, such as capital, 
knowledge and skills, technology, markets, labour opportunities and social identity and 
relations (Sen, 1997; Bebbington, 1999; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Barret et. al 2006). State-led 
policies and laws, for instance, regulate access rights (Shivji and Kapinga, 1998; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2005; Odeny, 2013) and influence the flow of capital and technologies used to exploit 
the natural resource (AU, 2010; Latina et al., 2011; Prieger, 2013). This makes the state a key 
player in facilitating an equitable and sustainable use of natural resources. 
Local peoples’ interests to access natural resources are driven by subsistence and/or 
development needs (livelihoods). But at the same time, interests to secure natural resources for 
future generation and science (conservation) necessitate putting in place some measures to 
control or limit resource exploitation. Thus, despite the complementary nature of conservation 
and livelihoods, based on actors’ interests and priorities, the real or imagined crisis pertaining 
to a particular resource may differ. Subsistence local users are more likely to always demand 
increased access to maintain or sustain their livelihoods. While conservationists might focus on 
putting more access restrictions to allow biodiversity recovery and/or reconstruct ecosystems. 
The divergent actors’ interests and use claims bring challenges in defining problems and finding 
viable conservation solutions. This is because the framing of real or imagined problems justifies 
the rules and methods to protect the resources. However, as argued in preceding sections, state 
and transnational conservational NGOs who design and fund conservation policies and 
programs view rural people land-based livelihoods strategies as destructive and unsustainable. 
Therefore, they tend to introduce conservation measures that target to restrict local peoples’ 
access to land and natural resources or completely remove them from their customary 
landscapes. However, in attempts to navigate these restrictive measures, rural people whose 
survival depends on access to natural resources would more likely resort to illicit access 
mechanisms to sustain their lives. Such illicit access mechanisms might include civil 
disobedience, social and political pressure, corruption and theft (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The 
dissertation, therefore, applies the concepts of access mechanisms as described in access theory 
by Ribot and Peluso (2003) to assess benefits flows and determine actors who win or lose in 
WMAs processes. The investigation dwells on analysing both the licit or mandated access 
mechanisms and the illicit or extra-legal access mechanisms, which encompasses all means by 
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which an individual or a group of actors employ to navigate access restrictions and acquire 
benefits. 
2.2.2.  Actors 
Actors are individuals, groups, formal or informal institutions who have a direct or indirect 
stake in a resource. Different actors are associated with different functions, powers and 
accountability relations. Their interests, claims, and relations depend on their historical 
background, socioeconomic status, political affiliation and power they hold. This may be based 
on ideology, wealth, heredity, elections, appointments or other means (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999). Actors may also be differentiated from each other by their beliefs, objectives, internal 
structure of their organization, membership, funding sources and the laws to which they are 
subject (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The identification of actors, the types of powers they hold 
and how they gain or lose power, therefore, facilitate the understanding of who controls access 
to WMA resources and how. The analysis of actors unveils who are the losers or winners in the 
WMA processes. 
2.2.3.  Powers 
Power is an important component because the theory predicts that actor’ commitments, and 
conservation and livelihoods outcomes are largely affected by the types of powers ceded to 
each of them (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Ostrom and Schlager (1996) and Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999) asserts that local peoples’ participation is meaningful when they have power to i) create 
rules or modify old ones, ii) make decisions on how a particular resource shall be used, iii) 
implement and ensure compliance with new or altered rules, and iv) arbitrate disputes arising 
from management process or effort to create rules and ensure compliance. Actors may gain 
power through appointments or employment, elections, NGOs functions, customary leadership, 
private investments and/or corporate bodies (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Power is however 
effective only when actors are well equipped with the tools to make informed decisions and 
have enough financial resources to enforce the rules (Smoke, 2003). 
This study therefore, build on previous work and experiences on CBC interventions to analyse 
the socioeconomic and political factors, which influence power symmetries in access to natural 
resources. The study unveil the information about who hold real powers to allocate resources, 
and what influences the changes in real powers to influence the flow of WMA benefits in CBC 
interventions. 
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2.2.4.  Accountability 
Accountability is concerned with power relations within and between actors i.e. to whom a 
WMA actor answer to? The theory predicts that intended outcomes would be realised when 
governing bodies and actors who represent their communities are downward accountable to 
their constituency (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Smoke, 2003; Ribot, 2004). The mechanisms of 
accountability vary from transparency and participatory techniques to legal regress, to social 
control and civil disobedience (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Each accountability mechanism 
produces different outcomes, and the sustainability of the outcomes depends on how the 
approach was employed to influence the changes. 
Participatory approaches are more likely to induce consistence in resources management, 
whereas civil disobedience divides actors into factions of us versus them. The latter might 
heighten division in areas where different groups within a large community have a strong belief 
in the ethnic or religious-based form of livelihoods. Therefore, the analysis of accountability 
mechanisms in WMAs facilitates the understanding of how different individuals or groups of 
actors employ different techniques to circumvent or ensure other actors abide to access rules 
for personal or communal gain. 
2.2.5.  Participation 
Participation matter because, when all actors are fully and willingly involved in decision-
making processes, the social costs of the changes and adjustments are reduced (Rondinelli and 
Cheema, 1983; Smoke, 2003; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2004). Meaningful participation 
makes people to have a feeling of being the driver of the change (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). It 
improves their responsiveness and willingness to accept the change they have pioneered. This 
means participation could be a means and an end (Cornwall, 2008). As a means, participation 
gives each actor an opportunity to take part in defining a resource problem and devise a viable 
and consensus solution. As an end, it could mean conservation and livelihoods success when 
targeted actors’ willingness to participate is enhanced, or failure when they refuse to abide by 
the rules. 
Intended outcomes are sustainable when participation is employed as a means to impact a sense 
of project ownership to the participating community by transforming their perceptions and 
practices through awareness and dialogue (Menocal and Sharma, 2008; Swindler and Watkins, 
2009; NORAD, 2013). Yet, the concept of ownership is complex and ambiguous. Depending 
on participant’s interests, a sense of ownership could mean either actors’ commitments to abide 
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by the rules despite the social and economic cost they endure or actors’ control over the 
resources and other actors’ interests (NORAD, 2013). 
Additionally, NORAD (2013: 17), argues that “issues around participation, power and gender 
relations, and inclusion are intangible and often difficult to define precisely or measure 
objectively or unambiguously.” Thus, this dissertation employed case study approach (see 
Flyvbjerg, 2006) and ethnographic methods (see Mosse, 2007; Davis, 2011), which have the 
potential to facilitate collection of sensitive and very personal information about participation 
and use and abuse of power (Nuno and John, 2015; Thomas et al., 2015) to uncover issues of 
participation in WMAs. 
2.2.6.  Representation 
Representation is the communication of perceived interests, meanings, knowledge, practices 
and shared reality and motives by an individual or a group, given authority by others or own 
motives to do so on their behalf (Castiglione and Warren, 2006; Drzyek and Niemeyer, 2008; 
Bengtsson and Wass, 2011). From this broad meaning of representation, however, it does not 
mean that representation is the absence of mass or popular participation (Castiglione and 
Warren, 2006) or the absolute power of representatives to make decisions (Arnstein, 1969). 
Rather, this dissertation assumes that representation is an avenue for a selected group of actors 
to consult, dialogue, and debate about issues tabled for decision making on behalf of the wider 
interests of actors being represented. This is because representatives of a large group of actors 
or a community would not have the opportunity to consult the entire population they represent 
for each and every matter placed in front of them for decision making (Warren, 2001). 
Therefore, the meaningful and effective representation can be reflected and measured based on 
how representatives communicate and defend the interests of the groups they represent, and on 
the level of trust between representatives and their constituencies (Castiglione and Warren, 
2006). 
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3. Research design 
This chapter presents the research design, starting with the worldview. This is followed by a 
description of the case study area, data collection methods, and analysis. 
3.1.  Worldview 
The philosophical base of this dissertation is drawn on the epistemology of interpretivism as 
well as reflective. According to Ruth (2014), individuals’ perceptions and actions are always 
influenced by and are under constant renegotiation with the diverse and dynamic perceptions 
and actions of other social entities. This means individuals always maintain a subjective 
meaning of their socioeconomic and physical environments. Therefore, the dissertation 
employs a subjective epistemology. It inductively constructs the multiple realities and 
experiences (Pearce, 2015) on how policy mediates relationships between people and natural 
resources (Cleaver and Koning, 2015). Moreover, because the main target is to explore and 
discover different realties as experienced by different groups of people and individuals. The 
study applies a case study approach that provides an opportunity for a research to produce an 
effective exemplar for policy review and re-adjustment (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
3.2.  Case Study Area 
3.2.1.  Geographical location and demographics 
The research for this study was conducted in Burunge WMA, Babati district in northern 
Tanzania (Figure 3). Burunge WMA is about 190 km from Kilimanjaro international airport, 
the main entry point for foreign tourists visiting the northern tourism circuit in Tanzania. 
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Figure 3: Burunge WMA, member villages and surrounding National Parks and a 
wildlife ranch (Modified from WWF, 2014) 
Burunge WMA was established in 2003, following the lobbying and campaigns conducted by 
African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), MNRT and district officials from early 1999 (Igoe and 
Brockington, 1999). The WMA was formally gazetted in 2006, covering a total of 24,319 
hectares corresponding to 31 percent of the total land in the member villages (Table 1). Initially 
it comprised five villages with a total population of around 22,000 individuals (URT, 2002). 
Between 2004 and 2009, the original five villages split into ten villages (Table 1), and the 
population increased to around 34,000 in 2012 (URT, 2012). Burunge villages are accessible 
by all-weather roads except for Manyara village. Primary schools and mobile phone networks 
are present in each village and health centres are easily accessible. In 2015 efforts to connect 
Burunge villages to the national electrical grid was launched. However, access to clean tap 
water remains a challenge to all villages. 
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Table 1: Burunge WMA villages and their individual land contribution to the WMA 
Ward Initial village  Year 
seceded 
Villages after 
secession 
Total village 
land before 
secession 
(Hectares) 
Area set 
aside for 
WMA 
(Hectares) 
Percentage 
Nkaiti Minjingu  Minjingu 23,860 3,747 16 
  2005 Olasiti    
  2009 Kakoi       
  Vilima Vitatu   Vilima Vitatu 19,800 12,830 65 
Mwada Mwada  Mwada 10,824 3,039 28 
  2004 Ngolei     
  Sangaiwe   Sangaiwe 9,200 2,445 27 
Magara Magara  Magara 15,808 2,258 14 
  2005 Maweni    
    2005 Manyara       
Total 79,492 24,319 31 
Source: Burunge WMA office notice board in 2014 
Ethnically, Burunge villages are dominated by Mbugwe, Arusha, Maasai, Barbaig, Iraqw, 
Nyaturu and Nyiramba. Other minority ethnic groups include Safwa, Hehe, Bena, Manda, and 
Nyakyusa from the southern part of Tanzania, Jaluo and Kisii from Kenya and Rundi from 
Burundi. These migrated to Burunge in search for agricultural land and pasture for livestock. 
Farmland and livestock are the most important household assets and pillars of the Burunge 
economy. Mbugwe, Iraqw, Nyaturu, and Nyiramba ethnic groups largely depend on agriculture 
for their livelihoods. They cultivate maize, finger millet, sorghum, and beans, mainly for food, 
and rice, sunflower, onions, garlic, watermelon, sesame and cotton as cash crops. Livestock 
keeping is a primary source of livelihoods for Maasai, Arusha, and Barbaigs. Traditionally, 
these ethnic groups keep large numbers of cattle to support their livelihoods and as a source of 
pride. Other ethnic groups also keep few herds of cattle to generate income in case of livelihood 
shocks. 
Burunge villages are squeezed in a network of protected areas (Figure 3). The villages are 
located within the Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem (TME), covering Tarangire National Park 
(gazetted in 1970), Lake Manyara National Park (gazetted in 1960), Manyara ranch (operated 
by AWF since 2000) and a newly established Randileni WMA (gazetted in 2012, to replace the 
Lolkisale Game Controlled Area). Conservationists view Burunge villages as important 
landscapes for sustaining the ecology of TME ecosystem. Securing village lands for 
conservation will ensure free migration of wildlife within a network of protected areas in the 
region (Goldman, 2009; Kikoti, 2009). On the other hand, agriculture and livestock keeping in 
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Burunge villages is vulnerable to wildlife damages, yet Burunge WMA is located in an area 
with lots of tourism activities and wildlife. The latter make up ideal conditions for Burunge 
villages to realize WMAs promises through tourism related businesses. 
WMA facilitators describe Burunge WMA as the best example of community-based wildlife 
management in Tanzania (AWF, n.d.; WWF, 2014), yet lots of conflicts exist. Its establishment 
was controversial, and today, ten years later, one of its original five member villages still refuses 
to acknowledge its legality. In other member villages, people wish to abandon the WMA 
altogether. This raises questions as to the viability and effectiveness of WMAs in motivating 
and providing incentives for local people to participate in wildlife management. Conflicting 
information about realities as offered by different actors makes Burunge WMA an interesting 
case for this study. Questions such as how is it possible that a village refuses to be a member of 
a voluntary and participatory wildlife management scheme, yet remains a member? Why do 
residents in some member villages wish to abandon the WMA, when it is ideally placed to 
generate revenues? Why should there be so many conflicts, infringements, and violations of 
rules in the best WMA? Became an important entry point for an empirical investigation to 
understand the impacts of WMA policy on rural livelihoods. 
3.2.2.  Burunge villages’ governments and political establishment 
The original five villages that initially established Burunge WMA originated from ‘Ujamaa’ 
villages. Ujamaa is a Swahili word equivalent to socialism. In the late 1960s, the president of 
the united republic of Tanzania, (then under single political party) issued a presidential decree 
to establish resettlement schemes in all parts of rural Tanzania. This was followed by Ujamaa 
villages scheme in the early 1970s. The key goal of Ujamaa villages was to consolidate rural 
population in areas where the state would provide communal services such as public schools, 
health facilities, and agricultural extension services. Ujamaa villages intended to improve 
efficiency in social service delivery and accelerate socioeconomic development. Following, in 
early to mid-1970s, rural people who were scattered in remote areas of Tanzania were ordered 
to move voluntarily to new centres identified by state officials. Yet in reality, in most cases, 
they were forced and coerced (Davis, 2011). However, a few years later, corruption and misuse 
of power at local levels led to the collapse of Ujamaa villages. Ujamaa village ideology and 
practices were (and are still) criticised for their devastating effects on societies and 
environments (Mashalla, 1988; Davis, 2011). Yet, the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements under which Burunge villages and most other villages in rural Tanzania operate 
are largely influenced by Ujamaa settings. 
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In 1982, the Tanzanian government initiated decentralisation reforms to improve local 
governance. The reforms sought to vest powers to govern rural people in the jurisdiction of 
elected local bodies. The same year, the Local Government Act and Local Government Finance 
Act were enacted. These provide legal opportunities for residents to elect village councillors 
and a chairperson from within the village population to govern village resources and manage 
finances (URT, 1982a; 1982b). The Local Government Act also gives power to the district 
executive officers to appoint Village Executive Officers (VEOs) (URT, 1982a). VEOs serve as 
chief executive officers of village councils (URT, 1982a). This reform implies that Burunge 
villages’ governments are politically and economically responsible to their citizens. Politically, 
Burunge village governments being close to the local people are expected to provide 
opportunities for residents to have more say in matters that affect them directly. Specifically, 
providing forums for residents to decide on how best they shall be governed. Economically, the 
village governments are obliged to facilitate residents to manage and access benefits derived 
from their village lands and the associated natural resources. 
In 1999, the Village Land Act No. 5 gave powers to village governments to negotiate and enter 
into contracts with private investors and/or organisations to invest in village lands (URT, 1999). 
This reinforced the power of village governments in the control and management of village 
lands. Local governance reforms also provide avenues for democratic accountability. Elected 
village representatives can be held accountable for their actions through elections conducted 
after every five years or through village general assemblies held at least four times a year (i.e. 
after every three months). In general elections, residents can vote to elect individuals who they 
believe would govern them responsibly. The village general assemblies2 have the mandate to 
terminate elected representatives’ term of office. However, the decision to terminate 
representatives’ term of office must be approved by the district executive officer. On the other 
hand, individuals aspiring for a political position to represent their communities e.g. as a village 
chairperson must seek affiliation and endorsement of a political party. This implies that once 
elected, the individuals would have the responsibility and obligation to serve the political 
interests of their political parties and the livelihoods interests of their constituencies. 
3.2.3. Burunge WMA structure 
WMAs are managed by a Community-Based Organisation (CBO), a registered civil 
organisation. Once the WMA is gazetted, the CBO becomes an Authorised Association (AA) 
                                                 
2 The general assembly comprise residents aged 18 years and above, who must have sound mind. 
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with powers to manage the WMA resources. It assumes the village governments’ powers to 
negotiate contracts, redistribute benefits, resolve conflicts and allocate user rights on parts of 
village lands that have been designated as WMA. However, the village governments remain 
with powers to sanction offenders according to the village by-laws. The CBO governance 
structure includes the CBO general assembly with a board of trustees attached, executive 
committee and the CBO secretariat (Figure 4). 
CBO general assembly 
 
Board of trustees   
     
     
Executive committee   
     
     
CBO secretariate   
 
Figure 4: CBO structure (source: Burunge-GMP, 2010) 
The CBO general assembly is the highest body of decision making. It comprises three CBO 
representatives and one member of the board of trustees from each of the member villages. 
Other members include village officials (village chairpersons and village executive officers), 
ward officials (ward executive officers and ward councilors), divisional secretary. The district 
office is represented by district game officer, district land officer, district cooperative officer 
and the district legal officer. District officials’ main task is to provide technical advice to the 
general assembly. Burunge CBO general assembly has a total of 66 members and meets, at 
least, three times per year. The assembly receives and deliberates on issues raised by village 
councils and village assemblies. It elects 10 people among the CBO village representatives to 
form an executive committee and employs staff and experts whenever deemed necessary. 
The executive committee is responsible for a day-to-day management of the CBO. This includes 
negotiating investment contracts, collection of revenues (until 2012 when it was recentralised 
again), distribution of incomes to member villages and lead efforts to prevent and resolve 
conflicts. The CBO secretariat is an administrative unit responsible for maintaining records and 
management of the CBO office. The secretariat is made up of the CBO secretary, one treasurer, 
one office secretary and one office attendant. The CBO also employs 30 (during the course of 
this study) Village Game Scouts (VGS). They are responsible for patrolling and enforcing 
WMA rules, as well as assisting residents in dealing with wildlife nuisances. 
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The CBO has managerial and advisory relations with state institutions, NGOs, and the private 
sector. State institutions, such as the Wildlife Division have direct supervisory powers over the 
CBO. This distant state institution has sole powers to decide how the CBO and state shall share 
WMA income, and approve resource management plans. Contrarily, institutions that are close 
to local people, such as the village assemblies have only advisory and consultative relations 
(Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: CBO relations with state institutions, NGOs and private sector (Source: 
modified from WWF, 2014 Burunge-GMP, 2010) 
 
3.3. Research methods 
The research for this dissertation follows Pearce (2015) iterative approach for social inquiry. 
The axes of inquiry and methods of data collection and analysis were continuously revised to 
suit the conditions in the local context and unfolding situations. Thus, although the initial 
research design focus was to quantitatively analyse the distribution of costs and benefits of CBC 
interventions. The unfolding local situation necessitated the focus shift toward qualitative 
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analysis. The first six months of field work revealed complex social political and economic 
realities pertaining to WMA policy implementation. This impelled the shift of study practical 
position (line of inquiry and methods) from quantitative to largely ethnographic. A review of 
official documents revealed that there are no direct financial benefits directed to the household 
level. A scoping exercise also indicated that diverse groups of actors hold a subjective meaning 
of costs and benefits of conservation. This means there is no one objective truth that can be 
easily quantified. It was important therefore to dwell on understanding the symbolic forms 
through which, the meanings are experienced and expressed in WMA processes. 
Besides, information pertaining to benefits flows and illegal activities are sensitive and 
personal. Further, the anti-poaching campaign ordered by the President of Tanzania in October 
2013 (while the study was in its initial stages of data collection), raised suspicion of rural people 
toward ‘strangers’ who investigates about wildlife conservation and use. The president ordered 
security forces (Policy and Military personnel) to conduct anti-poaching operation throughout 
the country. Despite the good intentions, the operation had devastating social and economic 
effects. Security personnel allegedly tortured rural people. There are claims of rape, torching of 
dwellings and properties, and people missing (Mwananchi Newspaper, 2013). Although a 
parliamentary select committee formed to investigate the effects of the anti-poaching operation 
led to the resignation of the ministers for home affairs, defense, and natural resources and 
tourism. Yet the damage was already done. Rural people become very suspicious of anyone 
digging information about wildlife management issues. 
Thus, to counteract the aforementioned challenges, and ensure validity, the research applied a 
case study approach (see Flyvbjerg, 2006), and ethnographic methods of data collection (see 
Mosse, 2007; Davis, 2011). This provided the opportunity for research to learn about local 
sociopolitical environments and build the trust needed for people to open up and share their life 
experiences and stories. The approach facilitated the research to reduce chances of non-
response and eliminate social desirability biases (Nuno and John, 2015; Thomas et al., 2015). 
It also provided the opportunity to triangulate information for story consistency and divergences 
(Ahlborg and Nightingale, 2012). By employing mixed but largely qualitative methods of data 
collection, the study put emphasis on observing and listening to participants’ stories and life 
experiences. It balances between what new information can be brought into light (ontology), 
and “how we can justify that what we know, epistemology” (Pearce, 2015:44). 
A schematic overview of specific research methods used in this study is present in table 2, and 
a detailed explanation of each method follows below. 
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Table 2: Schematic overview of research methods applied in the three papers 
Data collection methods Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 
Informal interviews, semi-structured X X X 
Formal interviews, semi-structured X X X 
In-depth interviews, focus group discussions X X X 
Household questionnaire survey - X X 
Document analysis X X X 
Data analysis methods       
Qualitative thematic analysis of transcripts X X X 
Ad hoc interpretation of interviews X X X 
Quantitative analysis of survey 
 
 
- - X 
 
3.3.1.  Household questionnaire survey 
Household questionnaire surveys were conducted in two WMA villages and two non-WMA 
villages using the household questionnaire (Appendix 1), the non-WMA villages formed 
counterfactual villages. Lack of baseline data impelled the study to compare villages with and 
without the WMA intervention. The approach allows this study to estimate the degree to which 
changes in livelihoods outcomes are attributed to the WMA policy implementation rather than 
to other factors (see Ferraro, 2009). Counterfactual villages provide the opportunity for research 
to unveil what the social and economic outcomes would have looked like in the absence of the 
WMAs interventions (see World Bank, 2006; Ferraro, 2009; Gertler, et al., 2011). This however 
required matching villages with similar socioeconomic and ecological conditions. To achieve 
this, the following criteria were used to select villages for the households survey: i) a WMA 
village and a non-WMA village are adjacent to each or at least shared a boundary before village 
succession occurred after the WMA establishment ii) a non-WMA village border a National 
Park. The underlying assumptions for these criteria are that residents in adjacent villages have 
more or less similar social and ecological conditions: Therefore, are more likely to have similar 
livelihood strategies. Secondly, when a non-WMA village borders a National Park, residents 
are more likely to face wildlife nuisances as their counterparts in a WMA village. At the same 
time, the presence of wildlife in a non-WMA village present tourism opportunities just as in 
WMA village. 
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In each of the four villages selected for the households survey, 40 households corresponding to 
about 8% of villages’ households were randomly sampled from a village register (Table 3). A 
total of 160 household questionnaires were completed. Before sampling the households, village 
registers were updated. This was done to ensure new households are included and those which 
seized to exist or moved out are excluded. In each village, village leaders together with elders 
who were knowledgeable with the village environment and the residents were involved in 
updating a village register. A household in this dissertation means a group of people living 
under one roof or compound and share (must) their incomes and expenses. 
Table 3: Type of survey and sampling intensity 
Survey Type  Respondents Number /Frequency per 
village 
     WMA      Non-WMA 
Households surveys Households heads/spouses  80 80 
    
Focus group 
discussions Village leaders 10 2 
 Women 10 2 
 Herdsmen 10 1 
 CBO representatives 3  
 Farmers  10 2 
    
In-depth interviews VGS 7  
 VGS spouses and relatives 7  
 CBO leaders 8  
 District game officer 1  
 District natural resource officer 1  
 District cooperative officer 1  
 The regional natural resource officer 1  
 VGS injured in access struggles  2  
 Longest serving CBO representatives  3  
 
Residences fined for trespassing WMA 
areas  2  
    
Partcipant observation Village general assemblies 2 1 
 CBO committees meetings 2  
 VGS meeting 1  
 VGS ranger posts 5  
  VGS camp 1   
 
3.3.2.  Formal and Informal interviews 
Formal and informal interviews were conducted in all 10 WMA villages and the two non-
villages using semi-structured questionnaires (Appendix 2). Respondents for formal and 
informal interviews were selected based on their knowledge of the village socioeconomic and 
30 
 
political situation, gender, livelihood activities and leadership positions. Followed by snowball 
sampling to reach data saturation and diagnose information for story consistency and 
divergence (Ahlborg and Nightingale, 2012). Focus group discussions were conducted 
separately for village leaders, women, herdsmen, farmers and CBO representatives. This 
facilitated participant to freely express their views. Because, in each of the focus group 
discussion, participants shared or had a similar livelihood strategy. Hence they were more likely 
to have shared interests and face the similar challenges. 
In total, 50 focus groups discussions, each comprising five to seven participants, were 
conducted at the village level. Participants in herdsmen, farmers and women focus group 
discussions were randomly selected. Selection was done after asking a group of village leaders 
together with other individuals knowledgeable with village residents and their livelihood 
activities to group residents in the village register based on their main livelihood activity. 
Participants in focus groups discussions were asked to, among other things, evaluate how 
village residents abide by the WMA access rules. Charts with names of environmental services 
and products in one column and a subjective scale of access rule acceptability or contestation 
in rows were provided (Appendix 3). Participants were encouraged to discuss and reach 
consensus before filling in. 
In-depth interviews followed to gather more information and triangulate issues raised in focus 
group discussions. In-depth interviews were conducted with VGS, VGS spouses and relatives, 
and CBO leaders, district game officer, district natural resource officer, district cooperative 
officer, and the regional natural resource officer (Table 3). Information obtained in the VGS 
and district officials’ interviews were triangulated with the villages ranking exercises, as well 
as VGS spouses and relatives. Individuals involved in particular incidences, such as VGS 
attacked by residents protesting the WMA rules, individuals fined for trespassing on WMA 
areas and the longest serving CBO representatives were also interviewed to share their specific 
experiences. Participant observations were conducted in village general assemblies, CBO 
committee meetings, a VGS meeting, at VGS ranger posts and a VGS camp. 
Information gathered was recorded in the form of field notes, and audio clips after seeking 
respondents consent. Respondents’ gestures and facial expression were also noted. In African 
culture, individuals’ gesture and facial expressions are important in understanding the intensity 
(inner feeling) and capture the real meaning of the words spoken. Swahili people, in particular, 
tend to combine words and gestures while communicating sensitive issues. All interviews were 
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conducted in Swahili. Which is not only a national language in Tanzania but also a common 
language which is spoken by almost (the majority) all Tanzanians. 
3.3.3.  Document analysis 
Data collection methods included an extensive review of official and unofficial documents. This 
included a review of CBO constitution, business contracts (investment contracts), court rulings 
(pertaining to WMA related conflicts), CBO financial reports (prepared by CBO and external 
auditors), and reports posted on CBO notice board. The study also explored reports and 
documents posted on various internet sites, newspapers and televisions. The review of official 
and unofficial documents provided a broader opportunity for this research to understand the 
narratives and the discourses around conservation of wildlife in human-dominated landscapes. 
3.4. Data management and analysis 
Data was analysed following techniques for both quantitative and qualitative data analysis 
approaches. Information collected through in-depth interviews were categorized and mapped 
to explain the functioning and efficiency of WMAs. The narratives were coded to determine 
how observed realities differ from theory. The analysis of associations between circumstances 
and behavior (i.e. rule changes and actors’ responses), and between attitude and motivation 
were done to identify the causal relations between WMAs implementation outcomes. 
Quantitative data were analysed using MS excel. Detailed data analysis approach and methods 
are presented in each of the three papers that comprise the results section of this dissertation 
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4. Results 
The major findings of this study are presented in the three papers that constitute the remaining 
part of this dissertation. The three papers are inserted in its original text (as could be seen on 
the publisher's sites online), but revised page layout to fit in the dissertation format. Followed 
by a synthesis of the research finding and the concluding section. Below is a snapshot of how 
the three papers respond to the research questions and the specific objectives (Table 4). 
Table 4: How the individual papers respond to the research questions and specific 
objectives 
Specific research objectives Research questions Paper I Paper II Paper III 
i) Examine to what extent local 
communities in WMA villages 
participate in managing 
wildlife and natural resources. 
i) To what extent do local 
communities participate in 
managing landscape 
resources? 
X X   
ii) Understand how the 
implementation of WMA 
changed the ways in which 
rural people access wildlife and 
natural resources. 
ii) How has the WMA 
implementation changed the 
ways in which people 
access and perceive wildlife 
resources? 
  X X 
iii) Determine how access and 
livelihoods outcomes of WMA 
implementation vary across 
different types of individuals 
and households. 
iii) How does access and 
livelihoods outcome of 
WMA implementation vary 
across different types of 
individuals and households? 
    X 
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Abstract 
We explore how the regime of rules over access to land, natural, and financial resources reflect 
the degree of community ownership of a Wildlife Management Area (WMA) in Tanzania. 
Being discursively associated with participatory and decentralised approaches to natural 
resource management, WMA policies have the ambition to promote the empowerment of 
communities to decide over rules that govern access to land and resources. Our purpose is to 
empirically examine the spaces for popular participation in decision-making over rules of 
management created by WMA policies: that is, in what sense of the word are WMAs actually 
community-based? We do this by studying conflicts over the regime of rules over access to land 
and resources. Analytically, we focus on actors, their rights and meaningful powers to exert 
control over resource management, and on accountability relationships amongst the actors. Our 
findings suggest that WMAs foster very limited ownership, participation and collective action at 
the community level because WMA governance follows an austere logic of centralized control over 
key resources. Thus, we suggest that it is difficult to argue that WMAs are community-owned 
conservation initiatives until a genuinely devolved and more flexible conservation model is 
implemented to give space for popular participation in rule-making. 
Keywords: CBNRM, WMA, Tanzania, management plan, participation, accountability, 
governance, conflict, community-based conservation, decentralised management, wildlife 
management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, fortress conservation and central government control have been accompanied by 
policies and legislation that put communities in focus for conserving natural resources in the 
Global South (Roe et al. 2009). Much has been written about community-based approaches to 
conservation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Songorwa et al. 2000; Balint 2006; Ribot et al. 2006; 
Nelson 2007; Dressler et al. 2010), illustrating all too well the need for continued critical 
observation and concern. A number of labels for community-based conservation (CBC) schemes 
have been promoted in the context of wildlife conservation, such as community wildlife 
management (CWM) (Balint 2007), CBC (Goldman 2003) or community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) (Nelson and Agrawal 2008). All these schemes are typically 
defined as systems of resource governance, whereby the rules for resource allocation and 
management are primarily set by communities themselves (Li 2005: 435). 
CBC schemes are uncritically hailed by proponents from government and non-
government sectors alike to be participatory and widely beneficial, despite the difficulties of 
evaluating the impact of what is often framed as ‘success’ (Blaikie 2006), with little evidence 
of the actual workings of participation on the ground (Lund et al. 2009). Despite the 
overabundance of win-win rhetoric in development policy circles and lack of evidence to 
support it, scholars believe in the virtues of participatory policies if: a) a wide range of 
information is available to local communities to enable informed decision making (Arnstein 
1969; Parkins and Mitchell 2005; Fernandez-Gimenez et al. 2008; Turnhout et al. 2010); 
b) meaningful powers to manage resources are actually devolved to democratically elected 
local bodies that are downwardly accountable to their electorate (Smoke 2003; Ribot 2001, 
2004); and c) substantial benefits can be generated and captured by the communities to improve 
their well-being (Homewood et al. 2012). 
Tanzanian Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) represent such a policy for community-based 
wildlife conservation that is hailed to be participatory and community-owned (WWF 2014; 
AWF n.d.) because WMAs seem to constitute a break with past, more centralised and exclusion-
based approaches, i.e., fortress conservation (Brockington 2002). Critical voices see them as non-
participatory, overly focused on conservation, and neoliberal in the sense of expanding the 
territories and resources that can be commoditised with little attention to local concerns and rural 
development (Goldman 2003; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010; 
Benjaminsen et al. 2013). The literature on the politics of participation is typically inspired by 
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a rich set of critical perspectives on participation (Ribot 1999; Cooke and Kothari 2001; 
Hickey and Mohan 2005; Cornwall 2008), continuously offering critique pertaining to 
community-conservation relations in Northern Tanzania (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; 
Goldman 2011; Mariki 2013; Loveless 2014) and potential ways to move beyond the critique 
(Goldman and Milliary 2014). With this article, we wish to explicitly examine an often 
overlooked, albeit a core assumption of WMAs. That is, in what sense their governance fosters or 
at least allows for popular participation in decision-making over rules that regulate access to 
land, natural and financial resources. 
Studying CBC through the regime of rules and regulations 
Little attention has been paid to the regime of management rules and regulations that 
constitute a key element for community-based interventions and shape a project’s success or 
failure. Scholars who look at management rules and regulations typically ask whether they 
are adhered to, what are the effects of lack of adherence, and how can compliance with rules 
and regulations be ensured (Keane et al. 2011, 2012; Nielsen and Meilby 2013). However, 
the question of the legitimacy of the regime of rules and regulations is rarely addressed1. We 
wish to contribute to the debates on CBC by explicitly looking at the operational regime of 
rules and regulations over access to land and resources. Building on previous work done by 
others who studied the initiation of WMAs (Igoe and Croucher 2007; Trench et al. 2009; 
Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Loveless 2014), our hypothesis is that processes of broad-based 
participation and devolved community-led rule-making and implementation are largely absent 
in operational WMAs, partly because these projects lacked genuine community involvement 
in the phase of establishment. Empirically, we direct our attention to conflicts over access to 
land and resources and examine how tensions over rule-making and compliance are dealt with 
and resolved by different actors. We focus on conflicts because they are indicators of a 
lack of popular consent to a regime of conservation rules, and can reveal dominant power 
relations and the workings of politics of participation on the ground. 
Conceptual framework 
We ground our research interest in political ecology (Robbins 2004) and propose to 
build an understanding of WMA governance by looking at the rules that govern rights, 
responsibilities, and powers over access to material and financial resources, and how these 
rules are made. Having the perspective of a WMA community in mind, we ask if the rules 
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can be changed by WMA villages to accommodate local needs and conditions. We discuss 
the policy-driven architecture for WMA governance by identifying key actors pertaining 
to communal access to land and natural resources, and to tourism-generated revenues from 
hunting and safari activities on village land. Throughout our analysis, we follow Agrawal and 
Ribot (1999) in assessing how rules governing access to land, resources and tourism-based 
revenues in WMAs distribute decision-making powers to different actors and how these 
actors are tied into relations of accountability. We study the distribution of powers to make 
decisions in community-based interventions by focusing on the degree of popular 
participation in rule-making. To do this, we see the need to examine the relationship between 
the WMA villages and the community-based organisation (CBO), because WMAs are 
primarily managed at the supra-village level by (CBO, also referred to as ‘Authorised 
Association’ in the context of WMAs). Therefore, we are interested in understanding what 
powers are assigned to the CBO—the managing body comprised of elected village 
representatives—and what powers are further devolved to village councils. With this, we are 
able to assess the degree of decentralisation, and to what extent decentralisation policies 
distribute ‘meaningful powers’ over resources to WMA governance bodies that are held 
accountable by their constituencies. When accountability relations force authorities to 
respond downwardly to its constituency, decentralisation takes democratic traits (Ribot et 
al. 2010). When local governments are mainly upwardly accountable to higher authorities, it 
resembles an extension of central government’s control into rural areas (Ribot 2004, following 
Rondinelli 1981) or in other words recentralisation (Ribot et al. 2006). In our exploration of 
WMA governance at the village level we look at how flexible the rules are and what it takes 
to change them. If certain rules cannot be changed, we look at patterns of conflict as an 
indicator for lack of genuine community participation in rule-making. 
METHODOLOGY AND CASE DESCRIPTION 
We use empirical data collected from a field study in Burunge WMA in Northern Tanzania. We 
rely on a review of relevant policy documents and on qualitative data compiled through 
observation (in two village assemblies, three CBO meetings, and one meeting of Village Game 
Scouts), semi-structured and unstructured interviews with agro-pastoralists and farmers 
(individually and in focus groups, >100 interviews), village and traditional leaders (>40 
interviews), members and employees of the CBO (13 interviews), Village Game Scouts 
(individually and in focus groups, 23 interviews), district officers (five interviews), ministry 
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representatives (four interviews and continuous email exchange), conservation NGO 
representatives (four interviews), investors (two interviews), and Protected Area authorities 
(one interview with three Tanzanian National Park Authority representatives). Data were 
collected in all Burunge WMA villages, in Babati town (District centre), in Arusha (Regional 
centre) and in Dar es Salaam (location of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism). 
The field work was conducted from January to May 2014, and in February, May, and 
November 2015 by the authors — either in parallel at different locations or jointly. 
We deal with highly sensitive and contentious issues of land ownership, local conflicts, and 
criminalized access to conservation territories. To build reliable narratives of events and 
conflicts we triangulated (Nightingale 2003) by talking to actors across all levels of WMA 
governance and local politics, and we used high-resolution satellite images (Google Earth) to gain 
a better understanding of different land uses and spatial relations in the area. Triangulation 
techniques do not always yield consistent accounts and can produce discrepancies and 
incompatibilities between different sets of data (Nightingale 2003). This dissonance, however, 
is telling in multiple ways and can inform about local interests and what is at stake for different 
actors, making social conflicts and the politics of conservation visible. To elicit historical 
events, we asked the same questions to different research participants until we did not receive 
new information. To reduce the various biases inherent in the study of conflicts, we put great 
stress on building trust with our interlocutors, being transparent in our research questions, asking 
for informed consent to be interviewed, an option to opt out at any time, and ensuring 
anonymity. Nonetheless, mutual trust does not prevent us from being ‘used’ by our informants in 
what they often referred to as a political game that the ‘others’ are playing, a game that one can 
hardly observe without being drawn into. 
We also recognise that by relying on qualitative methods in the field we lack a number of other 
techniques that could shed a different light. Our research design and methodology do not include 
environmental evidence that could inform a study of conflicts over access to land and resources 
in juxtaposition with claims to environmental stewardship or degradation (e.g., Brockington 
and Homewood 2001; Benjaminsen 2008). We interacted mostly with members of village 
governments and other more ‘visible’ community members, and we probably have not spent 
enough time in the villages that we study to be able to fully observe the daily workings of local 
politics. 
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In this article, we discuss WMA governance at large, despite drawing from one case study only. 
Every WMA is different as is every village. This makes any generalisation problematic, yet not 
impossible (Flyvbjerg 2006). We try to overcome the problem of generalisation of 
ethnographic qualitative research findings by using a conceptual framework that can be 
equally applied to most localities and contexts. Further, our case was not selected randomly. 
Rather — following Flyvbjerg (2006) — we selected it purposefully as a case: a) that stands 
out, being one of the first operational Tanzanian WMAs and attracting more tourism 
investment than most other WMAs in the country; and is b) with internal variation, being 
arguably one of the most heterogeneous WMAs in terms of the mix of ethnicities and 
languages, livelihoods and land use practices. 
Case study area 
Burunge WMA is located in Babati district in Northern Tanzania, around 190 km from 
Kilimanjaro international airport, the main entry point for international tourists visiting the 
Tanzanian northern circuit (Figure 1). Burunge WMA was established in 2003 and registered 
in 2006 with a total area of 280 sq. km (WWF 2014). The WMA initially comprised of five 
villages with a total population of around 22,000 individuals (2002 national census). 
Between 2004 and 2009, the five villages split into ten (Figure 2) and the population increased 
to around 34,000 in 2012 (2012 Babati District Council Population and Housing Census). 
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Figure 1: Burunge WMA in the regional context 
Note: GIS shapefiles provided by TANAPA, TAWIRI, WWF, and WDPA. Illustration by 
Jevgeniy Bluwstein 
Although Burunge WMA is located within a world-famous network of well-established 
protected areas that generate significant revenue for the safari industry and the Tanzanian 
state, Burunge villages cannot capture tourism revenue unless the tourists stay overnight in 
Burunge WMA lodges, go on a photo-safari, or hunt game in the WMA. The revenues from 
Burunge WMA-based tourism amounted to TZS 412 million (around USD 248,000) in 2014, 
after taxation by central and district governments. Assuming a population of 36,000 people 
in 2014 in Burunge villages based on the past population growth, around USD 7 per person 
per year are made available for the communities after taxation in 2014. Yet, only half of the 
sum is distributed to the villages for social development projects; the other half remains with the 
WMA office for administrative purposes, conservation activities and a development reserve 
(Homewood et al. 2015). 
Agriculture and livestock husbandry continue to be the main livelihood activities, with 
farmland and livestock herds constituting most important household assets and two pillars of 
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the local economy. The extent of agricultural activities in Burunge villages is shown in Figure 
2. Burunge villages, except Manyara village, are accessible by all-weather roads. Primary 
schools and mobile phone networks are present in each village, health centres are easily 
accessible for many, and in 2015, and efforts to connect the area to the national electrical grid 
have been launched. Access to water remains a challenge for all. 
Figure 2: Villages of Burunge WMA 
Note: Some village boundaries are not official and might change in local negotiations, estimated 
to our best knowledge based on field presence and corroborated with preliminary maps from 
Babati District, Village Land Use Plans, GIS shapefiles (WWF, National Bureau of Statistics) 
and Google Earth satellite images. Agricultural area is mapped based on2014 GIS shapefiles 
(Honeyguide Foundation). Burunge WMA is divided into three zones: General Use Zone 
(GUZ), Corridor Use Zone (CUZ), and Hunting Use Zone (HUZ). Illustration by Jevgeniy 
Bluwstein. 
Past conservation efforts squeezed the local population between a network of various types of 
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protected areas. Burunge WMA is located within the Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem (TME), 
that also encompasses Tarangire National Park (gazetted in 1970), Lake Manyara National 
Park (gazetted in 1960), Manyara Ranch (since 2000, operated by African Wildlife 
Foundation), and a newly established Randileni WMA (gazetted in 2012, to replace the Lolkisale 
Game Controlled Area, not mapped here) (Figure 1). From a conservationist point of view, 
the priorities are to maintain the ecological integrity of the entire ecosystem by protecting 
wildlife corridors, enabling wildlife to safely migrate across borders within TME (Goldman 
2009; Jones et al. 2009; Kikoti 2009). 
ANALYSING RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN WMAS: RIGHTS, POWERS, AND 
RELATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
WMA policy aims to establish restrictions on local land use and access to natural resources in 
return for a share of tourism revenues that are generated on village lands under a WMA regime 
of rules and regulations. Therefore, taking a community perspective we discuss the kind of 
changes the WMA policy brings at the village level in terms of local people’s ability to access 
communal lands for cultivation, livestock grazing, collection of natural resources (firewood, 
timber, non-timber forest products, poles, thatch, bushmeat, water, etc.), and their ability to 
benefit from tourism-based revenues generated through hunting and safari activities. 
Evolution of central government control over tourism activities on village lands 
Under the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974—long before the WMA era—the central 
government of Tanzania has reconsolidated state control over wildlife resources in post-
independent Tanzania, developing a vibrant tourist hunting industry and liberalising it to private 
investments in the 1980s (Nelson et al. 2007). This led to a growth of tourism activities on village 
lands. Hunting outfitters received hunting block concessions from the central government to 
bring in tourists to shoot game in Game Controlled Areas (GCAs) that often overlapped with 
village lands, while tour operators established direct investment contracts with village governments 
to conduct non-consumptive activities (e.g., photo safari) and to facilitate tourist camping and 
lodging on village lands. 
While no restrictions on human activities were imposed by central authorities on village lands 
inside and outside of GCAs, the Director of Wildlife, under the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Tourism (MNRT) had the power to allocate a hunting block on village land in a GCA without 
local consent, to allocate a hunting concession to an outfitter, and to collect the fees and revenues, 
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channeling back only 25% to the District that would share a small and unspecified amount 
with the village government (Nelson et al. 2007). Communities were dependent on the 
goodwill of hunting outfitters to support ‘community development’ as required through Tourist 
Hunting Regulations in 2000. The presence of hunting outfitters on village land could entail 
restrictions to local access to land and natural resources during the hunting season, and some 
concessions granted exclusive access to the outfitters (Snyder and Sulle 2011). 
The Ministry had no role to play in non-consumptive tourism on village land. The village 
governments could enter into direct negotiations with tour operators and lodging investors, 
negotiating a shared land-use regime that could entail self-imposed restrictions on access to land 
and resources to secure an attractive safari experience for visitors, and keep all the revenues 
(Nelson et al. 2007; Schroeder 2008; Sachedina and Nelson 2010). Obviously, communities 
would prefer self-negotiated non-consumptive tourism activities on their village land as 
opposed to having to host non-accountable hunting outfitters. The Ministry, however, 
benefited from tourist hunting financially and had little interest in seeing the villages 
interfere with hunting activities by hosting tourism safaris through direct contracts with 
safari operators (Snyder and Sulle 2011). The growing competition between consumptive and 
non-consumptive tourism activities within hunting blocks on village land has led the central 
government to pass a number of reforms to regulate in favour of tourist hunting, banning any 
kind of tourism activities within a hunting block without the approval of the Director of Wildlife, 
and introducing new fees on all tourism activities (URT 2000, 2008; Nelson 2011; Snyder 
and Sulle 2011). 
The evolution of wildlife conservation and tourism reforms was paralleled by deliberations over 
a comprehensive policy for devolved and community-based wildlife conservation. 
Eventually, it was implemented under the Wildlife Regulations of 2002 (URT 2002), stipulating 
how WMAs can be established on village lands. Until today, Tanzania’s WMA policy has 
undergone significant changes and is presently codified in form of the Wildlife Conservation 
Act 2009 (URT 2009) and the Wildlife Regulations 2012 (URT 2012). In what follows, we 
outline what has changed for communities’ access to their lands and resources, and how their 
relationships vis-à-vis tourist hunting outfitters and safari tour operators have been affected by 
WMA policies. 
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What powers over community-based wildlife conservation are vested in the CBO? 
When villages set aside a part of village land to be gazetted as a Wildlife Management Area, 
the WMA is created as a continuous piece of land spanning across village borders. In the 
process of WMA establishment, participating villages have to elect village representatives who 
form a supra-village CBO. The CBO has the right to apply for ‘user rights to wildlife’ at the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. In case of a successful application, the CBO can 
use the newly acquired powers to attract private investors to establish wildlife-based tourism 
activities (hunting and/or safari), and it can also apply for a resident hunting quota on behalf of 
the WMA villages, allowing–albeit very limited–access to legal bushmeat for local communities. 
While it is still up to the Director of Wildlife to allocate a hunting block even inside WMA 
territory, the Wildlife Regulations of 2012 give the CBO the right to decide upon whether a 
hunting block should be established or not, and CBO members are involved in negotiations with 
potential investors. Ultimately the village who hosts a WMA investor has to approve of the contract 
between the CBO and the investor. The CBO is in charge of the preparation of a General 
Management Plan (GMP) that governs local access to land and natural resources on WMA 
territory as well as tourist operators’ conduct and access to WMA-based village lands. This 
empowers the CBO to manage the WMA on behalf of the participating communities pertaining to 
local access to land and use of all natural resources, both inside and outside of a WMA hunting 
block. Hence, powers to make decisions over local access are recentralised away from the 
village councils up to the CBO pertaining to village lands that are outside of a hunting block and 
are set aside for a WMA. However, when a hunting block is operated on village land, powers 
partly shift from the central government to the CBO with the implementation of a WMA. In 
order to understand whether this shift enables more or less attention to residents’ needs and 
concerns, it is important to study the relationships between the communities, their CBO, and the 
investor. We will return to this later. 
The CBO is also entitled to a share of tourism-based revenues that are generated within WMA 
territories. Depending on the nature of revenues (consumptive and non-consumptive) and fees, 
different revenue sharing formulae apply, as specified by the law for hunting (URT 2009, 
2012), and suggested but still unspecified (Nelson et al. 2007, URT 2008) for non-
consumptive utilisation. A share is allocated to the government, the district and the CBO. 
As of 2012, the CBO receives 75% of the hunting block fees (25% go to the central government) 
and 65 % of non-consumptive revenues. Due to a number of additional taxation mechanisms on 
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hunting-related fees, the revenues from hunting to the CBO are reduced to roughly 60%. The 
CBO is entitled to keep whatever amount is negotiated between the CBO and the investor 
above the government-prescribed fees. 
The CBO is also encouraged to retain roughly half of the taxed WMA revenues for 
administration, conservation, and other activities, and to distribute the other half to the 
participating villages (URT 2012), who manage their share independently, typically 
investing the funds into public development projects and education. Although it is not 
regulated how the revenues should be distributed among the villages, the CBOs typically 
allocate equal amounts ‘as an easy answer to a difficult question’ (former WWF Tanzania 
employee, pers. comm. 2014) instead of putting it up for debate amongst the communities 
within the process of deliberations over the WMA rules. It creates or fuels conflicts amongst 
communities and the CBO, when a wildlife-rich village hosts a lodge and is persuaded to 
join other villages to establish a WMA, and subsequently to share tourism revenues with 
villages that might have much less wildlife and no tourism. These wildlife-poor villages are 
often more than willing to join and receive tourism-based revenues that are generated 
elsewhere (Trench et al. 2009; Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Green and Adams 2014). 
What powers remain with the central government? 
The Director of Wildlife retains its powers to authorise key proposals put forward by the CBO, 
such as the allocation of a hunting block within a WMA, the choice of tourism investors, the 
stipulations within the General Management Plan, that is regulating local people’s access to 
village lands inside the WMA, and the collection and distribution of tourism-based revenues 
on WMA territory. 
In 2014, the decision by the former Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism freed several 
tour operators in three WMAs from paying entry and motor vehicle fees for tourists staying 
in WMA lodges in a move that by-passed the parliament (Letter by the Minister of Natural 
Resources and Tourism to Tanzania Association of Tour Operators, 22.12.2014), effectively 
reducing WMA revenues from tourist visitors from USD 25 to USD 15 per person. This incident 
is telling in multiple ways: it demonstrates the bargaining power of tour operators who negotiate 
tourist fees directly with the Ministry (member of Tanzania Association of Tour Operators, pers. 
comm. 2015), while the villages have no say; it shows the power of the Ministry to decide and 
influence how much WMA villages will be able to generate from WMA-based tourism; and 
46 
 
it invites patronage and rent-seeking (Nelson and Agrawal 2008; Benjaminsen et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, correspondence from Burunge CBO to the Wildlife Division shows that the 
latter distributes a part of collected revenues to the CBO erratically, with delays and often without 
a way to trace back the payments to the respective investors and tourism activities, making the 
revenue generation and distribution non-transparent (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; WWF 
2014). This does not allow the CBO to effectively hold the Wildlife Division to account, and it 
makes adequate financial planning difficult at the CBO and village level. 
Perhaps most important and far-reaching is the continuous state ownership of all wildlife in 
Tanzania (URT 2009), allowing the CBO–on behalf of the Wildlife Division–to retain user 
rights over wildlife on village land and to manage and benefit from wildlife utilisation for 
tourism activities, even if the village leaves the WMA (URT 2012, section 34(6)), creating 
tensions and ambiguities with the Village Land Act No. 5 (URT 1999, section 8). The Village Land 
Act gives Tanzanian village governments the right to use, administer and manage village land—
land that is owned by the state—on behalf of the village assembly, i.e., all adult members of 
the village. In case a WMA village withdraws from the WMA, all decisions about the use of 
village land, that are considered by the Wildlife Division to be of importance to wildlife 
conservation, remain with the CBO (representative of Wildlife Division, and District Game 
Officer of Babati district pers. comm. 2014). Should the CBO cease to operate in the unlikely 
case that all villages of a WMA decide to dissolve the WMA and succeed in doing so, the user 
rights to wildlife over former WMA land return to the Wildlife Division, which then decides 
whether to ‘give’ back this land to the village or to use it for hunting tourism (representative 
of Wildlife Division, and District Game Officer of Babati district pers. comm. 2014). In the case 
of the latter, the village would not be allowed to utilise its own land, nor benefit from any 
generated fees or revenues from hunting tourism. While this is not clearly regulated, it has been 
used by Babati District Game Officer and Wildlife Division as a threat to Burunge WMA 
villagers. Should villages withdraw from the WMA, their village land set aside for the WMA 
would be converted into a Game Controlled Area, we were told, which would render this land a 
protected area without rights to any human activities according to Wildlife Conservation Act 
2009 (URT 2009, section 20(1)(c) and section 21(1)). This threat has no legal substance (Edward 
Lekaita pers. comm. 2016) but can exert political power when central and district government 
‘experts’ use it against villagers with little knowledge of the law, and most importantly little 
access to independent legal representation to claim their rights. Similarly, WMA villages and 
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the CBOs seem not to know that the CBO user rights cannot be automatically renewed by the 
Director of Wildlife if there have been changes to the General Management Plan. In order to pull 
out from a WMA, a village would have to change its own village land-use plan and announce it 
to the CBO and the Director of Wildlife. This would force the Wildlife Division to review the 
WMA status after five years (Edward Lekaita pers. comm. 2016). Because villages do not 
know their legal rights, nor are they appropriately informed about WMA laws by District 
authorities or the Wildlife Division, no village has yet managed to pull out of a WMA in 
Tanzania. 
Instead, the confusion about WMA laws and villagers’ rights can be used as an opportunity 
for conservationists and investors to engage with villages that cannot simply pull out from the 
WMA if residents change their minds about what they are willing to invest in or sacrifice for 
conservation. The stabilising effect of being under the WMA framework can create incentives 
for organisations that represent conservation interests to convince or, if necessary, coerce 
villages to join a WMA as a strategy to put more village land under a conservation regime 
without an option for reversal. 
Accountability relations matter 
The apparent lack of downward accountability of the CBO to the villages has already been 
criticised by others (Shivji 2002; Nelson 2007; Humphries 2013). The CBO does not need to 
be responsive to communities’ requests to change the rules, however, it can ask the village 
governments for support in enforcing rules that are decided upon elsewhere. Due to the top-
down revenue collection, the villages cannot hold the CBO accountable in terms of how 
revenues are generated and collected, because this responsibility is with the Wildlife Division, 
not the CBO. Similarly, the CBO is following central government regulations and guidelines on 
how to allocate the money, leaving little room for maneuver to meet villagers’ demands. 
The Local Government Act (URT 1982) gives the village assembly, i.e., the villagers, the 
power to elect and remove the village chairman or village council members. However, in the 
context of WMA-based tourism villagers can only complain about investors’ conduct, but 
they cannot make an investor leave, as the contract is signed between the CBO and the investor. 
The most important mechanism to hold the CBO downwardly accountable to the villagers is the 
power granted to villagers to elect and remove CBO representatives. While this right can be 
easily exercised in practice, the establishment of a supra-village CBO does not promote the 
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empowerment of existing village government organs (Shivji 2002; Ribot 2004; Nelson 
2007) and weakens accountability links that are already available, because the CBO is 
spatially further detached from the villagers than the village government that resides in the 
village office. For most villages, a CBO has its headquarters hours, if not a day trip away, 
depending on distance, terrain, means of available transport, and season. Burunge villagers 
are arguably least affected by this, having a tarmac road cutting through the region, but for 
communities in more remotely located WMAs, this is a serious burden and barrier to access 
their CBO (e.g., Lake Natron, Makame, the WMAs in the Selous-Niassa Corridor in Southern 
Tanzania). With the recentralisation of resource management from the village office up to the 
CBO, negotiations over access to some of the resources are also recentralised to the CBO level 
away from village committees, such as livestock grazing, and collection of firewood, thatch, or 
medicinal plants. The bargaining power of villagers also diminishes if people from several 
villages have to lobby the CBO through village representatives instead of attending village 
assemblies where demands can be expressed directly to an elected village council. 
We conclude that the CBO is upwardly accountable to the Wildlife Division that makes state 
policy and regulations, gives authority to the CBO to manage the WMA, and can take this 
authority away. Given the strong relations of accountability between the CBO and the Wildlife 
Division, CBO’s downward accountability to the communities is relatively weakened. That is 
to say, it does not matter much who will be elected to represent the villagers at the CBO 
if CBO’s powers to do what the villagers like it to do are limited by state policy and 
regulations that give the Director of Wildlife key decision-making powers in community-based 
natural resource management. At the same time, the CBO holds the villagers accountable to the 
rules over access, and it can enforce many of these rules through force or financial sanctioning. 
Hence, WMA villages are trapped into relations of accountability that make it difficult to 
leverage political power to change rules that govern rural livelihoods in their communities. 
In other words, there is no ‘balance of powers’ (Oyono 2004) to effectively hold community 
representatives (i.e., CBO members) accountable at the village level. 
BURUNGE WMA: GOVERNANCE THROUGH COERCION AND LEGAL 
STRUGGLES 
In the following sections, we review some of the evidence in support of our analysis of 
WMA governance through the case of Burunge WMA. We focus empirically on local 
struggles over powers to change rules and the consequences of an ostensibly centralised 
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management regime. Where it is necessary to ensure protection from possible reprisals, we 
anonymised the communities. 
Creating a conservation regime of rules and regulations 
As mentioned already, the CBO is in charge of land-use planning for village land inside a 
WMA. Depending on the zonation in accordance with the General Management Plan, WMA 
villagers can have access to pastures for livestock grazing, and to fuelwood and non-timber 
forest products, while cutting timber, making charcoal, farming or establishing permanent 
settlement structures are always prohibited in any WMA. Every WMA has to come up with 
its own regime of rules over access to land and natural resources. A GMP provides—at least 
in theory—the basis for developing and managing a WMA. Through an environmental 
resource assessment of the WMA, natural resources are to be valuated, challenges and goals to 
be identified, and solutions to be proposed. A core element of the management plan is the 
spatial dividing of a WMA into different resource zones that are assigned respective restrictions 
and allowable uses. We compile the various activities in Table 1 for Burunge WMA, showing 
how access to land, natural resources, and tourist activities are spatially contingent. 
According to Kaswamila (2006), no biophysical or socio-economic data were actually 
collected for the preparation of the initial management plan in 2005, nor where there any set 
criteria for zoning. The current GMP (JUHIBU 2011) is based on largely unchanged 
assumptions and planning. The Corridor Use Zone is situated on village lands of Minjingu and 
Vilima Vitatu and connects the western and eastern parts of the WMA, acting as an ecological link 
between Lake Manyara National Park and Tarangire National Park (cf. Figure 2). The General 
Use Zone spans the villages of Olasiti, Minjingu, Vilima Vitatu, Maweni, Magara, and Manyara, 
acting as a buffer zone for Lake Manyara National Park and hosting two tourist lodges, located 
in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu, respectively (cf. Figure 2). The Hunting Use Zone spans the 
villages of Kakoi, Vilima Vitatu, Ngolei, Mwada and Sangaiwe, acting as a buffer zone for 
Tarangire NP, hosting Burunge’s hunting block and three tourist lodges (cf. Figure 2). Further, 
access to the west shore of Lake Burunge is prohibited to villagers, hosting a tourist lodge in 
Mwada. 
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Table 1: Burunge WMA zone-based regime of allowable and prohibited activities 
Activity CUZ* GUZ^ HUZ+ 
Dry fire wood collection A† A P‡ 
Tree felling (poles for house construction) P P P 
Collecting Non-Timber Forest Products A A P 
Charcoal burning P P P 
Livestock grazing P A P 
Agriculture P P P 
Permanent settlements P P P 
Temporary settlements P A P 
Tourist hunting P P A 
Photo safari/game viewing A A A 
Local hunting P A P 
Entry without permit A A P 
 
Compiled based on Burunge General Management Plan 2010-2020 (JUHIBU 2011) and 
fieldwork. *Corridor Use Zone, ^General Use Zone, +Hunting Use Zone, †Allowable and 
‡Prohibited 
 
Our fieldwork suggests that Burunge’s regime of rules over access to land and natural resources 
is overly restrictive for many. How were these rules made? Formally, WMA policy and 
regulations put the responsibility to design access-specific rules in the hands of the CBO that 
should do it on behalf of the villagers. The policy is clear on the participation aspect here, it 
encourages participation of all and the village assembly has to sign off decisions pertaining to 
land use planning and the choice of investor. By unpacking the rhetoric of participation, we are 
looking at the distribution of powers in rule-making to qualify what it means when everyone 
is ‘participating’, and who holds meaningful powers in what is framed as decentralisation. 
We follow Agrawal and Ribot (1999) in order to focus on different types of powers for our 
analysis—powers to make or change rules and regulations, and powers to enforce restrictions. 
Before becoming a WMA village, a village land-use plan needs to be prepared. Village land-
use plans are in theory decided at the village level, being regulated through a set of Tanzanian 
laws (cf. ILC 2013), enabling all those who would normally attend village meetings to 
participate. Most likely, less than half of the adult population attends village meetings in 
communities that we studied for this article. Kaswamila and Songorwa (2009) report that 21% 
and 43% of adults (individuals above 18 years of age) participated in village land-use planning 
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in Burunge WMA villages of Vilima Vitatu and Sangaiwe, respectively. The authors further 
add that most of the active participants were ‘district officials and ward/village leaders’. This 
counteracts claims of popular participation, and often the plans are actually done by ‘experts’ 
without involving the villagers (Goldman 2003; ILC 2013; Bluwstein and Lund, in review). 
We argue that this is due to what we call a ‘conservation bias’ which can override local needs 
and conditions, and is built into WMA governance from the outset on through the logic of 
wildlife corridors as the basis for a WMA, and the obligatory assistance of the District Game 
Officer and a conservation NGO in the establishment of a WMA. 
Because a WMA is by default a continuous piece of land cutting across several villages to 
constitute a wildlife corridor or a buffer zone for a protected area, options for village land-
use planning and WMA land allocation are restricted since the goal is to establish a block 
of land instead of discontinuous patches. In addition, as soon as a part of village land is 
surrendered to the WMA through an approval in the village assembly, the power to make rules 
for ‘how’ to use this particular piece of village land is also surrendered to a group of actors—
CBO members, District Natural Resources Advisory Board with the District Game Officer 
acting as a secretary, consultants and NGO facilitators—who prepare a WMA-wide GMP. 
Although District officers and the NGO have an advisory role of facilitators, and are merely 
supposed to bring together stakeholders at the negotiation table, in the case of Burunge WMA 
the District Game Officer and the facilitating NGO, AWF, did have a substantial impact on 
decisions over the establishment of Burunge WMA and WMA land-use planning (Igoe and 
Croucher 2007; Sachedina 2011). Villagers were misinformed and manipulated–including claims 
of forgery–to accept the WMA without informed consent (Baha and Chachage 2007; Igoe and 
Croucher 2007; Interviews by authors). The District Game Officer was allegedly 
demarcating parts of village lands for WMA without informing anyone, creating confusion, and 
sawing seeds for future land conflicts (interviews with anonymous). Sachedina (2008, 2011) 
offers a convincing ethnographic account on AWF’s role in conservation projects across the 
Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem, being the primary organisation in the region in pursuit of 
community-based conservation that is not so community-friendly (also see Goldman 2011; 
Goldman et al. 2013; Benjaminsen et al. 2013). The influence of the facilitators in the decision-
making process over rules for conservation management explains why villagers have little to 
no access to natural resources such as dry-season pastures and non-timber forest products, 
despite the fact that the CBO is in a position to grant access to these resources without the central 
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government watching over it. In an environment of imposed conservation ‘expertise’, the NGO 
and the District Game Officer appear to act in unison, as perceived by a village official: 
AWF and other conservation organisations all go to District level first and share the 
same ideas and beliefs. So District Game Officer might sometimes represent 
conservation NGOs perspective. NGOs always come together with the District 
Game Officer, they coordinate their activities. The District Game Officer is the 
advisor to wildlife management. NGOs and District Game Officer say the same 
things, so they must accept each other’s positions. (Interview with a member of the 
village government in Olasiti, 2014). 
The CBO is the only actor with an assigned budget for rule enforcement and monitoring. 
Official rules are enforced through village game scouts or private investor guards (on 
investor’s concession), and by relying on traditional leaders and village governments. As 
another instrument for rule enforcement, the CBO might threaten to withhold some of the 
revenues to a particular village, if the village WMA is not well maintained. This is not 
explicitly regulated, but expressing threats has been a common practice in Burunge WMA. 
Some of management plan rules, so far, only exist on paper. For instance, temporal limits 
to grazing (carrying capacity) and other livelihood activities are arbitrarily defined, yet not 
implemented. Access to land for livestock grazing in the General Use Zone is allowed 
according to the management plan but is insecure, because a tourist lodge operator claims 
much of that area and uses his guards to harass and police the residents. The residents never 
agreed to the establishment of the WMA and won a legal case against the CBO and the village 
government, but efforts to evict the people continue to this day. Farming restrictions on 
Burunge WMA land in the villages of Manyara, Magara, and Maweni are not policed by 
CBO’s village game scouts for various reasons, including the challenge to patrolling wetland 
areas and contesting claims to land ownership. 
CBO’s powers to change arrangements in response to conflicts are often constrained by 
higher levels of government, poor understanding of the land laws or simply reluctance to listen 
to WMA communities. 
This is a complicated process. The village would have to request to change 
boundaries at the Authorised Association [i.e., the CBO], the Authorised 
Association would have to ask the District and the Wildlife Division. Burunge 
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WMA does not accept such requests, because villages would keep asking for 
more and more changes. (Interview with former member of Burunge CBO, 2015). 
Having a conservation NGO and the District Game Officer as facilitators and watchmen further 
reduces incentives to listen to demands from below. 
Although we have village representatives [at the CBO], they are not well educated and 
not well aware of legal issues, so the District and Wildlife Division impose their 
own will on WMA. Authorised Association [i.e., the CBO] members are sometimes 
tricked by District and other authorities by being taken to seminars and treated 
nicely. Authorised Association members feel obliged to accept whatever is told 
them. They forget that they should be representing the villagers. Only a few 
Authorised Association members are strong enough to keep representing the village 
needs. (Interview with a member of Olasiti village government, 2014). 
Community struggles over access to grazing land 
One of Burunge’s villages used to be part of another village until about five years ago when 
it separated and became independent. The newly created village had to be sensitised by the 
District Game Officer anew to be persuaded to join Burunge WMA. With the attained 
independence, all grazing land set aside during the WMA establishment remained with the old 
village. To complicate matters, the new village is located next to and overlaps with the 
WMA hunting block, an area that has been traditionally used by livestock keepers from 
adjacent communities for dry season grazing. In 2013, the hunting block has been taken over 
by a new investor who does not offer any hunting tourism but uses the concession for non-
consumptive (safari) activities throughout the year. Until recently, livestock keepers from the 
new village believed that the village leadership gave away their land to the WMA, while the 
leadership sees itself as being lured into accepting the WMA, not being fully informed about the 
challenges during the sensitisation process (interview with former member of village 
government, 2015). 
Not having enough land for dry season grazing, pastoralists from this and other Burunge 
villages continue to bring livestock into banned WMA territory (the hunting block), even though 
they are facing punishment from Burunge village game scouts and private investor guards who 
can hand them over to the CBO and the police. Private investor guards might seize their 
livestock and either leave it unattended for predators or push it across the border to Tarangire 
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National Park in order to criminalise the herders in the eyes of the Tanzanian National Park 
Authority (TANAPA). “They [investor and village game scouts] deny us to graze on our land 
[WMA], they attack our children and push our livestock to Tarangire [National Park] to be 
eaten by lions.” (Interview with a female villager, 2014). People are generally more afraid to 
be caught by private investor guards who are sourced from different parts of the region, unlike 
the village game scouts who have to be local villagers, which promotes restraint on the side of 
village game scouts and fosters confrontation on the side of private guards. 
Yet, it is not merely a conflict over rules that are contested by livestock keepers when they 
knowingly risk severe punishment by entering the hunting block. Underlying is a conflict over 
land ownership. The investment contract gives the investor the right to use the area exclusively 
and throughout the year. In fact, the investor advertises the territory as a ‘private wildlife 
concession’ offering luxurious tourism on around 35 sq. km (estimation using Google Earth; 
for comparison: village land area of the adjacent community is ~ 33 sq. km) for ‘only 10 guests’, 
who can ‘blend into the wilderness’ (Chemchem safari 2015). These claims to exclusive land 
ownership and nature that is untouched by human use are contested by pastoralists from adjacent 
WMA communities on the grounds that the land does not belong to the investor. “It is very 
shameful that we have to write a letter to apply for grazing land to a French guy [the Investor], 
we are like guests in our own land.” (Interview with a member of local pastoralist association, 
2014). The fact that a previous arrangement was preferred by the local communities even though 
the contract was made between other parties, shows that some arrangements are accepted and 
others are not. As long as access to ‘our land’ is granted, the question of land ownership can rest. 
Yet, it will erupt as soon as access is taken away. 
This is also evident from conflicts with a previous investor who operated in the hunting block before 
Burunge WMA was launched (Igoe and Croucher 2007). Back in 2005, villagers from all adjacent 
villages called for the replacement of the investor with someone who would cooperate with local 
communities in land-sharing (Ihucha 2005). Apparently, not much changed until recently, as the 
conflict intensified under the WMA regime, this time with a different investor and hard-edged front 
lines. Already back then, the Babati District Game Officer sided with the old investor (Igoe and 
Croucher 2007), and he does so again with the current investor, this time supported by the 
Burunge CBO. 
The village leaders perceive the CBO, not the investor, to have decision-making powers over 
the area that is used by the investor; they blame the CBO, not the investor, for having 
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negotiated an arrangement that is disadvantageous to the communities’ access to land for dry 
season grazing. This is further supported by the fact, that according to the contract between the 
CBO, the investor ‘agrees’ not to allow livestock in the hunting block throughout the year. In 
addition to grazing restrictions, people living close to the hunting block are cut off from access 
to dry firewood and construction materials (poles and thatch). Being too far from alternative 
areas that allow access, villagers see themselves forced to enter the hunting block illegally, 
risking fines and excessive punishment. Members of the new village keep requesting to change the 
rules of access to the hunting block to ease the situation ever since the new investor took over the 
hunting block in 2013. Their pleas have been rejected by the CBO. To the contrary, five village 
leaders were imprisoned and sued in court for trespassing and herding livestock in the 
hunting block (Criminal Case 182/2014, Resident’s Magistrate Court of Manyara). The fact 
that the investor is not the land ‘owner’ as wrongfully stated in the court documents, but only 
an investor on village land, does not allow him to sue villagers in a ‘criminal offence’ for 
trespassing through village land (Edward Lekaita pers. comm. 2016). Likely for that reason the 
charges were eventually dropped (Defendants and lawyer pers. comm. 2015). 
As of 2015, after a series of violent confrontations between local herders and the investor’s 
guards, the investor realised that insisting on exclusive access to the hunting block will only 
produce more conflicts with local communities. Therefore, the investor is changing the strategy 
towards more negotiations and room for concessions (Bluwstein, in preparation). Remarkably, it 
was not the CBO leadership but the investor who realised that only negotiations can solve the 
hard-edged conflicts with local herders. 
When conservation competes with rice cultivation 
The two communities next to Lake Manyara became independent few years ago. After 
secession from an old village (at the time of WMA establishment) parts of WMA land in these 
new villages were taken for rice cultivation by local farmers and fishermen, non-resident land 
owners, and amongst others, district officials. In addition, some villagers established settlements 
inside the WMA. Both communities are dependent on agriculture and have little wildlife to offer, 
which does not make the villages interesting for tourism. The two communities surrendered a 
relatively small part of village land to the WMA, subsequently benefiting from WMA 
revenues that are generated in other villages. The CBO did not succeed in enforcing the rules 
given the terrain (wetlands), and the fact, that some of the farmers are district officials. “I am just 
a mouse against the elephants” (member of the village government, 2015). “The VEO2 cannot 
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stop his bosses from farming on WMA land” (member of the Village Natural Resource 
Committee, 2015). 
In July 2014, the CBO decided to stop paying both villages parts of their share of WMA 
revenues, putting pressure on the villages. One of the villages asked the CBO to change the 
WMA boundaries to release the land that is used for settlements from being part of WMA because 
they cannot resettle people without force and they lack village funds to compensate them. Both 
village governments are also trying to clear the WMA from farming, but feel powerless to 
make its villagers follow WMA rules and the CBO cannot effectively enforce them. People 
keep coming back to cultivate rice, that is simply more attractive to many, while the WMA 
revenues provide indirect benefits that cannot compete with a cash crop. The CBO insists on 
compliance with WMA rules, disregards requests to change the boundaries and cuts off the 
revenues. 
Local struggles over autonomy in dealing with tourism investors 
According to virtually all respondents across all Burunge villages, one of the villages was 
forced to join Burunge WMA through manipulation and forgery of official documents (pers. 
comm. with the implicated individual, 2014, also see Igoe and Croucher 2007). This village is 
not interested in being part of a conservation model that redistributes tourism revenues from 
villages that are rich in wildlife to villages without any wildlife. Because the CBO and the District 
Game Officer insist that all communities joined the WMA voluntarily, the village is not allowed 
to directly collect revenues from a lodge that operates on its WMA territory. The village 
government refuses to accept its accumulated WMA share of almost USD 70,000 since 2006-
2007 as a form of protest against being part of the WMA, arguing that they do not need the 
WMA to conserve wildlife; the community has been doing it for years before the WMA was 
established, having had a village land-use plan that includes a conservation area. The village 
wants to leave the WMA and to reinstate a direct contract with the tourist lodge that was forced 
by Burunge CBO to pay the WMA instead of the village. The following statement attests to 
the widely perceived injustice of imposed equal benefit sharing. “Imagine you have a hundred 
cows, your neighbour has one, he asks you to enter into joint venture with him and share milk 
equally, will you accept?” (Interview with a member of Ngoley village government, 2014). 
The Wildlife Regulations of 2012 (URT 2012) make the District Natural Resource Advisory 
Board an arbitrator to resolve WMA conflicts, rendering impartial conflict resolution impossible 
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if members of the Board (such as the District Game Officer) are part of the very conflict they 
are supposed to help to resolve. This is exactly the case in this village. Leaving a WMA is 
effectively impossible and the avenue for conflict resolution at the WMA level is blocked 
through the involvement of a District Game Officer who was, by all accounts, the mastermind 
behind the coercive inclusion of the village into the WMA over 10 years ago. Having exhausted 
all political options for conflict resolution, the village government went to court to sue the CBO 
for the foregone revenues, demanding to be paid out what was directly agreed with the investor 
in 2006 (more than USD 300,000 by the end of 2015, own estimation). As of July 2016, the court 
has ruled in favour of this village, potentially creating a legal precedent for other WMA villages 
across Tanzania interested in pulling out of a WMA. 
‘If this is a community project, then who is the community?’ 
The question was raised by a Kakoi villager in a conversation about Burunge WMA. It reflects 
a general discontent with the WMA. The various conflicts and perceived injustices have led 
to a number of violent incidents in Burunge WMA in the past few years. Local people were 
incited to destroy WMA infrastructure. Several village game scouts have been beaten up by a 
group of Barabaig residents when a Barabaig woman was apprehended by a WMA village game 
scout for cutting a tree inside the WMA. During the dry season in 2014, Waarusha residents 
collectively decided to enter the hunting block with their livestock and their spears seeking 
direct confrontation with the security forces, which led to an injured guard of the hunting 
block operator. Several legal cases have been pursued by WMA actors and village governments 
to safeguard the territorial integrity of Burunge WMA against its own residents. Many of the 
people whom we talked to and who are not affiliated with the CBO, insisted that CBO 
members either do not represent them or are powerless to do what their constituencies expect 
them to do. “These people become part of CBO once they are elected. They stop caring about us, 
they only think about their stomachs” (Member of Kakoi village government, interview 2014). 
We can barely recognise the participating villages when we look for the ‘C’ in CBNRM or 
CBC, rather it seems to us that at best it is the CBO that is the actual ‘community’ if we follow 
the framing of a WMA as community-based natural resource management. This fits well with 
our analysis of actors and powers in WMA governance. The CBO is positioned to make rules 
that govern people’s access to land and natural resources, and the CBO is vested with authority 
and powers to enforce the rules and to withstand pressure from below to modify them, while 
the central government is–supported by the facilitators from the District and NGOs–making 
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sure that the rules are following the logic of conservation corridors first, and rural 
development second. The effects on people’s livelihoods begin to emerge. Being an area 
where human and livestock population have been on the rise for years, communities most 
squeezed by conservation territories and exposed to an intensifying human-wildlife conflict 
(especially in Kakoi) are increasingly looking for opportunities to rent farmland and graze 
livestock outside of Burunge WMA. Despite the promise of rural development through 
WMA membership, tourism-based revenues cannot be sufficiently captured by the 
communities to represent viable options for alternative livelihood strategies. Instead, sesame 
has become a popular cash crop in response to intensifying crop damage by wildlife, which 
makes the cultivation of corn–a key staple food–a risky endeavor, and has the potential to 
transform food security strategies for those who ostensibly become dependent on markets instead 
of subsistence farming. 
CONCLUSION 
With this article, we have shown how WMA governance distributes rights to land and 
resources to different actors and regulates access in a way that villagers feel disempowered to 
hold their representatives at the CBO to account. We have also argued that the prevalent 
conservation bias acts as a backdrop to WMA governance, inhibiting genuine participation 
in decisions over management goals and access to land and natural resources. Consequently, 
the general management plan hardly reflects local needs and conditions, leading to or 
exacerbating pre-existing conflicts over land and access to natural resources that the rural 
population relies on to sustain livelihoods. This situation is aggravated by an inflexible, in other 
words ‘austere’, conservation regime of fixed boundaries, rules and restrictions. It is no 
coincidence that as of 2016, AWF has been effectively de-funded by its main donor United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Babati District Game Officer has 
been demoted from his position. After two decades of conservation through coercion and 
‘decentralized despotism’ (Igoe, 2006) their actions have produced a legacy of conflicts for 
years to come. 
If our case is framed as a ‘successful’ WMA, what can we expect from other ‘less’ 
successful examples? Using a prominent community-based scheme, we have demonstrated 
how decentralisation is constrained to the level of a CBO that is weakly accountable to its 
constituencies, while recentralisation over some of the key resources to the central government 
or the CBO took place where village governments were previously in control. It remains to 
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be seen how WMAs with more homogenous livelihoods and land-use practices fare in terms of 
the communities’ ability to negotiate a regime of rules over access to land and resources that work 
for the majority of people. There are some positive examples from Northern Tanzanian WMAs 
that are more internally united and have a more supportive relationship with their CBO (Enduimet 
WMA, Makame WMA, personal observations). Our case shows that inter- and intra-communal 
differences can easily yield into full-blown conflicts if several villages are coerced into a 
WMA regime that is perceived unfair without the possibility to pull out. 
If the promise of community-based conservation is to be taken seriously—i.e., natural 
and financial resource management ‘by’ communities instead of ‘an austere quasi- fortress 
model’ (Vaccaro et al. 2013) on village land; attention to power and accountability relations is 
needed during the process of WMA establishment and the making of the regime of rules over 
access to land and resources. If community-based management is to embody community 
ownership of the WMA, a claim widely advertised by facilitating NGOs and government 
representatives, the needs of the villagers must be reflected in the land-use and management 
plans. With our analysis, we have tried to point to some of the key obstacles preventing a 
genuinely devolved community-based management, highlighting continuous central 
government control of key resources and the problematic role of facilitating NGOs, district 
authorities, and tourism investors. While we are not promoting a particular kind of policy 
for wildlife conservation, we do hope that our study can problematise some of the key aspects of 
Tanzania’s land, wildlife and conservation policies that reproduce past inequalities for rural 
populations. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This article benefited from comments by Jens Friis Lund, Emmanuel Sulle, Eliezeri Sungusia, 
Edward Lekatia, the editor, two anonymous reviewers, and other colleagues at the Department 
of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Copenhagen. Most importantly we 
thank the many people who shared their time and knowledge with us in the field. Earlier 
versions of this article were presented at the ‘Green Economy in the South’ conference in 
Dodoma/ Tanzania in July 2014, and at the 2
nd  Nordic Forest Policy Conference in South Sweden 
in November 2014. 
This work was partly funded by ‘PIMA, NERC project number NE/ L00139X/1’ with support 
from the Ecosystem Services for Poverty Alleviation (ESPA) program. The ESPA programme 
60 
 
is funded by the Department for International Development (DFID), the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) and the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC). 
NOTES 
1. One such instance is a Special Issue in Biological Conservation, Vol. 189, o f  September 
2015, ‘Detecting and Understanding Non-Compliance with Conservation Rules’ where 
the entire issue does not consider the question of the legitimacy of conservation rules. 
2. Village Executive Officers are not elected village officials but are put in power by the 
government to share village government duties with the Village Chairman who is elected by the 
villagers. 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we revisit the on-the-ground reality of Burunge Wildlife Management Area (WMA) 
that is celebrated as one of Tanzania’s best examples of community-based conservation (CBC). 
We find Burunge WMA rife with conflict and contestation over grievances that remained 
unsettled since its establishment a decade ago. These grievances have been accentuated by 
growing land pressure resulting from increasing human, livestock, and elephant populations, in 
combination with infrastructure improvements and support for agriculture-led development. 
The WMA governance regime has little to offer the residents and village leaders of Burunge 
member villages who appear hostages in a situation where interests in human development 
and conservation are pitted against each other, making a mockery of the notions of CBC. By 
re-examining this exemplary WMA case and compare our findings with the way it is being 
portrayed by supporting agencies, we pinpoint the tendency of the actors promoting conservation 
in Tanzania to misrepresent or ignore the realities on the ground that defy official policy 
promises. In doing this, we hope to call upon the many empathetic and hard-working individuals 
to end the collective failure to address this detrimental discrepancy between reality and 
representation, and start supporting affected residents in their struggles for self-determination. 
Keywords: WMAs, conservation, politics, participation, community, East Africa, community-
based conservation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) denote a community-based wildlife conservation 
approach whereby a number of villages set aside part of their village lands for wildlife 
protection (URT 1998). Ideally, WMAs provide a legal opportunity for local communities 
to participate in wildlife management and are designed to address issues related to wildlife 
habitat fragmentation, disjointed conservation and rural poverty (URT 1998; WWF 2014). 
Proponents of WMAs present them as ‘win-win’ solutions to conservation and poverty 
challenges as they generate revenues for participating local communities whilst conserving large 
and interconnected landscapes for wildlife protection: 
[The] growth of the WMA movement from an initial 16 pilot WMAs to 
17 gazetted, with more in progress (involving about one million rural people), 
indicates the popularity of the approach across the country and the wide 
acceptance it has received among communities as a promising approach 
for conservation and community development. […] WMAs have the 
potential to enhance livelihoods of their [associated] communities and secure 
valuable areas for wildlife protection. (WWF 2014: 39). 
Financial and so-called technical support to WMA implementation comes from a number 
of aid agencies and NGOs such as Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), African Wildlife Fund 
(AWF), PAMS foundation, and Honeyguide Foundation (HGF), among others. These 
institutions, along with the responsible ministry, also form partnerships with wildlife tourism 
companies that invest in WMAs in the form of land leases for hunting and photographic tourism 
as well as the establishment of lodges etc. Such investments form the economic 
underpinning of revenues to WMAs. Community-Based Conservation (CBC) is, thus, 
thoroughly embedded in larger projects connecting them to the industries of conservation, 
tourism, and development. 
In practice, this embedding appears to have led to processes that defy the theoretical 
assumptions of meaningful participation. Rather, a picture emerges of de facto centralised and 
top-down management approaches that facilitate private investments and favour conservation 
under a thin veil of win-win rhetoric (Igoe and Croucher 2007; Nelson and Agrawal 2008; 
Noe 2009; Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010; Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Humphries 2012). 
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McShane et al. (2011), for example, argues that the win-win rhetoric, such as that illustrated 
in the quote above, is used instrumentally by implementing institutions to garner support 
from local people and politicians, who would most likely reject CBC if the likely trade-offs are 
fully revealed. Later on, however, as the trade-offs of the imposed conservation unfold, 
community frustrations build (Loveless 2014; Bluwstein et al. 2016). As a result, many WMAs 
are rife with natural resource-related conflicts and locally-perceived grievances, and the 
WMA concept has been severely criticised (Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010; Loveless 
2014; Homewood et al. 2015; Noe and Kangalawe 2015; Bluwstein et al. 2016). 
Yet, the WMA implementation train rolls on with 21 WMAs fully operational and another 17 
underway (MNRT 2015). Together, these 38 WMAs are estimated to cover approximately 7% of 
Tanzania’s total surface area, or an area the size of Sierra Leone. Given this speed of 
implementation alongside a critique of how local concerns are overheard and ignored, we wish 
to re-examine Burunge WMA. Re-examine, because Igoe and Croucher (2007) almost 10 
years ago wrote about how its initiation involved manipulation and coercion. 
Burunge WMA is in many ways an interesting and paradoxical case. It is often highlighted 
as the best example of CBC in Tanzania (WWF 2014; AWF n.d.). It is located at the centre of 
northern Tanzania’s wildlife tourism circuit, which constitutes ideal conditions to realise the 
WMA promises of garnering local benefits and development opportunities through wildlife-
related tourism. Thus, it is in some senses a ‘white swan’–or best scenario–case (Flyvbjerg 
2006). Yet, it is rife with conflict; one of its five original member villages have never 
acknowledged its legality and there have been several recent instances of violent confrontations 
between village residents and village game scouts (Bluwstein et al. 2016). The apparent dis-
juncture between how this WMA is both, portrayed as an exemplary of CBC and seen as rife with 
old and new grievances and conflicts, is the starting point for the present study. In revisiting 
Burunge and its portrayals, we hope to contribute to a movement towards ending the collective 
failure to address this discrepancy between reality and representations. 
METHODOLOGY 
The empirical work underlying the present article employed what can broadly be called an 
ethnographic approach. The first author spent several months in and around Burunge villages 
over two periods in 2014 and 2015. The second author has done research on agriculture in the area 
for more than five years. The third author spent approximately four weeks over two periods 
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in 2014 and 2015 doing field work in different Burunge villages, including accompanying a group 
of M.Sc. students who were doing a field course. Neither of these field activities were 
coordinated, yet the first author has spent time in Burunge WMA with both the second and third 
author. Multiple methods have been applied by us during the course of these different 
immersions in Burunge, including focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews and 
informal discussions with individuals and groups, and participant observation at meetings and 
village assemblies. The empirics gathered through these methods were recorded in the form 
of field notes and audio clips. Prior to any interviewing and audio recording, informed consent 
was sought from interviewees after explaining the purpose for which the information was 
sought. 
In constructing the present article, we have drawn on our collective knowledge and sought 
to create a coherent representation of events through triangulations for convergence and 
divergence (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2012). Thus, the present article can be seen as flowing 
from a collective process of drawing upon multifarious impressions to come up with our 
representation of Burunge WMA. 
BURUNGE WMA 
Burunge WMA is situated in Babati district, Manyara, Tanzania. The WMA has 10 member 
villages
1 that are situated between Lake Manyara and Tarangire National Parks and Manyara 
Ranch (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Burunge WMA16 General use zone (GUZ), Corridor use zone (CUZ) and 
Hunting use zone (HUZ). 
The almost 35,000 people residing in the 10 member villages are dominated by the ethnic groups 
of Mbugwe, Waarusha, Maasai, Barbaig, Iraqw, Nyaturu, and Nyiramba. Other ethnic groups 
include Safwa, Hehe, Bena, Manda, and Nyakyusa from the southern part of the country, and 
Jaluo and Kisii from Kenya, and Rundi from Burundi. 
People in the villages depend on agriculture and livestock- keeping for their livelihood. The 
main agricultural crops include maize, finger millet, sorghum, and beans cultivated primarily 
for subsistence, and rice, sunflower, onions, garlic, sesame, and cotton cultivated as cash crops. 
Livestock are kept in large numbers by people from the Waarusha, Maasai, and Barbaig ethnic 
groups. Other ethnic groups also often keep smaller herds of cattle. The Burunge villages are 
accessible by road throughout the year, except for Manyara village where a seasonal river blocks 
road access to the village during the rainy season. Whereas all the 10 member villages have 
a village government office and a primary school, only eight have a health centre. 
The WMA was formally initiated in 2006, and since, the village land areas that were designated 
for the WMA have been managed by a community-based organisation (CBO) known as Burunge 
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Authorised Association (JUHIBU). The CBO has assumed the member village councils’ 
powers to negotiate contracts, redistribute revenues, resolve conflicts, and allocate user rights on 
the WMA lands. The CBO governance structure includes the CBO general assembly with a 
board of trustees attached, executive committee, and the CBO secretariat. The CBO general 
assembly is the highest body of decision-making, and its participants include three 
representatives from each member village and one member of board of trustees from each 
member village, village officials (village chairpersons and village executive officers), ward 
officials (ward executive officers and ward councillors), divisional secretary, and district officials, 
including, district game officer, district land officer, district cooperative officer, and the district 
legal officer. Only village representatives hold voting rights; village, ward, and districts 
officials’ participation in the general assembly is meant for provision of legal and technical advice 
to representatives to make informed decisions. The general assembly has a total of 66 members 
and meets at least three times each year. The assembly receives and deliberates on issues raised 
by village councils and village assemblies, elects 10 people among the CBO village 
representatives to form an executive committee, and employs staff and experts whenever 
deemed necessary. 
The executive committee is responsible for day-to-day management of the CBO, such as 
negotiating investment contracts, distribution of revenue to member villages, and leading 
efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts. The CBO secretariat is an administrative unit, which 
maintains records and manages the CBO office. This secretariat comprises the CBO secretary, 
treasurer, office secretary, and an attendant. The CBO employs 30 village game scouts who conduct 
patrols and enforce the rules governing the WMA as well as seek to assist farmers in dealing with 
wildlife nuisances, in particular, crop damages. Burunge CBO has both managerial and 
advisory relations with many other institutions and private individuals. However, whilst distant 
institutions, e.g., the Wildlife Division under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism of 
the government of Tanzania, have direct supervisory powers over the CBO, e.g., approval of 
management plans, the institutions close to local people, namely, village assemblies, which have 
power to hold elected village representatives accountable (URT 1982), have only advisory and 
consultative relations (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Burunge CBO interaction with WMA stakeholders (Source: Modified from 
WWF, 2014). 
 
Notes: –––– Administrative relations, 
           ……..Consultative/ Advisory relations 
WMA INITIATION: OFF TO A BAD START 
In the process of joining Burunge WMA, the present-day 10 member villages agreed to set aside 
24,319 ha or around 31% of their total village land area for the WMA (Table 1). The process 
has been described as externally driven and ridden with manipulation and coercion (Igoe and 
Croucher 2007; Baha and Chachage 2007; Sachedina 2008). This impression was confirmed by 
our field work in the present-day Burunge, 10 years after the events. 
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Table 1: Burunge WMA villages and their individual land contributions 
Ward 
name 
Original 
village 
Year of 
secession 
Names of 
villages after 
secession 
Total village 
land before 
secession (ha) 
Land designated for 
WMA ha In % 
Nkaiti Minjingu  Minjingu 23,860 3,747 16 
  2005 Olasiti    
  2009 Kakoi    
 Vilima 
Vitatu 
 Vilima Vitatu 19,800 12,830 65 
Mwada Mwada  Mwada 10,824 3,039 28 
  2004 Ngolei    
 Sangaiwe  Sangaiwe 9,200 2,445 27 
Magara Magara  Magara 15,808 2,258 14 
  2005 Maweni    
  2005 Manyara    
Total 79,492 24,319 31 
Source: Burunge WMA office notice board in 2014. 
The initiation campaigns were led by the District Wildlife Officer with support from the 
African Wildlife Foundation, among others. It targeted six villages located within an area that had 
become known as part of the Tarangire-Manyara wildlife corridor, namely Mwada, Sangaiwe, 
Vilima Vitatu and Magara that quickly accepted the idea, and Minjingu and Mayoka that were 
sceptical. The four villages that readily accepted the WMA had vast tracts of land readily 
available for their relatively low populations at the time and perceived the areas proposed for 
the WMA as marginal lands. In Magara village (the area that now comprises the villages of 
Magara, Manyara, and Maweni. See Table 1), for instance, swampland areas that were regarded 
marginal for agriculture were proposed for the WMA by facilitators. In Mwada, Sangaiwe, 
and Vilima Vitatu, facilitators proposed lands that were situated along the border with Tarangire 
National Park and wildlife migratory routes that were also seen by residents as less valuable 
for agriculture due to risks of crop damage by wildlife. In Vilima Vitatu, the Barbaig ethnic 
minority was wilfully ignored by the village government in the initial land-use planning 
processes, and their settlement and livestock grazing area close to Lake Manyara was suggested 
to be included for Burunge WMA. The perceived low land pressure around the time is reflected 
in the land price: one acre of fertile agricultural land in this area could be bought for USD 10-20 
(1 USD ≈ TSH 1,000, in the early 2000s). In addition, not all residents were well-informed about 
the extent of lands set aside, which, later resulted in conflicts over access to grazing areas. 
Finally, these four villages had no prior income from wildlife-related sources. Therefore, the 
potential to obtain revenue from wildlife-related tourism promised a profitable use of ‘marginal’ 
lands. 
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The two sceptical villages were so, for different reasons. Mayoka suspected that the WMA was 
merely another attempt to include their (disputed) land into Lake Manyara National Park. Since 
1984, Lake Manyara National Park authorities had claimed an area that Mayoka residents 
believed was their village land and prevented residents from using it. Minjingu, on the other 
hand, at the time generated about USD 30,000 per year from private wildlife tourism 
campsites operating on their village land. Minjingu residents were, therefore, not interested in 
joining the WMA if that entailed sharing this income with other villages. They decided to delay 
the decision until more information about income-sharing mechanisms and potential sources of 
income from other villages was availed. Yet, through manipulation and alleged forgery, 
facilitators succeeded in seeing Minjingu included in the WMA (Igoe and Croucher 2007). 
However, to this day, Minjingu village has not consented to be part of the WMA and is actively 
seeking to withdraw from it (Bluwstein et al. 2016). 
FROM BAD TO WORSE, 10 YEARS LATER 
The contestations around Burunge WMA’s establishment were just a pretext to the mounting 
challenges that would face its governance regime over the years to come. Bluwstein et al. 
(2016) describe how the WMA today is ridden with conflicts and contestation over its legality 
and the restrictions on uses of WMA land. The CBO appears unwilling to listen to demands and 
grievances from WMA communities that experience disproportionally high costs through 
the WMA. Instead, the CBO spends substantial financial resources in legal trials against 
Minjingu village that challenges its membership, and there have been several violent encounters 
between groups of villagers and village game scouts and/or the guards hired by the tourism 
investors in Burunge. 
While there is little doubt that past grievances and present discontent with CBO management 
underlies these conflicts, the WMA is also structurally challenged on several accounts. Human, 
livestock and wildlife populations and general socio-economic developments assert an 
increasing pressure on the WMA governance regime. According to national and local-level 
censuses, the human population in the villages that today comprise Burunge WMA has grown 
from around 17,000 individuals in 2000 (URT 2003) to 34,000 in 2012 (NBS 2012)2. This 
development has contributed to a growing land pressure. 
In this village, many young people have completed primary and some 
secondary school, but they have no jobs. They need land to start their 
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own farms and have their own incomes. But the village has no land to 
distribute, not like 10 years ago, when we even gave land to people from 
town [outside the village] to farm. (Interview with a village chairperson, 
a Burunge WMA member village, 2015). 
Further, the past decade has seen an increase in the potential for agriculture-led development 
in the area. Prices for agricultural crops have increased substantially in Tanzania over this 
period (Minot 2010; Adam et al. 2012), and the Burunge area has seen infrastructure 
improvement and State-led initiatives aimed at agriculture-led development. The Manyara 
regional government, the NGO Farm Africa, and the Selian Agriculture Research Institute 
(SARI), among others, have supported agriculture-led development in the area in various ways, 
such as promoting farming of cash crops, e.g. rice, onions and sesame, through extension 
services and education as well as direct marketing. This has changed people’ outlook with 
regard to farmlands areas. Swamplands that were previously considered marginal are now 
highly profitable agricultural lands. Today, the cost of leasing one acre of wetland suitable for 
rice production is estimated at USD 60-90 (1 USD ≈ TSH 2,000, in June 2015) per production 
cycle, and the selling price for such land is estimated at USD 600-700 per acre. In an interview, 
a male resident of a Burunge WMA member village said in 2015, “Land for our youth is a big 
problem. Few households still have land to give to their children. The prices show how valuable 
land is in the village. And with more people coming to the village for farming, land conflicts 
increase.” 
Elephants raiding peoples’ farms add to the pressure on Burunge WMA governance. A recent 
census estimates that the elephant population density in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem 
has grown by more than 60% since 2009 to reach approximately 1 elephant per sq. km in 2014 
(TAWIRI 2010; 2015). The census results are mirrored in the perceptions of people residing 
in the Burunge villages of Kakoi, Vilima Vitatu, Minjingu, Olasiti, and Sangaiwe who report 
increasing intensity of crop raids in the early harvesting season for maize, watermelons, and 
cowpea. The rampant destruction of near-ripe crops, and the feeling of insecurity and 
powerlessness when facing elephant herds in the agricultural fields at night, lead to anger and 
resentment against the CBO that is seen as one of the prominent faces of conservation in the 
area. In response to the elephant problem, and as a consequence of the support to agriculture-led 
development mentioned above, some farmers in elephant-prone areas are now growing sesame3. 
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Yet, this has, in turn, increased the overall demand for agricultural land, as most people farming 
sesame also rent land further away to grow maize for subsistence. 
Alongside the growth in human and elephant populations, the Burunge area has apparently 
seen an increase in overall livestock populations. Table 2 presents official statistics on the 
development of  livestock populations since 2002 in Burunge member villages. While we 
are critical of these figures, there are other indications that livestock populations in the area 
have increased. A survey of 161 households among eight4 Burunge member villages in 2014, 
for instance, indicated that since 2007 cattle ownership had grown by 4% and ownership of goats 
and sheep by 27%. This is a much lower growth rate than what is reflected in the statistics, but the 
survey excluded changes in livestock populations as a consequence of population growth. In 
sum, these 161 households reported ownership of a total of 3,048 heads of cattle and 4,026 
sheep and goats in 2014. Extrapolating these numbers to the total sample population of the 
survey5 gives 53,033 heads of cattle and 73,750 sheep and goats6. While this estimate only 
covers the survey population, which is a subset of the total populations of eight of Burunge’s nine 
member villages, it appears to support the broader range of estimates in the official statistics 
report for 2010 and 20127. While we cannot provide precise estimates of the growth in livestock 
populations, there is little doubt that such growth has taken place and that it is attributed as much 
to a growth in the number of resident households and outsiders coming to the area in search 
of pasture as it is to increase in livestock numbers kept by individual households: 
Mbulu and Mang’ati migrants from Dareda [a highland division of 
Babati district] come with many cows. [Name of Mbulu migrant] alone 
has maybe 150 cows. Some villagers [residents] here own about 10 to 20 cows, 
grazing areas were enough for us, but now Mbulu graze even in our farms. 
(Interview with a village chairperson, a Burunge WMA member village, 2014). 
Therefore, today, 10 years after it was established, the governance regime of Burunge WMA 
is severely challenged. Grievances associated with its manipulative initiation (Igoe and 
Croucher 2007) continue to haunt present-day governance efforts in the form of court trials and 
everyday challenges to the grazing restrictions by herdsmen who feel that they were not 
consulted during the initial land-use planning process (Bluwstein et al. 2016). In addition, 
the growth in human, livestock, and elephant populations, and in opportunities for agriculture-
led development has added considerable pressure on the WMA governance regime. In the 
following, we examine how the governance regime responds to these challenges. 
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Table 2: Livestock trends in Burunge WMA 
Name of livestock Population 
Year 2003 2010 2012 
Cattle 10,683 39,015 61,118 
Goat 3,227 47,900 35,077 
Sheep 2,781 9,623 20,090 
Donkey          150 1,246 3,238 
Source: Compiled from URT (2003), Burunge-GMP (2010b) and Babati district livestock 
census 201217 
A FAILING GOVERNANCE REGIME 
Wildlife-related tourism, and the revenues and labour opportunities it may give rise to, is 
the main tangible benefit that may offset or at least counter the costs for villages associated 
with joining into a WMA. Burunge is a leading income-generating WMA in Tanzania, second 
only to Ikona (WWF 2014). The WMA income sources include photographic tourism, fees from 
game hunting, fines, research fees, and NGO donations. The WMA receives 65% of non-
consumptive revenues paid as tourist fees or commonly referred to as photographic tourism 
revenue while 20% and 15% are retained by the Wildlife Division and District council, 
respectively (WWF 2014). Our attempts at gaining an overview of the finances of Burunge 
CBO showed that the records are scattered and internally contradictory8. Yet, from the evidence 
available, our best estimate of the total WMA income over the past 10 years is USD 1,951,010. 
Annual incomes appear to have increased over this period from USD 29,997 in 2006-2007 
to over USD 488,445 in 2014-2015 due to an increase in the number of tourist lodges paying 
revenues to the WMA over the period (Table 3). 
Table 3: Burunge WMA revenues and expenses in USD18 
Financial 
Year 
Reported 
Revenue 
CBO 
Expenses 
Shared with 
member 
villages 
Number of 
villages  
Revenue 
received by 
each village 
2006-2007 29,997.59 6,637.13 14,998.80 9# 1,666.53 
2007-2008 62,714.08 20,202.52 31,357.04 8^ 3,919.63 
2008-2009 53,534.91 26,316.16 24,840.53 9* 2,760.05 
2009-2010 151,745.88 67,555.45 75,872.94 10† 7,587.29 
2010-2011 244,662.35 93,953.24 122,331.17 10† 12,233.12 
2011-2012 301,744.50 112,064.19 150,872.25 9^ 16,763.58 
2012-2013 293,015.00 128,570.64 119,875.50 10† 14,103.00 
2013-2014 325,150.60 146,205.92 105,633.49 10† 12,427.47 
2014-2015 488,445.58 224,937.10 114,971.40 10† 13,526.05 
Total 1,951,010.49 826,442.34 760,753.12 10 84,986.72 
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Source: Burunge CBO office notice board in 2015 and audit reports. Notes: # Burunge WMA 
has 9 member villages; ^ Minjingu refuses to accept income share, and it was distributed to 
other villages; * Kakoi village is formed; † Minjingu income is being held by the CBO 
The officially declared incomes are equally distributed between a share going towards 
WMA administration and management, i.e., CBO office expenses and village game scouts 
salaries and operational expenses, and a share that is distributed equally among Burunge’s 
member villages. Over the 10 years USD 826,442 were used to pay for office expenses, 
administration and rule enforcement, USD 760,753 were shared among member villages. 
Around USD 360,564 were kept in four different CBO bank accounts, and about USD 3,250 
remained unaccounted for in official records9. 
The funding of village game scouts contributes to some degree towards alleviating problems 
with crop raiding by elephants. Yet, although appreciated by villagers, the efforts by village 
game scouts are seen as wholly inadequate to effectively reduce wildlife damages. A Burunge 
WMA member village resident said in a 2015 interview, “If they [village game scouts] are around 
when the elephants come, they bomb them [using chili bombs]. But many times, we call them, 
they don’t come, sometimes they came late, they have only one car.” 
On average, Burunge member villages have received USD 7,606 per year corresponding to 
roughly USD 2.2 per person per year (based on the 2012 census estimate of 34,000 people 
residing in the Burunge member villages). As Table 3 indicates, Minjingu village has never 
accepted its share of the revenues. Rather, its share from the periods 2009-2010 and 2012-2014 
is held by the Burunge CBO. 
The funds received by the villages have been invested in village development activities, 
such as construction and maintenance of public school classrooms, teachers’ houses, village 
offices, and a ward health centre, which is yet to be completed. Burunge residents perceive 
that WMA incomes have resulted in fewer requests from the village councils for individual 
contributions to village development activities. Yet, many see this as wholly inadequate to 
compensate for forgone access to agricultural and grazing lands. The common sentiments from 
residents, especially those from the ‘livestock villages’ of Kakoi, Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu 
include statement from an interview of a Burunge WMA member village resident in 2015, 
“Yes we don’t contribute anymore, but we still have to pay school fees and buy uniforms and 
shoes for our children. I have to sell a cow or may be two goats. We need to graze there [in a 
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hunting block].” In another statement, an elderly man, participating in a focus group discussion in 
one of the Burunge WMA member village in 2014, said: 
Who is the community? They [CBO and district game officer] say it is a 
community conservation. Where do they get all the powers to push villagers 
not to graze in the community land? Livestock is our life, when a cow dies it 
is very painful. 
WMA revenue is not used to compensate residents for damages caused by wildlife (WWF 
2014). The government has no compensatory policy either. Rather it may decide to provide 
money to individuals as a consolation for their loss (URT 1998). Yet, such consolation is 
rarely offered in Tanzania. In Burunge for instance, residents complained that district officials 
would send someone to record their losses, but nothing follows after that: “They [district 
officials] write our names and acres of crops eaten by elephants, but we don’t see money” 
(interview with a Burunge WMA member village resident, 2014). 
The equality principle applied in the sharing of WMAs revenue between villages is 
contested. While revenues are shared equally, tourism investments that generate the revenue are 
located in a few villages, namely Mwada, Kakoi, Vilima Vitatu and Minjingu. Olasiti and 
Sangaiwe villages, each has two campsites on land that is outside the WMA and, therefore, the 
full incomes accrue to the villages, not the WMA. The remaining villages, Magara, Maweni, 
Ngolei, and Manyara, are rarely if ever, visited by the larger wildlife species of interests to 
tourists10. Thus, these three villages do not currently provide any wildlife corridor function. So, 
while revenue is distributed equally, the underlying ‘production’ of that revenue through hosting 
of investments on village WMA-land and associated higher wildlife densities, and thereby costs 
of wildlife damages to crops and livestock, are not. In effect, some Burunge villages free-ride on 
others by receiving revenue they do not contribute to producing, and Kakoi, Olasiti, and 
Sangaiwe villages in addition to that, also reap full benefits from investments on their lands 
that are not part of the WMA. 
Furthermore, some of the freeriding villages today perceive the restrictions on their WMA land 
as severely compromising their development opportunities. Wetlands within the Magara, 
Manyara, and Maweni villages WMA areas, for instance, are today seen as highly valuable 
agricultural land for rice production. Thus, the WMA restrictions have become ‘real’ 
constraints. 
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Elsewhere in Burunge, restrictions on the use of WMA land follow from the specifics of 
contracts made with investors. In Vilima Vitatu, for instance, a large tract of WMA land has 
become off limits for people and livestock due to the establishment of a luxury wildlife 
tourism business that requires a large tract of ‘pristine’ and undisturbed wilderness for its high 
end accommodation and game drives. Ironically, this lodge–which imposes high costs on the 
villages in terms of a large reduction in the area where grazing is permitted– brings in only 
small amounts of revenue. In another Burunge village, Mwada, another lodge that offers 
more modest accommodation and no game drives, but for a higher number of visitors, only 
takes up a fraction of the land and brings in much more revenue11. 
Thus, the cost-benefit ratio of the WMA varies over time and space due to a number of factors that 
determine the restrictions on WMA land and the costs associated with such restrictions. These 
have not been constant over time, but have generally increased with the developments in 
populations of humans, livestock and elephants, and agriculture-led development 
opportunities described above. Unfortunately, the land-use planning done during the 
establishment of Burunge WMA and in subsequent negotiations with investors has not resulted 
in favourable cost-benefit ratios. The original land-use planning exercise did not anticipate a 
growing demand for land for grazing and farming and the contract made with the investor in 
Vilima Vitatu has imposed additional costs on villagers. 
REALITY AND REPRESENTATION: WMAS IN TANZANIA 
Burunge WMA is a story of unsettled past grievances and growing pressure on a governance 
regime that is unable or unwilling to respond (Bluwstein et al., 2016). To this date, Minjingu 
village rejects its status as a member and residents explore multiple ways of exiting and 
pursuing compensation for what they perceive as an illegal and coercive take-over of rights to 
their village land and the profits generated thereon. A mere 10 years following its implementation, 
the restrictions on land-use associated with Burunge WMA are seen as severely limiting peoples’ 
development opportunities, and as adding insult to injury for the many people who never agreed 
to enter into the WMA in the first place. The meagre revenues–and their sharing across too many 
villages–do little to appease peoples’ feelings of losses and injustice. Thus, on a closer look, 
one of the most celebrated WMAs in Tanzania–ideally situated in the midst of the northern 
wildlife tourism circuit–is rife with conflict and contestation. 
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Unfortunately, evidence from other, including much more recent, WMA establishment 
processes across Tanzania indicates that manipulative, haphazard, and illegitimate WMA 
implementation processes that result in villages losing rights to large shares of their village land 
territories remain the standard today (Loveless 2014; Homewood et al. 2015; Bluwstein and 
Lund, in review). This seriously contradicts the portrayal of WMAs and their implementation 
processes by the Government of Tanzania, donors, NGOs, and other actors involved in 
legislating, financing, and implementing this policy and clearly defies the notion of ‘CBC’. 
It takes little imagination to see how the situation could be changed in favour of more local support 
and legitimacy. Indeed, many of the ideas we will present below are also described in the recent 
WMA evaluations by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and WWF 
(USAID 2013; WWF 2014). The Government of Tanzania could forfeit its share of the revenues to 
favour villages, for instance, by doing away with the 35% tax on non-consumptive tourism 
revenues12. Such an arrangement would be logical because WMAs ostensibly serve as corridors 
between and/or buffer zones for protected areas and game reserves. Thus, the positive externalities 
rendered by WMAs support the generation of substantial foreign exchange earnings and revenue for 
the central government through tourism in protected areas and game reserves managed by the 
Wildlife Division. At the WMA level, the sharing of revenues could be changed to favour villages 
that bear the brunt of the costs, and/ or villages that do not contribute to corridor functions could 
be excluded. In Burunge, for instance, there seems to be agreement that the main rationale for its 
establishment was to maintain the area as a viable wildlife corridor (Igoe and Croucher 2007; 
Sachedina 2008; District game officer, CBO representatives, and AWF staff. pers. comm. 
2013). Yet, presently, Minjingu, Kakoi, Vilima Vitatu, and Olasiti village serve this function. The 
setup of Burunge WMA, thus, brings an unnecessary (from the point of view of the corridor 
function) element of conflict and illegitimacy to the WMA. Another possibility that could tilt the 
cost-benefit in favour of the WMA would be a greater allowance for grazing within the WMA. 
In Burunge, for instance, grazing is, in principle13, allowed in the General Use Zone, while banned 
in the Hunting Use Zone, and Corridor Use Zone. While the business models of investors in 
photographic and hunting tourism may be incompatible with livestock grazing, there is less 
evidence to suggest that the corridor function of Burunge, and other WMAs, would suffer from 
a general allowance of grazing within the WMA. Evidence exists of close and peaceful co-
habitation among livestock, pastoralists, and wildlife (e.g., Nepal and Webber 1995; Woodroffe et 
al. 2005; Goldman 2009; Odadi et al. 2011), and use of the WMA Corridor Use Zones for grazing 
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would not imply changed land uses or the establishment of permanent settlements that could defy 
the purposes of the WMA. Finally, the Government of Tanzania could support the Burunge 
CBO (and other CBOs with similar problems) in rule enforcement against political and 
economic elites, such as district level civil servants, tourism operators, and wealthy individuals 
who today appear to more or less act with impunity (see also Homewood et al. 2015). 
While it is not difficult to point to sensible policy measures that could support the legitimacy 
and long-term viability of WMAs, we are not optimistic with regard to the possibilities for 
change. Recent years have seen a recentralisation of wildlife-based revenue collection and 
a rise in repressive and militarised anti-poaching measures in Tanzania that does not bode 
well for the enfranchisement of village residents (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; 
Homewood et al. 2015). Meanwhile, new WMAs are established at a high pace and with 
deleterious consequences for rural residents who are subjected to haphazard and top-down 
planning processes without the due attention to process and consultation promised in official 
WMA implementation guidelines (Loveless 2014; Bluwstein and Lund, in review). And while 
villages, such as Sinya in Enduimet WMA and Minjingu in Burunge WMA, have struggled 
for years to regain rights over their village lands, there appears to be no responsiveness to their 
calls for justice. 
This brings us to the question—that was posed already by Igoe and Croucher in 2007—of why 
the blatant differences between realities on the ground and the ‘sacred simplified’ descriptions 
offered by implementing agencies can persist? Relevant staff at the implementing agencies, 
such as the Wildlife Division, WWF, AWF, GIZ, Honeyguide Foundation, and Wildlife 
Conservation Society of Tanzania, are hardly unaware of the failure of the WMA policy to 
bring about the promises of improved rural livelihoods and its glaring lack of local legitimacy 
in many places. Yet, this evidence remains ignored or downplayed in reports. For instance, the 
cases of Sinya village in Enduimet and Minjingu village in Burunge that were coerced and 
manipulated into joining the WMAs (Igoe and Croucher 2007; Benjaminsen et al. 2013) is 
written off in recent WMA evaluations by USAID and WWF as a question of villagers being 
disgruntled with having to share wildlife tourism revenues that they would previously keep 
to themselves (USAID 2013; WWF 2014). Yet, this representation erases the processes 
whereby these two villages ended up being part of the WMA, processes that defy the notion 
of CBC as well14. While staff from these organisations acknowledge the existence of such 
fundamental problems in private conversation (see Transnational conservation NGO staff, 
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pers. comm. 2013; Bluwstein and Lund, in review), there are no indications that such 
acknowledgement will lead to a serious rethinking of the WMA policy model or to the 
reopening of negotiations about existing WMAs (see PINGOs forum 2013; Bluwstein and Lund, 
in review). Rather, there are indications that WMAs are increasingly seen as strategic entities 
for increased anti-poaching efforts15. 
So, resourceful actors continue to support and publicly celebrate the WMA policy. The 
Wildlife Division and the host of NGOs and donor agencies thereby choose to ignore the 
evidence of fundamental problems for reasons we can only speculate about. From the point 
of view of conservation, WMAs have allowed conservation interests to gain a foothold on 
massive amounts of village land—the 38 WMAs will cover ~7% of Tanzania’s total territory 
(WWF 2014; MNRT 2015). When viewed as such, the rush to establish WMAs has 
accomplished quite a lot in a decade— allowing conservationists a possibility to further affirm 
and consolidate conservation interests on village lands for years to come. Yet, we are fully 
aware that construing the observed discrepancy between public and private transcripts of the 
actors involved in funding and implementing WMAs as owing to a conservationist plot is too 
simplistic. Rather, we follow Benjaminsen et al. (2013: 7) who argue that the broader 
developments within wildlife policy in Tanzania owes to “a complex interaction of several 
factors, including neoliberal conservation, neo-patrimonial state practices, and foreign 
control of wildlife conservation discourse and practice.” 
Yet, while we agree with Benjaminsen et al. (2013) that the policy, practice, and outcomes of 
WMAs and the wider wildlife policy environment resonate with the interacting forces they 
identify, we do not believe that neoliberal ideology, profit, and rent-seeking are the only 
motives driving individual professionals within conservation in Tanzania. Rather, our 
impression is that many of the people working as professionals within the conservation-
development industry in Tanzania— professionals within the Government of Tanzania, 
funders, conservation and research organizations—believe in the value of seeking to do 
better for both, people and wildlife in Tanzania. 
However, there is a collective failure to fully acknowledge and confront on the ground realities 
in public. As such, the discrepancy between realities on the ground and what can be gleaned from 
official evaluation reports by funders and implementing agencies as well as some research 
publications echo findings from other critical studies of policy formation (Mosse 2004; 
Goldman 2007; Büscher 2014 Blundo 2015). These studies, often based on ethnographic work, 
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show that staffs of development organisations and public bureaucracies manage multiple 
competing and contradicting logics and claims. The contradictions inherent in ends and means 
present professionals within the environment-development industry with a stream of dilemmas. 
Few can claim to be outside of that stream. Yet, acknowledging that our hands are not completely 
free does not absolve us from responsibility. People in the areas affected by the WMA policy 
are caught in the midst of a gross injustice that is unlikely to go away in the absence of 
concerted contestation. It is our common responsibility to see that injustice undone. This 
cannot be achieved in the same top-down manner that led residents (knowingly or 
unknowingly) into the WMAs in the first place. Yet, in many WMA areas, contestation from 
below takes place. It is high time for those who fund, legislate, implement, and study WMAs 
to lend time and support directly to such efforts of people who seek to unravel themselves 
from an unwanted and unfair policy. 
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NOTES 
1. This number includes Minjingu village that, however, has never acknowledged its membership 
status and is currently pursuing its independence and land rights in a court case against the WMA. 
2. The growth of the human population of the area over time is documented in various 
sources: approximately 22,500 people when the WMA was initiated in 2002 (NBS 2002); 
Approximately. 27,000 in 2010 (Burunge-GMP 2010a) and; Approximately. 34,000 in the 2012 
national census (NBS 2012). The 2012 national census data were corroborated by checking 
contemporary census data held at the member village offices. 
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3. According to local residents, sesame is not eaten by elephants. 
4. The 161 households were distributed among eight of Burunge’s nine current member villages. 
Yet, the sampling was done on the basis of villages in existence in 2002. Thus, the households 
in the sample are divided as: 41 from the 2002 Minjingu village (only sampled within present-day 
Kakoi and Olasiti, as Minjingu village does not recognize being member of Burunge WMA); 40 
from 2002 Magara village (present-day Magara, Manyara and Maweni villages); 40 from 2002 
Mwada village (present-day Mwada and Ngolei villages); and 40 from Sangaiwe village (no 
village secessions since 2002). Selection was stratified random. Only households that were 
present in the village in 2007 were included in the sample frame. This implied, inter alia, that 
the sampling targeted older households and, therefore, likely households owning more 
livestock than the average household. 
5. The total sample population included households that had been formed prior to 2007, i.e., it 
is a sub-sample of the total village population. We do not attempt extrapolation to the total 
village population due to our hypothesis that the sample population is different from the total 
population, i.e., likely to be older households owning more livestock. 
6. The survey sample included one very large cattle owner. Excluding that household from 
the estimate changes the overall estimate to 29,098 heads of cattle and 68,267 sheep and goats. 
7. Interviews with members of the pastoralists association of the village Vilima Vitatu–that 
is one of three member villages (Vilima Vitatu, Olasiti, Kakoi) having the majority of livestock 
among Burunge member villages—further corroborate the estimate. In 2014, a local census 
revealed around 15,000 heads of cattle in this village. The census implied that 4,000 heads 
were moved out of the village on grounds that they belonged to non-residents. 
8. There were no well-kept records that show income and expenditure for early years of 
the WMA. We obtained annual incomes and funds distributed to village from the CBO office 
notice board, and for other expenditures, we gathered data from different meeting reports. A 
complete set of financial records were available for financial years 2012-2013, 2013-2014, 
and 2014-2015 only. 
9. The amount in bank accounts include USD 44,540 owed to Minjingu village, unaccounted 
revenue is, therefore, more than USD 3,250. 
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10. We interviewed several villagers who all claimed that large wildlife did not pass through 
the villages, apart from the rare hippopotamus in the wet season. Monthly reports from village 
game scouts confirmed this as does the research done by Kikoti (2009) on wildlife movements 
in the area. 
11. The lodge in Mwada village has 65 beds (i.e., can accommodate 65 tourist per night) and is 
estimated to generate about USD 268,800 per year i.e., four times more than the lodge which 
offer game drives on a large pristine land but accommodate only 12 tourists per night, bringing 
about USD 50,400 for the WMA per year. 
12. This would bring WMAs in line with community-based forest management that is, in 
many ways, a parallel to WMAs only focusing on forests, rather than wildlife (Nelson and 
Blomley, 2010). Villages retain all revenues from products from community-based forest 
management, whereas the government waives all royalties and fees (Lund, 2007). 
Community-based forest management in Tanzania is not free of environmentalist-
paternalistic oversight (Green and Lund 2015). Yet, the revenue sharing formulae does 
favour villages to  a much higher degree than other CBC schemes in Tanzania, such as those 
of Joint Forest Management and Wildlife Management Areas. 
13. Due to an agreement with investors operating in the General Use Zone down towards 
Lake Manyara, the WMA has agreed to ban grazing there too.  
14. Sinya’s case has been described by Benjaminsen et al. (2013). The village hosted wildlife 
tourism investments before the arrival of the WMA policy and did not wish to join a WMA. Yet, 
Benjaminsen et al. (2013) describe how the investor was pushed to relocate investments to a 
neighboring village that was WMA member and from then one only paid the government fees, 
while Sinya suddenly received no income from the continued use of its lands for game drives. 
15. In 2015, for instance, USAID initiated two projects ‘Promoting Tanzania’s Environment, 
Conservation, and Tourism (PROTECT)’ and ‘Endangered Ecosystems - Northern Tanzania 
(EENT)’ focusing on WMAs and anti-poaching efforts in Northern Tanzania with a total 
budget of app. 25 million USD over five years (USAID, 2015a, 2015b). 
16. The map was graciously provided to us by Jevgeniy Bluwstein. It also features in Bluwstein et 
al. (2016). Importantly, this is not an official map. Many village boundaries are not official and 
might change in local negotiations. The boundaries have been estimated as best possible based on 
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field presence and corroborated with preliminary maps from Babati District, Village Land Use 
Plans, GIS shapefiles (WWF, National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania) and Google Earth satellite 
images. Agricultural area is mapped based on 2014 shapefiles (Honeyguide Foundation). 
17. Livestock population data were compiled from the socio-economic baseline study for 
Burunge WMA in 2003, the general management plan that use information sourced from 
member villages in 2010, and the district livestock survey conducted in 2012 where village 
leaders collected information about livestock populations in their respective villages. 
18. Income and revenue records were obtained in Tanzanian shilling, and changed to USD based 
on the annual exchange rate. Data for 2006-2007 to 2011-2012 were obtained from CBO notice 
board (posted as part of accountability and transparency agenda), between 2012-2012 and 2013-
2014 from audit reports (audits conducted by a freelance certified auditor as part of capacity 
building program) and for 2014-2015 information was obtained from handover report for CBO 
leadership changes. 
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Abstract 
This article analyses how states and non-state actors’ efforts at sustaining natural resource lead 
to the exclusion of those who are most dependent on access to it. An access lenses review of 
Burunge Wildlife Management Area unravels the paradox between policy promise and practice. 
Situating our case in the context of neoliberal conservation that offers opportunities of 
patronage, rent-seeking, and capital accumulation to various state and private investors, we 
show that Wildlife Management Areas concentrate licit benefits to a few elites while excluding 
the majority of rural peoples in accessing their customary lands and natural resources. This 
leads people to rely on illicit access mechanisms, and consequently, leading to violent 
confrontations between game scouts and people and protests and struggles to regain legal 
access. These conflicts erode rural peoples’ trust and willingness to support conservation. The 
widely overlooked socioeconomic and political contextualization in conservation policy 
formation, often framed in apolitical and normative terms, acts as a vehicle for different 
meanings and practices that are mobilized by different actors to promote their own interests. 
Thus, state and non-state actors, whose interests override ideals of an apolitical conservation 
vision, jointly produce an austere conservation regime that strips local people from access to 
resources. 
Key Words: 
Wildlife Management Areas, land, access, elite capture, conflicts 
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Introduction 
For the past two decades, the discourse and policy negotiations in conservation - development 
nexus has been to harmonize compliance with conservation rules (Kahler & Gore, 2012; 
Solomon, Gavin, & Gore, 2015) and improve equality in benefits distribution (Belsky 1999; 
Dressler et al., 2010; Miller, Minteer, & Malan, 2011; Ribot, Lund, & Treue, 2010; Roe, 
Mohammed, Porras, & Giuliani, 2013). Policy documents and programs promoted greater 
inclusion of local communities in natural resource management and sustainable use of the 
resources for poverty alleviation (see World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987; International Union for Conservation of Nature/United Nations Environment 
Programme/World Wide Fund for Nature, 1991; United Nation, 1992; MDG, 2000). 
The paradox is, however, that while policy level dialogue seems to favour community inclusion, 
developments on the ground appear to further exclude communities from accessing land and 
resources (Green & Adams, 2015; Sachedina, 2010). This divide between policy intent and 
outcome can be explained by the way of how policy is formulated and implemented in apolitical 
and normative terms (Benjaminsen, Goldman, Minwary, & Maganga, 2013; Humphries, 2013; 
Kiwango, Komakech, Tarimo, & Martz, 2015). While calls for good governance, transparency, 
and accountability abound, the political economy of patronage, rent-seeking, and elite capture 
is ignored rather than actively engaged and transformed (Sachedina, Igoe, & Brockington, 
2010). Consequently, neoliberal conservation does not promote the principles of good 
governance, transparency, and accountability, but rather acts as a vehicle for practices of 
exclusion that are mobilized by different conservation actors in pursuit of their interests in the 
name of conservation (Moyo, Ijumba, & Lund, 2016). 
In Tanzania, state and non-state conservation actors1 have, with substantial donor financing, 
promoted wildlife conservation outside of core protected areas through the implementation of 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) on village lands2 (Sachedina, 2010; Sachedina et al., 
2010; Wilfred, 2010). WMAs, a community-based wildlife management policy, intends to 
foster wildlife conservation and promote local people’s participation in the management of 
wildlife in their village lands (URT, 1998). However, the past two decades of WMAs policy 
implementation have so far not produced the intended socioeconomic outcomes (see; 
Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Bluwstein, Moyo, & Kicheleri, 2016; Moyo et al., 2016; Pailler, 
Naidoo, Burgess, Freeman, & Fisher, 2015). Instead, various studies have shown how WMAs 
operate through top-down interventions that lack space for local peoples’ meaningful 
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participation (e.g., Baha & Chachage, 2007; Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 
2010; Bluwstein et al., 2016; Igoe & Croucher, 2007; Loveless, 2014). The centralization of 
meaningful powers has led to technical planning that offers no room for the accommodation of 
local peoples’ needs in the light of emerging socioeconomic developments (Moyo et al., 2016). 
However, a recent scholarship by Wright (2017) aptly asserts that WMAs creates spaces for the 
community to collectively demand change and influence access decisions. Yet, Wright (2017) 
argues that in diverse communities with largely heterogeneous livelihoods strategies, averting 
top-down drawn access limitations might be less effective. 
To illustrate how policy intent is translated into an exclusionary practice of conservation, we 
explored a prominent Tanzanian WMA, Burunge WMA. Burunge WMA is an interesting case 
because it is portrayed by its initiators — the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), as a model example of Community Based Wildlife 
Management (CBWM) (see AWF, n.d.; WWF, 2014), and the WMA training manuals and the 
proliferation of WMAs in Tanzania have been much based on reported Burunge successes. 
AWF’s practical handbook for setting up and managing a WMA, for instance, refers to Burunge 
WMA as ‘‘one of the most well managed WMAs in Tanzania and a source of many good 
practices’’ (AWF, n.d., p. 15). Burunge WMA is also located in an area with lots of tourism 
activities (Moyo et al., 2016), which is an ideal condition for realizing WMAs goal to promote 
activities that are less dependent on land such as ecotourism to reduce pressure on land 
(Goldman, 2003; Nelson, 2013). Yet a large body of literature exists that shows that Burunge 
WMA is rife with community grievances pertaining to access to land and others resources (see 
e.g., Bluwstein et al., 2016; Moyo et al., 2016; Igoe & Croucher, 2007; Sachedina, 2008). By 
employing mixed methods, but largely, ethnographic approaches, this study illustrates the 
discrepancy between policy promise and practice, and unfolds the underlying reasons for the 
observed access grievances across a wide range of people practicing different livelihoods 
strategies in Burunge communities. 
Analytical Framework 
To illustrate the discrepancy between policy intents and outcomes on the ground, we studied 
how the WMA access rules and the different actors have contributed to a restrictive 
conservation regime that changed the way local people access land and other resources. We 
employed Ribot and Peluso (2003) access theory as our analytical tool to assess the distribution 
of WMA benefits across different individuals and groups of actors. Ribot and Peluso (2003, p. 
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153), define access as the ‘‘ability [of an actor] to derive benefits from things’’. Thus, following 
this definition, we set our mission to analyse what an actor actually can do with or without 
entitlements. Access theory, as an analytical tool, guides the unveiling of the actual distribution 
of WMA resources and benefits among different actors, and the multiple mechanisms 
underpinning that distribution, such as property rights (based on customary rights, formal rights, 
and legal rights), and the structural and relational mechanisms, such as capital, knowledge and 
skills, technology, markets, labor opportunities, and social identity and relations (see Barrett, 
Carter, & Little, 2006; Bebbington, 1999; Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Sen, 1997). 
Yet, communities are not homogeneous units with a single or aligned interests (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999). Thus, different communities or actors may employ these mechanisms 
differently to keep access open to themselves or exert power over others (Neimark, 2010). 
Property rights, for example, may enhance licit access for holders of titles, permits, and licenses 
(De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2005; Odeny, 2013; Shivji & Kapinga, 1998), but capital, technology, 
and market opportunities may determine actors’ power and influence over the resources 
(African Union, 2010; Latina, Piermartini, & Ruta, 2011; Prieger, 2013). On the other hand, 
social relations and culture may play a key role in mediating access to resources (Neimark 
2010). Thus, restrictive access rules (Myers & Muhajir, 2015; Peluso, 1993; Redford & 
Sanderson, 2000) and neoliberal conservation approaches that promote property rights (Igoe & 
Croucher, 2007) may drive those who depend on customary claims of rights to resort to illicit 
access mechanisms to sustain their livelihoods. 
We, therefore, pay due attention to licit or mandated rights, as well as to illicit actions to identify 
factors beyond the policy that influence benefits distribution (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Through 
access theory lenses, we unveil how different people, depending on their livelihoods strategies, 
access resources through either contestations and compliance of WMAs rules, and identify 
actors who benefit or lose and how. As an analytical tool, access theory also helps to unravel 
the multiple interests and identities within participating communities and their relationships to 
external actors (Ameha, Nielsen, & Larsen, 2014; Blaikie, 1987; Belsky, 1999; Bandyopadhyay 
& Tembo, 2010; Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Forsyth, 2003). We show that different state and non-
state conservation actors assume mediating roles to translate WMA policy into conservation 
practice by following their own interests in the name of conservation. In this process of policy 
translation, the WMA policy notion of combining the agenda of rural peoples’ development 
and sustainable resource management is lost in the struggles over access to land and resources. 
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Methods 
Case Study Area and Methods 
Burunge WMA is located in Babati district, Manyara region in northern Tanzania (Figure 1). 
Burunge WMA was gazzeted in 2006 as one of the first WMAs in Tanzania. It is managed by 
a registered community-based organization (CBO), comprising elected representatives from 
each of the member villages (Moyo et al., 2016). Initially, Burunge WMA consisted of five 
villages, which released 60,094 acres or 31% of their village lands for wildlife conservation. 
Between 2005 and 2009, the original five villages split into 10 villages. According to district 
officials, in response to the rapidly growing population in the area, the district divided the 
villages as a strategy to bring social services closer to local people (Moyo et al., 2016). Burunge 
dwellers livelihoods largely depend on agriculture and livestock (Funk, 2015). Agriculture is a 
primary source of livelihoods for the Mbugwe, Iraqw, Nyaturu, and Nyiramba who dominate 
the population in Mwada, Sangaiwe, Ngolei, Maweni, Magara, and Manyara villages. They 
mainly grow maize and beans for subsistence, and rice, sesame, and cotton to generate cash. 
Livestock are the main source of livelihoods for Arusha and Maasai, ethnicities who are 
predominant in Minjingu, Kakoi and Olasiti villages, and for the Barbaig in Vilima Vitatu 
village. However, agriculture and livestock keeping in Burunge are under constant threats from 
wildlife from the Lake Manyara and Tarangire National Parks and The Manyara Wildlife Ranch 
(Sachedina, 2008; Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute, 2015) that engulf the villages (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Burunge WMA, member villages, tourism investment, and the three use zones 
(modified from Bluwstein et al., 2016). 
GUZ =general use zone; CUZ =corridor use zone; HUZ= hunting use zone 
Methodologically, we used both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. 
Quantitative methods were used to capture information about licit or mandated benefits. Data 
were collected over a period of 11 months3. Ethnographic approach following Thomas, Gavin, 
and Milfont (2015) was used to collect information about illicit activities or extra-legal access 
mechanisms. The longer duration spent in the field helped us to build trust and establish rapport 
with local people, hence reducing chances of nonresponse and social desirability biases (Nuno 
& John, 2015). Twelve villages were surveyed — 10 WMA villages and two non-WMA 
villages. The two non-WMA villages serve as control or comparator villages, whereby 
information collected from the two non-WMA villages is used as a mirror to filter out access 
challenges which are not related to WMA interventions. Selection of non-WMA villages was 
based on (a) the village being adjacent to a WMA village, (b) a non-WMA village borders a 
National Park, and (c) a village not involved in any wildlife conservation project that requires 
it to surrender part of their village lands to conservation. The underlying assumptions were that, 
residents in neighbouring villages are more likely to have similar livelihood strategies, and a 
non-WMA village bordering a National Park face a more or less similar wildlife nuisances and 
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tourism potentials like a WMA village. The similarities in socioeconomic and ecological 
conditions in the study villages make possible the analysis of the impacts of policy on access 
changes (Noe & Kangalawe, 2015). 
We used a semi-structured questionnaire to conduct 33 in-depth interviews and 50 focus group 
discussions, and participated in 13 events, including village assembly meetings, CBO 
committees, village game scout (VGS) camp and ranger posts (Table 1). Prior to the interviews, 
we explained the aim of our research to the prospective respondents to obtain their informed 
consent and promised them anonymity. Participants in focus groups discussions were asked, 
among other things, to evaluate how village residents abide by the WMA access rules. Using 
village households register4, we selected respondents based on their knowledge of the village 
socioeconomic and political situation, gender, livelihood activities, leadership position and 
specific experiences, and relationship with rule-enforcing agents. To minimize biases 
associated with this purposive sampling techniques, we repeated the same questions to different 
respondents, and conducted follow-up interviews with the same respondents and through 
snowballing sampling to triangulate responses. We carefully observed respondents’ facial 
expressions and gestures to capture the real meaning they wished to convey. All interviews 
were conducted in Kiswahili by the first author. Kiswahili is a native language for the first 
author, which is also spoken by almost all residents in Burunge area and in Tanzania. 
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Table 1: Type of survey and sampling intensity 
Survey Type  Respondents Number /Frequency 
WMA villages  Non-WMA villages  
Focus group discussions Village leaders 10 2 
 
Women 10 2 
 
Herdsmen 10 1 
 
CBO representatives 3 
 
 
Farmers  10 2 
    
In-depth interviews VGS 7 
 
 
VGS spouses and relatives 7 
 
 
CBO leaders 8 
 
 
District game officer 1 
 
 
District natural resource officer 1 
 
 
District cooperative officer 1 
 
 
The regional natural resource officer 1 
 
 
VGS injured in access struggles  2 
 
 
Longest serving CBO representatives  3 
 
 
Residences fined for trespassing WMA areas  2 
 
    
Partcipant observation Village general assemblies 2 1 
 
CBO committees meetings 2 
 
 
VGS meeting 1 
 
 
VGS ranger posts 5 
 
  VGS camp 1   
 
Results 
This section documents access conflicts and grievances in Burunge WMA and show how 
different actors and segments of the Burunge community, a congregation of villages and people 
bound together by a WMA, navigate WMA access rules to gain or restrict others from accessing 
WMA resources. It also focuses on unveiling the effectiveness of different resistance 
mechanisms as practiced by different groups of people and actors. Later on, we mirror the 
experiences of WMA villages residents to that of non-WMA villages. By doing so, we are able 
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to show how WMAs processes offer very minimal space political space or democratic processes 
to influence change. Rather WMA process creates spaces for elite capture and incites conflicts 
among participating communities. 
De facto Common Pool Resource Access 
Burunge WMA hosts valuable livelihoods resources, such as potential land for agriculture, 
settlements and livestock grazing, building poles, dry firewood, wood for charcoal production, 
tourism income, wildlife, as well as thatch grasses and other non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs). The CBO, which manages the WMA on behalf of the local communities, with the 
support from the state and non-state conservation actors (WWF and AWF), has put forward a 
set of rules in the General Management Plan (GMP) that guide where, how, and by who a 
particular resource shall be used (Burunge GMP, 2010). The GMP categorizes the WMA lands 
into three use zones: corridor use zone, general use zone, and hunting use zone (see Figure 1 
above). 
Dry firewood and NTFP collection are permitted in corridor use zone and general use zone, 
through a free permit issued by the CBO. Yet, none of the residents had applied for one. The 
CBO office is located about 5 km away from the nearest next WMA village and the furthest 
village is about 25 km away (one day travel by foot). The distance and the associated 
transportation costs discourage residents from obtaining the free permits. The VGS’ role is to 
enforce access rules, but they seem to ‘‘understand and accept’’ the situation. They let residents 
to collect dry firewood and NTFPs without permits, making it a de facto common pool resource 
in certain areas (see Table 2). The lax enforcement could be attributed to (a) the fact that the 
permit is free of charge and (b) state actors and transnational conservation non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs) funding WMAs do not consider collection of dry firewood and NTFP as 
a threat to conservation, and thus do not put emphasis on its control as in the control of livestock 
grazing, tree felling, and agriculture (see the sections that follows). This implies that access 
rules are only enforced when revenues for the WMAs (and state) and conservation interests are 
thought to be jeopardised. Yet, permits are useful tools for collecting information about natural 
resource use trends (Reinganum & Stokey, 1985; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992)—thus Burunge 
WMA misses useful data for management planning. 
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Table 5. Burunge WMA access rules contestation/acceptability 
Products/service Restrictions are broadly 
accepted and adhered to 
Restrictions are 
obeyed by 
some/not always 
Restrictions are 
generally (but not 
openly) ignored 
Restrictions are 
openly contested and 
ignored 
Dry fuel wood 
collection 
 
   
All villages (de facto 
free access) 
 
Tree felling (poles 
for house 
construction) 
 
 
Four agricultural 
villages and two 
pastoral villages 
 
One agricultural 
village and one 
pastoral village 
Two pastoral villages 
and one agricultural 
village* 
Collecting NTFPs 
   
All villages (de facto 
free access) 
 
Charcoal burning Four agricultural 
villages and two 
pastoral villages 
Three agricultural 
villages and one 
pastoral village 
 
  
Livestock grazing 
 
Five agricultural 
villages 
One agricultural 
village (migrants 
herders from other 
areas) 
 
Four pastoral villages 
(host the hunting use 
zone) 
Agricultural land Five pastoral villages 
(host the corridor use 
zone or share boundary 
with the Tarangire 
national park) 
 
Two agricultural 
village 
  Three agricultural 
villages (lucrative 
wetlands for rice 
production) 
Permanent 
settlements 
 
All villages except one 
agricultural village  
  
One agricultural 
village* 
Temporary 
settlements 
 
All villages except, one 
pastoral village 
  
One pastoral village 
(allegedly Barbaigs 
newcomers) 
 
Local hunting 
 
All villages 
  
* This particular agricultural village is home to fishermen who cut trees to establish dwellings close the shores of 
Lake Manyara. 
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Restricted Access and Contestations Patterns 
Burunge WMA regime allows livestock grazing in the general use zone only. Cattle are seen 
by state actors, transnational conservation NGOs funding WMAs and tourism investors as a 
source of landscape degradation (Goldman, 2009), and disturbance to tourism: ‘‘Tourists don’t 
come all the way from Europe to see cattle’’ (interview with a campsite investor, 2015). 
Agriculture, tree felling, permanent settlements, and charcoal production are also viewed as the 
driver of environmental degradation and disjointed conservation (see WWF, 2014), and are 
therefore prohibited in all the three use zones. However, persistent old grievances and changes 
in socioeconomic factors (Moyo et al., 2016) have led Burunge residents to systematically 
contest and neglect WMA access rules. 
Contestation of access rules largely follows a combination of geographical positioning of the 
village and land use zonation and residents’ livelihood strategies. In Burunge, villages located 
along the corridor and hunting use zone are predominantly pastoralist. Historically and prior to 
the WMA, the abundance of fodder for livestock in these areas attracted Maasai, Waarusha, 
and Barbaig agro-pastoralists to settle in. These ethnic groups depended on open access to 
livestock grazing areas, mainly governed by a communally managed5 access mechanism to 
sustain their pastoral based livelihoods. The introduction of WMA, however, has changed 
access to grazing lands from communal to a private control. Corridor use zone is seen by state 
actors and transnational conservation NGOs as an important land needed to connect Tarangire 
and Manyara National Parks, and the hunting zone is leased to a private investor who has sole 
use rights. As a result, grazing restrictions in these two zones are highly enforced by VGS and 
guards hired by private investors to protect their now private property. These changes in 
property rights impel dwellers in these villages to resort to illicit mechanisms and openly contest 
grazing restrictions through violence. Access to agricultural land is openly contested in villages 
where WMA areas host lucrative wetlands for rice production and have less wildlife that could 
nuance agriculture production (Moyo et al., 2016). The predominant population in these 
villages also happens to be Mbugwe, Iraqw, Nyaturu, and Nyiramba who have historically 
exploited their lands for agriculture. Contestations for other natural resources perceived equally 
important across the different segments of the Burunge communities were more or less similar 
across the villages (Table 2). 
The manifestation of access struggles along the lines of the largely ethnic-based livelihoods 
strategies deepens existing societal division between pastoralist and farmers (see Benjaminsen, 
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Maganga, & Abdallah, 2009). While farmers see the absence of wildlife in their areas as an 
opportunity to advance agriculture, pastoralists believe agriculture pushes away wildlife. An 
elder Maasai man said: ‘‘you will only see wildlife in Maasai villages, we take care of them’’ 
(Focus group interview with pastoralists, 2015). The divergent interests among the different 
segments of the community block the opportunities for a community level collective action 
against state and conservationist NGOs. The Burunge case also affirms Benjaminsen et al.’s 
(2009) assertion that, in Tanzania, conflicts pertaining to access to land and natural resources 
result in policy and conservation interventions failures to consider historical and past land use 
experiences. 
The restrictive conservation regime also has negative outcomes on wealth generation in 
WMA communities. A parallel study (conducted by the second author) has shown 
through a quasi-experimental impact evaluation design that since WMA was established, 
poor WMA households have, on average, experienced a slower growth in wealth 
compared to similar non-WMA households (see Funk, 2015). Therefore, we devote the 
remaining part of this article in unravelling the struggles and unveiling the mechanisms 
employed by different actors to gain, maintain access, and restrict others from accessing 
WMA resources. Although we focus on demonstrating access mechanisms in WMA 
villages, we use the information gathered from the two non-WMA villages as a mirror to 
eliminate access challenges that are not originating from the WMA interventions (non-
intervention nuisances). Throughout, we demonstrate that although policy intent is to 
improve local peoples’ access to land and resources, state and non-state conservation 
actors’ efforts at realizing the policy goals lead to the very negative outcomes they strive 
to abate. 
Access to Land for Cultivation and Settlements 
Agriculturalists and individuals seeking to establish permanent dwellings often use 
political maneuvers and bribe village officials to influence WMA rule enforcement. They 
avoid any form of violent confrontations, which could trigger their immediate eviction, 
because dwellings are permanent and crops need to grow for at least one agricultural cycle 
(mostly more than 3 months until they are harvested). Their sedentary nature, therefore, 
requires ‘‘good’’ relations with village officials, assuring their very existence. In one of the 
WMA villages, for example, about 13 individuals (some of them district officials) possess 
documents which show that between the year 2001 and 20056 the village council offered 
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them land in the area now pertaining to the WMA. The documents issued by the then 
village executive officer granted each of the individuals about 10 to 30 acres of lucrative 
wetlands for agriculture. The documents, however, do not meet the legal requirements, as 
they were not accompanied by village assembly or village council minutes of consent as 
required by the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 (URT, 1999). Village council members 
whose signatures appear in the documents also disowned them7. Yet, the costly and slow 
legal processes make the village government less effective in reclaiming the lands. The 
village chairman argued: ‘‘[. . .] every day [frequently] we [village leaders] have to go to 
the police, they tell us to bring this, bring that, but there is no action.’’  
In another WMA village, the village leadership was protective of people who have 
established themselves in the WMA area. In July 1, 2010, the then Babati district 
commissioner ordered the village to evict all individuals who were seen by the CBO to be 
encroaching on the WMA area. Part of the district commissioner’s order read: ‘‘By 
authority rendered to me by the Prime Minister’s Act of 1962, Section 182 C, I order that 
all people from the [name] village and other areas, to vacate the WMA lands within seven 
days.’’ Village leaders, however, ignored the order, arguing that they do not have 
alternative land or funds to offer as compensation. Also, the district authorities were silent 
thereafter; most likely because (a) this particular village has less wildlife and therefore is 
less important for the generation of WMA revenues and (b) some of the farms in this village 
are ‘‘owned’’ and cultivated by district elites who use their office affiliation to suppress 
actions taken against them (Moyo et al., 2016). On the other hand, in areas such as a hunting 
use zone and areas where tourist campsites are located, those encroaching the WMA lands 
have been immediately evicted or taken to court8. These areas generate all the income for 
the CBO (except for income from NGOs donations) and state. This implies that lack of 
potential revenues for the CBO and state, and absence of wildlife and private investors’ 
interests in some parts of the WMA lands, offers opportunity for less violent access 
mechanisms such as political pressure and mimicking behind powerful district elites 
mistakes to be effective. However, the lax enforcement lessens opportunities for ecological 
restoration in the areas thought as ‘‘less valuable WMA areas,’’ which if properly managed 
through land enclosures9, vegetation regeneration would allow wildlife to comeback. 
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Access to Grazing Land 
Traditionally, pastoralists organize themselves and work in groups to exploit communal 
land rights that provide them access to shared grazing areas. But some Burunge residents 
feel that WMA rules infringe on their grazing access (Funk, 2015). They thus use their 
customary organization structures, such as Morans, groups of young Arusha and Maasai 
warriors, to demand and gain access to grazing areas. This is different from the way in 
which pastoralists contest access restrictions: Rather than employing political pressure 
(like how agriculturalist do), pastoralists have often physically confronted VGS and guards 
hired by private investors. Pastoralists can move their herds of cattle quickly to avoid fines 
and confiscation for illicit grazing access. Thanks to this, and their ability to organize and 
work in groups, they are more effective in using physical confrontation to demand access. 
In early 2015, pastoralists in one of the villages where the hunting use zone is located 
attacked two guards hired by a private investor in an attempt to force their way into hunting 
use zone where grazing is prohibited. Village leaders, who were aware of the incident and 
of the perpetrators, refused to take action and instead used the incident to pressure the 
investor to agree to their customary claims of rights to graze in the hunting use zone which 
is also the only source of fodder for their livestock during the dry season. They argued: ‘‘If 
he [the investor] wants peace in his business he should allow us to graze there [hunting use 
zone], as no one will attack his guards, we will protect them.’’ (Interview with a village 
leader, 2015). 
In another WMA village, a resident was fined about US$500 by Tarangire National Park 
authorities for bringing 100 cows to the National Park. The cattle were grazing in the 
hunting use zone when they were ‘‘pushed to the National Park by guards hired by a private 
investor’’ (interview with the village resident, 2014). Park authorities are stricter than VGS 
and have a well-equipped paramilitary unit, which local people cannot easily challenge. A 
number of court cases involving Burunge pastoralists and the CBO, and relating to illicit 
grazing access, were also reported. These cases consumed money and time of both 
pastoralists and the CBO (see Table 4). A former village leader accused of spearheading 
pastoralists to graze in the hunting use zone, for example, sold a cow to pay lawyers to 
fight the criminal charges he was facing at Babati district court: ‘‘I travelled every day 
[frequently] to Babati [Court]. I sold a cow to pay the lawyer, at the end, the court said it 
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is not true [charges were dropped], but who is going to pay me? my money is gone’’ 
(interview with a village resident, 2015). 
Burunge pastoralists also have an association (Nkaiti Herders Association) that ostensibly 
represents their interests across the villages. Yet Maasai and Waarusha, who are the 
majority ethnic groups in villages hosting the hunting use zone, vowed to put their lives on 
line in order to maintain dry season grazing access in this restricted area. A village leader 
argued: 
Although investor’s guards [guards hired by private investors] patrol with 
guns, we are not afraid of them, we will not leave our cows to die. If they want 
peace they have to let us graze there [hunting use zone] when we need 
(interview with a village leader, 2015). 
Maasai and Waarusha, who are the majority in Minjingu and Kakoi villages, share 
traditions and speak a more or less similar language. They view themselves as ‘‘native’’ to 
the area and consider the Barbaigs, who are the majority in Vilima Vitatu village, as 
newcomers and rival competitors for the grazing resources. Thus, they do not cooperate 
with or comprehend Barbaigs’ efforts to fight for grazing restrictions. VGS also reported 
that Barbaigs are more aggressive against VGS of Maasai origin. Barbaigs believe Maasai 
VGS are harsh on them but merciful toward Maasai and Waarusha. In previous years, 
attempts to resist WMAs’ restrictions to access grazing lands led Maasai and Waarusha 
pastoralists to destroy WMA infrastructure, such as roads leading to tourism campsites and 
VGS ranger posts, and attack guards hired by private investors. Barbaigs pastoralists on 
the other hand selectively attacked VGS of Maasai and Waarusha origin. It is important 
also to note that, of the 30 VGS positions, none is Barbaig. The Mbugwe hold 12 VGS 
positions followed by Maasai who hold 5 positions and other minorities share the 
remaining 13 positions. CBO and village leaders also refer to Barbaigs as newcomers and 
intruders (Moyo et al., 2016). 
The narrative described earlier suggests that in Burunge, access to grazing areas is 
regulated through social ties and ethnic identities. This defies the notion that WMAs would 
foster community ties to aptly offer opportunity for communal-level action to influence 
change (see in Wright, 2017). Rather, it demonstrates that conservation territorialisation 
and zonation (Bluwstein & Lund, 2016), and the tendency of conservation programs to 
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ignore historical and cultural land uses (Benjaminsen et al., 2009), exacerbate community 
divisions, inflict loss of wealth to individuals, and cause community to resent conservation. 
Access to Poles for Construction 
Tree felling is prohibited in WMA areas. The WMA regulations state that: 
any person who fells trees in a WMA commits an offence and is liable on 
conviction to a fine not exceeding one mil- lion [Tanzanian] shillings or to 
imprisonment for a term not less than six months and not exceeding one year 
or both such fine and imprisonment. (URT, 2012, Section 54 (4)) 
Yet, in-depth interviews revealed that collection of poles is tolerated outside the hunting 
use zone where a private investor has a sole use right. VGS turn a blind eye toward 
individuals who collect poles for personal use in other use zones. Thus, residents collect 
poles in small quantities, over a period of time, until their demands are fulfilled. In some 
villages, residents felled big trees and used branches for livestock fencing, leaving the rest 
to dry for firewood. In other villages, piles of poles were seen outside some of the 
dwellings. The owners reported having collected them from the WMA areas. Residents of 
the villages where the hunting use zone is located reported that poles of good quality are 
found in the hunting use zone, where restrictions are enforced by both VGS and guards 
hired by a private investor from outside Burunge villages. This demonstrates that although 
property rights regimes are more effective in eliminating others from accessing common 
resources, when property rights are not directly transferred to a particular individual, social 
and relational access mechanism can still be effective. 
Access to Bushmeat 
Restrictions for wildlife hunting are not a new phenomenon attributable to the WMA policy 
implementation. The Wildlife Act of 1974 and its amendment in 2002 barred wildlife 
hunting without a permit issued by the wildlife department, regardless of where it occurs 
(URT, 1974, 2002). WMAs, therefore, mainly seek to garner the support of rural people 
living close to wildlife in preventing wildlife poaching. Burunge communities, however, 
seem to have taken on the role of a ‘‘watch-man’’ who regulates access to wildlife based 
on social relations. In the first 6 months of the year 2015, for instance, VGS reported two 
poaching incidents involving Burunge residents. VGS arrested two Burunge residents in 
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connection with the killing of a giraffe and a wildebeest. But most residents defended the 
suspects and blamed it on non-residents. VGS also reported that local residents tend to alert 
them if they see or suspect a non-resident poaching, but not if fellow residents are 
committing the crime. In early 2015, for instance, the residents of Vilima Vitatu village 
called VGS to arrest ‘‘four unfamiliar men with motorbikes chasing zebra’’ (VGS focus 
group discussion, 2015). 
In-depth interviews revealed that VGS behaviour also favoured local residents. Before 
VGS would arrest a suspected local poacher, they assess the suspect’s economic situation 
and consider the type of wildlife poached. Poor local residents seen with small wildlife, 
such as rabbits or warthogs, are given a verbal warning and left to walk free. VGS believe 
that poor individuals are desperate and therefore compelled to poach for subsistence. 
Arresting a poor resident who is trying to find ‘‘food’’ would cause community members, 
who often tend to side with the poor, to disapprove VGS’ work, and refuse to cooperate 
with them. VGS argued: ‘‘we don’t arrest poor old men, if you arrest [name of an old man 
seen with a rabbit], people will get angry’’ (VGS focus group discussion, 2015). In 
Burunge, therefore, access to bushmeat is regulated through social identity and relations. 
Although CBO leaders and transnational conservation NGOs funding the implementation 
of WMA policy in Burunge do not accept or condone any form of wildlife poaching, 
Burunge residents together with VGS use the opportunity of being the primary protectors 
of wildlife in WMA areas to open access to bushmeat for their ‘poor’ while at the same 
time eliminating access for outsiders. 
WMA Revenues 
Burunge WMA hosts five tourist campsites and a hunting block, which are the main 
sources of income for the WMA (Table 3)10. Other sources of income include fines, NGOs’ 
donations, and research fees. The campsites are privately owned, and a hunting block is 
leased to private investors who are from outside Burunge villages. The state collects 
campsite and hunting fees and remits part of it to the CBO based on the 2012 wildlife 
regulations (URT, 2012), which direct the state to retain 20% of the campsite fees, and 
remit 65% and 15% to the CBO and district council, respectively. For the hunting fees, 
which include block and permit fees, the state retains 25% of the block fee and 85% of 
permit fees. Originally, the director of the wildlife division of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism held discretionary powers to decide on how the WMAs income 
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should be shared (see URT, 1998, p. 19). In the 2012 regulations, this power was shared 
with the CBO for some parts of the incomes, providing some assurance to WMAs in terms 
of financial planning (WWF, 2014). Yet in the same year, 2012, the revenue collection was 
taken over by the state actors again, reinforcing state control over WMA resources, and 
resulting in diminishing transparency in revenue collection and delays in disbursement of 
the same to the villages (Funk, 2015). 
Table 3: Reported Burunge WMA income (in US$) 
Income category  2012/2013  2013/2014       2014/2015 
Opening balance 15,210 39,212 106,611 
Campsite fees 263,949 a 197,142 295,703 
Game hunting                  - 50,237 85,425 
Fines 231 277 56 
NGOs Donations and other* sources 3,728 38,282 651 
Total 283,118 325,151 488,447 
* ‘Other’ sources include research fees and unidentified sources 
a Hunting and campsite fees were available as a single entry 
The CBO uses 50% of its income to run the WMA and distributes the remaining half to its 
member villages, as stipulated in the CBO constitution. The villages use the income to fund 
village development activities (e.g., village office building, schools, water pumps, etc.). 
Later we narrate how different actors gain and maintain access to WMA revenues. Through 
these narratives, we demonstrate how the WMA process concentrates licit financial 
benefits to local elites by virtue of their position in CBO or WMA ranks. We also show 
how state and transnational conservation NGOs attempt at improving revenue sharing 
between state, private investors and local communities (and within local communities), 
lead to exclusion of the communities and the emergence of local elites. 
Accessing WMA Revenues through VGS and Other CBO Employments 
Burunge CBO locally recruits 30 VGS, one accountant, one office assistant, and one 
attendant who receive a monthly salary and other allowances (Table 4). Accountancy and 
office assistance are professional fulltime jobs for maintaining CBO financial records and 
office, respectively. VGS patrol WMA areas to enforce WMA rules. They are required to 
work day and night—throughout the year—and receive wages of about US$80 per month. 
VGS job requirements imply that they have no free time to carry on other livelihood 
activities. Yet, VGS and their spouses are proud that their work protects wildlife and the 
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environment, and consider the monthly wages as an appreciation of their work. In reality, 
however, VGS have informal arrangements that free them from their patrol duties, 
alternately offering themselves breaks. This gives VGS chances to continue with regular 
income-earning activities such as agriculture and livestock keeping while maintaining 
access to WMA income. The CBO, for example, requires two VGS to be positioned at a 
ranger post to monitor tourist entry and exit in the campsite at all times, but we observed 
that only one VGS was carrying out the duty. 
VGS agree informally to work on shifts, one during the day and another at night or on a 
weekly rotation. The special anti-poaching VGS unit, comprising 10 VGS, also frees three 
of its members daily to carry on other livelihoods activities (participant observation). CBO 
leaders and residents tolerate these informal arrangements, but yet most of the residents 
refute VGS’ claims of service to the community. To them, VGS positions are an income-
earning opportunity that also gives VGS members an excuse to skip social responsibilities, 
such as contributing manpower to community development activities and participating in 
social events without being officially or socially sanctioned. 
Burunge residents’ claims that VGS positions are income-earning opportunities are 
substantiated by an increasing number of individuals aspiring for VGS and CBO positions. 
According to individuals who served in the CBO since its initiation, previously village 
assemblies had to plead with residents to fill these positions. Today, since residents have 
learned about the associated personal benefits, such as salaries and allowances, competition 
has emerged. In 2014, the CBO announced one VGS vacancy to be filled by a resident of 
Mwada village (VGS positions are divided equally among member villages). More than 30 
young people from Mwada responded to the call. In March, the same year, elections for 
CBO representatives in Burunge WMA member villages saw a surge of aspirants and 
voters. Election assemblies were packed and participation in terms of questioning 
aspirants’ motives was relatively high (personal observation)12. Although issues related to 
access rights dominated questioning sessions, voting decision was much based on how 
WMA incomes are spent. CBO representatives seeking re-election were seen as 
‘‘individuals representing their own stomach’’ (inter- view with a village resident, 2014). 
Thus, of the 34 seeking reelection13, only 13 were re-elected. When we asked residents 
why they did not re-elect a CBO representative who was also a CBO leader, residents 
pointed to the wealth accumulated while in power: ‘‘[name] was not rich before, just a few 
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years after becoming a WMA leader, [name] started to build a big house, where does 
[name] get all the money? They eat [steal] our money’’ (interview with a village resident, 
2014). 
Accessing WMA Revenues through CBO Membership and Leadership 
The CBO consists of 40 representatives, 20 village leaders (village chairpersons and village 
executive officers), 3 ward executive officers, and 3 district officials. They access WMA 
incomes through allowances for attending CBO meetings, training, and other WMA-
related duties. In a period of 3 years (from July 2012 to June 2015), the CBO has spent an 
average of US$32,568 and US$9,416 as meeting and travel allowances per year, 
respectively, together corresponding to 17% of average total expenditures (Table 4). The 
allowances cover members’ costs when attending CBO general meetings, held at least three 
times a year and involving all CBO members, village, ward, and district officials. They 
also cover costs for CBO executive committee and finance committee meetings, 
comprising ten and five individuals, respectively, selected among the CBO representatives, 
held at least once a month. In addition, the CBO speaker, deputy speaker, and the secretary 
receive a leadership allowance of about US$110 per month. There can also be frequent 
additional consultation meetings involving CBO representatives, and other benefits, which 
give them increased access to WMA income. In 2014, for example, each CBO 
representative received a gratuity of about US$356, for their 3 years of service (CBO 
representative positions last for 3 years). In total, the 40 members received US$14,259 
(5.3% of total expenditures in 2014–2015), which is more than the amount remitted by the 
CBO to the individual member village annually. 
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Table 4: Burunge WMA expenditures (in US$) 
Expenditure category 2012/2013   2013/2014  2014/2015 
Member villages' share (10 villages) 141,030 124,275 135,260 
VGS salaries and allowances 30,834 34,725 31,053 
CBO office staff Salaries 7,664 2,024 1,842 
CBO office running cost 4,338 6,445 8,880 
Meeting allowances 44,445 26,622 26,640 
Travel allowances 7,481 8,424 12,343 
Leadership allowances 5,850 4,337 3,349 
WMA patrol cost 1,634 3,801 2,830 
WMA infrastucture and assets 10,694 1,489 9,364 
Maintenance of assets and infrastructure  633 1,120 7,573 
Conflicts resolution (Legal fees) 7,500 12,587 8,372 
CBO members gratuity - - 14,259 
Other* 1,564 2,928 6,287 
Total 263,665 228,777 268,052 
* ‘Others’ include condolences, VGS health care, guest entertainments and uncategorised 
expenditures. 
Source: Compilation based on CBO office financial records. 
Member Villages’ Access to WMA Revenues 
The average member village annual income in the past 3 years was US$13,352 (Table 4) 
or US$3.90 per person per year (based on villages population estimates of 2012). Residents 
do not, however, receive cash payments equal to their share. Rather, the money belongs to 
the village and decisions on how to spend it are made by the village assembly (where 
individuals older than 18 years can participate). Most often the money is used for public 
service projects, such as village office building, schools, and infrastructure improvements. 
Previously, these were financed through individuals’ contribution and state grants. 
Individual contribution was adjusted to the residents’ level of wealth and the number of 
adults in the households. With WMA revenue now financing these projects, the wealthier 
households, and households with many adults are implicitly favoured, since they used to 
pay more in village development contribution. 
Residents also complained about WMA funds misappropriation at the village level. In one 
of the villages, residents argued: ‘‘the [village] chairman and the village executive officer 
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used our [WMA] money to build [hand] water pumps in their hamlets [where the two 
leaders reside], we never agreed to build water pumps, [but] they decided by themselves’’ 
(interview with a village resident, 2014). Rules governing WMA income expenditure are 
not as strict as those governing the use of state grants. State grants are allocated for a 
specific activity and the district council would provide direct supervision to ensure villages 
comply with rules governing the use of state funds. This leaves no or less room for 
manipulation by village officials as compared to WMA income, whose expenditure is 
mainly determined by village officials who, according to the residents, collude with service 
providers to hike prices, and use most of the WMA income to pay themselves allowances. 
Elected village officials are working on a voluntary basis (no monthly salaries), gaining 
mostly honour and respect in return. Yet, their responsibilities, such as that of a village 
chairman, often demand substantial amounts of time. This creates costs since this time is 
then lacking for engaging in other livelihoods activities. Therefore, village officials might 
regard the WMA revenues as a welcome opportunity to compensate themselves for the 
time and effort they invest in serving the community (Funk, 2015). 
Accessing WMA Revenues through WMA Tourism Investments and Other Labor 
and Business Opportunities 
In Burunge, all tourism investments such as campsites and a hunting block are owned by 
non-residents. Tourism investments require a substantial amount of capital and knowledge 
(Chachage, 1999; Salazar, 2009; Temu & Due, 2000), which most Burunge residents do 
not have. WMA income opportunities for regular residents are therefore limited to sales of 
crafts and souvenirs and providing labor to investors. But souvenir business is not a new 
income opportunity, as it existed prior to the WMA, and still, residents maintained access 
to natural resources in all parts of their village lands. Moreover, in-depth interviews 
revealed income from tourism-related activities, such as income from sales of crafts or 
souvenirs benefited only a few villagers who live around the National Parks entrance gates 
that are popular with tourists entering the National Parks, mainly in Olasiti and Kakoi 
villages. Sale of crafts and souvenirs are therefore not necessarily related to the WMA 
implementation, but rather to the direct proximity to the National Park entrance gates, 
which are frequently used by tourists. 
Burunge residents also lack skills to work as tour guides, chefs or other ‘‘well paid’’ 
positions in tourist campsites. Previously, few residents worked as guards for private 
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investors. Yet, access struggles made these positions socially risky and professionally 
difficult. Strict enforcement against fellow residents presented them as obstacles to their 
communities’ livelihoods strategies; thus, they acted leniently. In response, investors 
started to replace locally hired guards with individuals from outside Burunge to increase 
security. One investor argued: ‘‘I was employing local guards, my generator was stolen 
and it was found within one day, but they [locally hired guards] don’t care about cows 
being close to my hotels, it is not good for tourism’’ (interview with tourist campsite 
investor, 2015). This implies that the notion that WMAs would attract external capital to 
diversify local peoples’ income opportunities is a simplistic idea. It ignores past 
experiences in community-based conservation, where issues of elite capture and profit-
seeking behaviours are common (see e.g., Brooks, Waylen, & Mulder, 2013; Green & 
Lund, 2015; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013; Lund & Treue, 2008; Platteau, 2004), and when 
conservation dwells on restrictive access rules, local enforcement becomes ineffective as 
rural communities would apply social pressure on VGS and rely on relational access 
mechanisms. 
Mirroring WMA Residents’ Access Experiences Against non-WMA Residents 
In the preceding sections, we have largely narrated how WMA rules have affected WMAs 
residents’ access to land and other resources and how different segments of the WMA 
community have responded to restrictions. In this section, we contrast those experiences to 
non-WMA residents who either refused to join the WMA or were not included (by the 
WMA initiators) in the program (see Moyo et al., 2016). By not surrendering parts of their 
village land to WMA, the non-WMA residents maintain access to all parts of their village 
lands. Although this means the villages miss potential WMA incomes that would have 
ostensibly reduce individuals’ burden for financial contribution to community 
development projects (and at the same continue to experience wildlife nuisances like WMA 
villages), there were no access conflicts. Non-WMA residents felt free of conservation 
‘‘oppression’’ and frequently referred to conflicts about access to grazing and agricultural 
lands in WMA villages as something that ‘‘eats’’ the people in WMA villages. A resident 
in one of the non-WMA village, where villagers refused to join the WMA, for example, 
argued: ‘‘we had good leaders other-wise we would be suffering like those in Vilima Vitatu 
[a WMA village]’’. In another village, residents viewed WMAs’ access limitations rules 
in a neighbouring Sangaiwe village, a WMA village, as domination and an oppression to 
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the people who offered their lands to the conservation of wildlife. The general sentiments 
were ‘‘Sangaiwe people are not free’’ (interview with a village council member non- WMA 
village, 2015) and ‘‘we don’t want to be prisoners in our own land like those in Sangaiwe’’ 
(interview with a female resident in non-WMA village, 2015). 
WMA is thus perceived as state’s attempt at retaining control over wildlife resources and 
village lands, and effort to discipline local people to comply with conservationist’ NGOs 
as well as global investors’ interests. This matters because WMA success hinges on the 
participating communities’ positive perception toward the policy intention to improve their 
livelihoods and access to resources. The dissatisfaction in WMA villages communities and 
the negative thinking toward WMA access rules in non-WMA villages thus showcases a 
policy failure to impact a sense of conservation ownership and attract local communities 
to participate in wildlife conservation. As a result, those who have accepted WMA resort 
to a host of illicit access mechanism, which are likely to jeopardise conservation efforts. 
On the other hand, those who refused or are yet to accept WMAs become more sceptical 
of the conservation approach. 
Discussion 
Using access theory analytical framework, we have explored Burunge WMA to 
demonstrate access struggles in community based conservation (CBC). We have shown 
how state and non-state conservation actors’ efforts at sustaining a natural resource base 
for all lead to the exclusion of those who are most dependent on access to it. By mirroring 
WMA residents’ access experiences against non-WMA residents, we were able to 
eliminate many other processes such as ‘‘land grabbing for large scale agriculture’’ that 
are taking place in Tanzania (Funk, 2015), that would have impact on access changes. 
Access struggles in WMA villages show that state actors and conservationists NGOs 
promotion of conservation by territorialisation and zonation of WMAs lands (Bluwstein & 
Lund, 2016) incite access and land use conflicts. The categorization of community lands 
into go and no go zones curtails local peoples’ access to land and natural resources. The 
process denies them their customary use rights and claims to resources. 
On the hand, WMA success hinges on the neoliberal conservation thinking, which assumes 
that by attracting external capital to be invested in ecotourism activities in village lands 
(now WMAs lands), local peoples’ livelihood strategies will be diversified, consequently 
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reducing pressure on land (Igoe & Croucher, 2007; Green & Adams, 2015). In reality, 
however, neoliberal conservation transfers communal lands to private individuals. 
Specifically, it privileges actors who have access to large amounts of financial capital and 
connections required to invest in the lucrative tourism businesses (Chachage, 1999; 
Salazar, 2009; Temu & Due, 2000) and disadvantages poor rural people who endure the 
losses caused by wildlife nuisances (Moyo et al., 2016) and forgone interest such as access 
to land for agriculture and livestock grazing (Noe & Kangalawe, 2015). 
WMAs processes also create spaces for elite capture by local elites. It concentrates licit 
benefits, such as income opportunities to those who hold official positions such as CBO 
leaders, representatives, and VGS. These individuals pocket a large share of WMA income 
through allowances and salaries. By reassuming powers to collect WMA fees, and 
thereafter remit part of it to the CBO, the state also amplified its control village lands. Thus, 
instead of empowering local communities to benefit from natural resources, WMAs 
processes legitimize transfer of land and natural resources from the hands of local 
communities to the state and elites (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Noe & Kangalawe, 
2015) and consolidate resource control powers to the state and create space for elite capture 
(Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Igoe & Croucher, 2007). 
Implicitly, WMAs policy implementation supports platforms for capital accumulation by 
wealth investors and elite capture by local elites. The process leaves the majority of poor 
rural people, whose livelihoods largely depend on access to natural resources, to rely on 
illicit access mechanisms. As a result, in Burunge, communities have employed a wide 
range of access mechanisms such as social and relational mechanism to demand or gain 
access to lands and natural resources. Different actors and segments of the community have 
exerted remarkable determination and political perspicuity, knowing especially when to 
adopt covert and more diplomatic means or adopt overt, forceful means such as destroying 
WMA infrastructure. While these mechanisms seem to have worked successfully on 
providing local people access to land and natural resources such as grazing and agricultural 
lands, the direct incomes generated by WMAs remain in the hands of the few elites. This 
raises alarm on the WMA capacity to promote equity in natural resources management and 
on its long-term impact on the protection of wildlife corridors and biodiversity. It thus 
necessitates the need to revisit the WMA policy design and implementation processes, 
which are currently firmly built on the domain of state and conservationist NGOs agendas 
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(Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010; Sachedina, 2008), to refocus its emphasis on meeting 
community needs and ensuring equity in sharing benefits accrued from conservation 
activates. Yet in Burunge, the implementation of WMA policy reveals typical state and 
NGOs’ behaviour, where state institutions tend to focus on land control while retaining a 
necessary level of legitimacy, while NGOs often focus on accountability toward their 
donors (Mosse, 2007; Myers & Muhajir, 2015; Sachedina et al., 2010). Although state 
actors’ and trans- national conservation NGOs’ narrative is to promote good governance, 
transparency, and accountability, the practice is at odds with the policy goals and local 
participating communities’ interests. WMAs policy is implemented without considering 
local people’s livelihoods needs and aspects of costs and benefits sharing. By not 
recognizing rural people’s customary claims to land and resource use (Myers & Muhajir, 
2015), the official policy prescriptions of inclusion becomes ineffective. 
Implication for Conservation 
This article shows that different actors view conservation success differently. State and 
donors consider income at community level as a measure of success, while the 
community’s measure of success is individual incomes and access to resources deemed 
vital to support their livelihoods. This misjudgement in policy design and implementation 
processes, or failure to align the various actors’ interests, makes conservation unprofitable 
and unattractive to rural people (Belsky, 2009; Benjaminsen et al., 2009), and leaves 
‘‘black holes’’ for local powers to colonize and turn the intended outcomes to different 
ends (see also Scheba & Rakotonarivo, 2016). State and donor attempts’ to empower and 
promote local communities to participate in conservation has lead to (a) strengthening of 
states’ power to collect and retain revenues accrued from conservation activities 
(Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Brockington & Schmidt-Soltau, 2004; Igoe & Croucher, 2007), 
(b) creation of property rights to elites who then use these rights to alienate others from 
accessing common resources (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 
2013), and (c) emergence of local elites who through leadership positions and employment 
in conservation projects pocket a significant share of conservation income that would 
otherwise be used for community development (Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013). This leads to 
protests against conservation, and attempts to regain access, resorting to violent struggles 
against state and private investors. Consequently, the conflicts created by the failed states’ 
and donors’ attempts at inclusion erodes rural peoples’ trust and willingness to support 
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conservation, in areas where previously, people coexisted with wildlife and collaborated 
with private investors in conservation and tourism activities (Benjaminsen et al., 2013). 
It shows that rural the peoples’ need to access natural resources has come to an age in 
which ‘‘the unthinkable has become, frankly, inevitable.’’ It posits that some of our best 
minds remain anchored in older ways of ‘‘seeing and thinking’’ leading to ‘‘repeated 
misjudgements’’ about new realities. It shows that the integrity of conservation and the 
willingness of rural communities to support conservation and trust that CBC programs 
understand their needs-or, for that matter, CBC programs are telling the truth about access 
rights—is leaching away. The situation leads to the emergence of a violent wave of protests 
and struggles against conservation, a change that a few years ago, many thought of as 
‘‘unthinkable’’ in communities where historically rural people ‘‘harmoniously’’ shared 
landscapes with wildlife. Thus, state and conservationists’ NGOs attempts’ to eliminate 
conservation challenges must better acknowledge the inherent trade-offs of natural 
resources conservation and livelihoods and take into consideration the local situation. We 
argue that conservation policies and programs should come into terms with, and embrace 
reality that conservation success is fundamentally driven by and is no longer immune to 
local socioeconomics dynamics. We call upon states, conservationist NGOs, and the 
private sector, each at their capacity, to provide conducive and friendly environments that 
iteratively learn from and incorporate new local experiences that would assure that the 
long-term policy goals on conservation and community amity are secured. 
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Notes 
1. By non-state conservation actors we refer to transnational conservation NGOs or agencies. 
2. Village land means a piece of land owned by the village and all decisions pertaining to sell 
or change land use are taken by the village council or village assembly. 
3. Field work was divided into two field visits. January to June 2014 and February to June 
2015 
4. The register was first updated by asking village leaders and council members to add new 
households and remove those which are no longer existing. 
5. The management of dry season grazing was headed by village elders who used social 
sanctions to protect common property. 
6. The villages had already set aside the areas for establishing WMA but were not officially 
recognised until 2006 when Burunge was registered 
7. First author has in possession copies of statements signed by individual council members 
at the village assembly on 28th November 2013 to disown the signature in the documents. 
8. In 2013, CBO and state agencies burned temporary herdsmen dwellings in one of the WMA 
areas (corridor use zone) needed by a tourist investor for game rides (‘‘Kijiji Chachomwa 
Kumpisha’’, 2013). 
9. A system where land is closed for all human activities to allow vegetation to regenerate. 
10. Complete records of WMA income and expenditure were available for the period of three 
financial years, starting from July 2012 to June 2015. Currency exchange rate was adjusted at 
end of each fiscal year. 
11. Since 2012 the wildlife department collects campsite fees. VGS records are therefore used 
by CBOs to reconcile incomes reported by the state and the actual number of tourists who 
visited the campsites. 
12. First author attended other village assemblies that discussed issues related to education 
and election of members of primary school board, where residents were less interested and 
members of the school board were simply nominated. 
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13. Two individuals did not seek re-election and Minjingu village refused to conduct election 
as the village does not recognise the WMA. 
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5. Synthesis of key findings and their implication for policy, development, and research 
5.1. Overview of key results: Conservation-development nexus 
This synopsis provides an outlook for the complex issue of the conservation-development nexus 
based on the recollection of the rich history of resource use trends, and the evolution of its 
management regimes presented in the introductory chapters. The synopsis also integrates 
empirical findings from the three papers which respond to the three research questions set on 
the onset on this dissertation, which are: i) to what extent do local communities participate in 
managing landscape resources? ii) how has WMA implementation changed the way in which 
local people access and perceive wildlife resources? and iii) how does access to resources and 
livelihoods outcomes of WMA implementation vary across different types of individuals and 
households? In attempt to advance knowledge and contribute to the efforts on finding better 
ways and less coercive ways to manage natural resource, the synopsis proposes a framework 
for tailoring adaptive co-management (see Plummer and Hashimoto, 2011; Sayer et al., 2013). 
This synopsis concludes by presenting a critical review of the research methods and analytical 
generalisation of study results, and an outlook that puts forward recommendations for research, 
policy, and development. 
The first paper in this dissertation demonstrates that there are enormous discrepancies between 
discourses and ground realities pertaining to attempts to empower rural people to take charge 
of conservation and their own development. It shows that, in spite of the optimistic portrayals 
of WMAs from state and conservationist NGOs, the reality is messy and chaotic. WMAs foster 
limited ownership, participation and collective action at the community level. WMAs 
governance continues to follow a logic of central government control over natural resources 
and the associated benefit. Thus, drawing from empirical evidence on power constellation in 
Burunge case, this dissertation puts forward an explanatory model for predicting power transfer 
under status quo CBC regimes (Figure 6). The model is build based on Schlager and Ostrom 
(1992) types of actors, namely i) authorised users, ii) claimants, iii) proprietors and, iv) owners. 
Together with Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) four types of powers: i) create rules or modify old 
ones, ii) make decisions on how a particular resource shall be used iii) implement and ensure 
compliance with new or altered rules and, iv) arbitrate disputes arising from management 
process or effort to create rules and ensure compliance to access rules. The concentration of 
powers at the state level reveal that the so-called community-led conservation initiatives do not 
constitute genuine community ownership of the resources and space for popular participation 
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in rule-making and resource allocation. WMAs, therefore, cannot be referred to as CBC unless 
genuine ownership and powers are transferred to participating communities. 
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Figure 6. An explanatory model of power transfer in current CBC processes (Own 
illustration based on Schlager and Ostrom, (1992) and Agrawal and Ribot (1999) 
The second paper reveals how WMAs are rife with conflicts and contestations over grievances 
that it sought to abate. The grievances are accentuated by growing land pressure resulting from 
an increase in human, livestock and wildlife populations, in combination with infrastructure 
improvements and support for agriculture-led development. It shed light on the complex 
interactions between conservation and development by exposing the precarious feedbacks 
within the nexus. Improvement in agriculture, livestock, infrastructure and access to markets, 
for example, increases pressure on land and landscape resources. Yet, the inflexible WMAs 
governance regimes offer very little or nothing to the residents and village leaders in the 
participating communities who appear hostages in a situation where interests in human 
development and conservation are pitted against each other. Rural populations are not 
compensated for crop and livestock losses and/or even human injuries and death caused by 
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wildlife. Besides, WMA regimes invest very little resources (revenues) in the protection of 
crops and livestock against wildlife. Yet, state agencies and transnational conservationists 
NGOs continue to praise and embrace WMA regimes. This situation not only makes a mockery 
of the notions of community-based conservation but also pinpoint to the tendency of global and 
national actors promoting conservation in Tanzania and elsewhere to misrepresent or ignore the 
local realities that defy official policy promises. 
The third article shows that WMAs concentrate licit benefits to few elites and criminalises rural 
peoples’ customary livelihoods and claims of access rights to natural resources. This leaves the 
majority of rural people who endure the cost of conservation in forgone individual livelihoods 
interests, such as farmland and pasture for livestock, and wildlife damages on crops, livestock, 
and people, to rely on illicit access mechanisms. In Burunge, this has led to violent 
confrontations between game scouts and people, and protests and struggles to re-gain legal 
access. But at a more general level, the conflicts created/exacerbated by the WMA regimes 
gradually erodes rural peoples’ trust and willingness to support conservation. Thus, in order to 
advance conservation-development agenda, conservation policies need to understand rural 
peoples’ needs and address them not only as ‘add on’ but at their very core. CBC interventions, 
therefore, must recognise customary claims to land and use of natural resources, and make sure 
that benefits accruing from conservation activities trickle down to the household level. State 
and conservation agencies need to clearly communicate the intended outcomes and 
beneficiaries of development and conservation interventions. Participating communities shall 
be given the opportunity to principally agree on benefit sharing mechanisms, largely, based on 
the need or merit. Institutions entrusted with natural resource management must be accountable 
to affected people, across scales of governance to allow local communities to challenge power 
relations. 
Based on the above empirical evidence, and the historical trends on natural resource use and 
management regimes presented on the onset of this dissertation, it is evident that any 
conservation interventions on human-dominated landscape will result in the emergence of new 
competing claims of property rights, legitimacy and access rights (see also Rasmussen and 
Lund, 2018). In particular, conservation interventions’ attempts to simultaneously improve 
conservation and alleviate rural peoples’ poverty by seeking biodiversity refuge on human-
dominated landscapes produce a wave of unpredictable and precarious feedbacks to both 
conservation and livelihoods. The interventions are largely designed and implemented based 
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on global and state level interests, hence continue to reinforce states’ powers over access to and 
control over landscape resources (Vorlaufer, 2002). This failure to empower and clearly address 
rural dwellers’ access needs is the leading cause of community grievances and resource 
conflicts in conservation interventions. Attempts to resolve conflicts and achieve long lasting 
conservation impacts, therefore, need to put emphasis on facilitating rural populations’ access 
to land and natural resources which are an important source of rural peoples’ livelihood and 
culture. This means the intervention should be able to provide opportunity for community’s 
self-evaluation of outcomes, social cultural norms and values (the subjective wellbeing), food 
and health security, and access to incomes (the objective wellbeing), and freedom of choice and 
action, power relation between stakeholders, and social relation and conflicts resolution (the 
relational wellbeing) (see Woodhouse et al., 2018). 
There is a need also to facilitate local communities to meaningfully participate in the design 
and implementation of conservation intervention. This will allow transparent and logical 
changes (Sandker, 2010, Sayer et al., 2013), and facilitate state and conservation agencies to 
identify and put forward conservation interventions and policies that not only clarify rights and 
responsibilities but also accommodate interests of the multiple stakeholders. Meaningful 
participation in the design and implementation of conservation intervention also have the 
potential to reduce the risks for adjacent populations to bear disproportionate costs of 
conservation and enhance chances for access rule compliance. This, together with transparent 
and logical changes will improve actors’ freedom of choice and action, power relations, and 
end state tendency to coerce rural people into conducting themselves in ways that are 
compatible with states’ conservation ideals (see Bluwstein, 2018). 
Thus, in order to help policy makers and practitioners to effectively set up co-management 
regimes that could exploit the multifunctionality of rural landscapes for the benefit of the 
multiple stakeholders and conservation at a particular locality, this dissertation breaks down the 
empirical findings in to two main theoretical concepts, namely: i) property rights and rule 
enforcement agency, and ii) governance rationality and limit to governance. The former has 
been revealed in many previous CBC studies which have also offered a way out of this 
challenge, yet it is persistent and common in new CBC interventions (e.g. Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999; Igoe and Brockington, 1999; 2007; Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Hall, 2013). The latter is a 
relatively new school of thought. It is a novelty arm of political ecology that seek to put 
emphasise on the need to contemplate and synthesise in a more acute and systematic way the 
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understanding of the policy promise having in mind the potential tradeoffs and human capacity 
to predict future socioecological events (see Lyall et al., 2009). However, for purpose of 
operationalisation, the two theoretical concepts are further boiled-down to issues of i) creation 
property rights and extension of the capitalist market into the rural economy, ii) disenchanted 
rule enforcement agency and knowledge dichotomy (authority, legitimacy, accountability), and 
iii) governance rationality and limits to governance. 
5.1.1.  Creation of property rights and extension of capitalist market to rural economies 
Empirical evidence shows that CBC legitimises the transfer of ownership, and power to control 
access to land and natural resources from local communities to the state and elites (figure 6) 
(see also Hall, 2013; Noe et al., 2015). This alters labor and production relations as private 
investments use economic means to expand and reproduce capitalist social relations in their 
attempt to maximise profit and assume control over the resources (Hall, 2013). This process of 
accumulation by dispossession or primitive accumulation engrained in CBC implementation is 
however not a new phenomenon to conservation processes in Tanzania and beyond (Neumann, 
1998; Pearce, 2010; Lekan, 2011; Gardner, 2016). Rather, it has roots in colonial and post-
colonial governance regimes that in many cases chose to maximise state gains by enhancing 
access to natural resources for elites who pay rents and taxes to the government (Gardner, 
2016). As a result, the decades of policy and law reforms to return ownership and control of the 
resources to rural people has not generated any notable outcomes in Tanzania. 
Conservation and land legislations in Tanzania and most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
continue to view natural resources as an important source of income for central governments, 
making rural people tenants on their own landscape (Wily, 2011). This persistent failure of 
national policies and laws to recognise customary land rights and rural peoples’ livelihoods 
interests impede efforts to restore ownership and transfer power and control of the resources to 
the local people. The situation deters the ability of local people to challenge state actors and the 
associated elites from abusing common or public resources for private gain through the official 
channel. It also makes CBC become part of broader discourses and mostly historical trends in 
elite capture and criminalisation of rural livelihoods in Tanzania and beyond. This dissertation, 
therefore, calls upon the many empathetic and hard-working individuals to end the collective 
failure to address this detrimental discrepancy between reality and representation and start to 
support affected residents in their struggles for self-determination by supporting interventions 
that promote forums for negotiations and continual learning. 
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5.1.2.  Disenchanted rule enforcement agency and knowledge dichotomy 
CBCs are trapped in the dichotomy of local knowledge versus the official knowledge based on 
western science. Conservation interventions use official knowledge to override local knowledge 
and experiences to impose conservation. However, empirical evidence from this study shows 
that local knowledge is simply a way of life. It constitutes real and perceived values of 
landscape resources, cultural and ethical standards, and the social and power relations that 
animate them (see also Berkes, 2009). This means the suppression of local knowledge in the 
design and implementation of conservation interventions, is simply the suppression of rural 
peoples’ ways of life and their wellbeing (Pilgrim and Pretty, 2010). In this study, in particular, 
the suppression of local knowledge has resulted in the emergence of access conflicts in 
landscapes where previously people co-existed with wildlife. Further, in paper three, this 
dissertation shows that, through training, transnational conservation NGOs and state agencies 
impart official knowledge to selected few community representatives, who then turn against the 
people they are supposed to represent. Arguably, because, the new knowledge acquired 
facilitate them to gain and maintain access to personal incomes through meeting allowances 
and salaries, which then make representative become royal to the state-driven conservation 
narratives. 
Besides, by entrusting control of landscape resources to the CBO comprising few local 
individuals who acquire official knowledge through employments (e.g. VGS) and leadership or 
representation positions, CBC creates space for elite capture and control (see Lund and Saito-
Jensen, 2013). This situation drives a wedge of ideological and power relation between 
representatives and the community, and leads to a feeling of them versus us. ‘Them’ being 
representatives and state and conservationist NGOs actors, and ‘us’ being the community. Local 
people normally view CBO, a supra-village government organ with no mechanisms for 
downward accountability, and VGS as an obstacle for them to access landscapes resources for 
food security and incomes. This situation gives rise to contending accounts of environmental 
and institutional change (Robbins, 2000), and it intensifies the unnecessary struggles over 
resources at the local level. It also limits the efficiency of rule enforcing agency to protect the 
resources and the ability and effectiveness of civil movements (local people) to resist 
dispossession and reclaim access to landscape resources through the official channels. 
However, to abate the aforementioned challenges arising from knowledge dichotomy, 
conservation interventions should strive to match local and official knowledge (Pearce, 2010). 
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This is because, although global driven socioecological changes (Moller et al., 2004) necessitate 
conservation interventions to engage official knowledge (Gagnon and Berteaux, 2009), the 
knowledge formulated based on the national and global agenda alone cannot bring development 
and real change in rural environment (see Scoones et al., 1992; Inglis, 1993; Pearce, 2010; 
Gardner; 2016). It implies that, vagueness and intentional or unintentional misrepresentation of 
local knowledge in conservation policies and programs would only mean decisions about how 
the resources shall be governed are made based on incomplete information, and therefore failure 
to meet the intended conservation and livelihoods goals are inevitable (Ballard et al., 2008; 
Pearce, 2010). To end the dichotomy of local versus official knowledge, CBC needs to embrace 
the congruence and contrast between the local and official knowledge. This will facilitate 
conservation interventions to exploit the comparative advantages of different regimes and 
knowledge formation to produce alternative resource management approaches that are less 
coercive and more sustainable (Berkes, 2009; Berkes et al., 2000). 
5.1.3.  Governance rationality and limit to governance 
According to Agrawal and Waylen (n.d.), there is a limit on which we can govern our way out 
of socioecological problems. Their arguments are based on human limitations in the 
understanding of the specific ecological and environmental processes at a particular time and 
space, and our limitations to predict future social and environmental events. This limitations 
deter our ability to design conservation interventions and plan safety nets with exactness. In 
this dissertation, in particular, the rapid growth in human, elephant and livestock population, 
and improvements in infrastructure and markets for agricultural products came as a shock to 
the WMA design and the prescribed management rules. During the planning and initiation 
period, low human and livestock population were seen as an advantage for the conservation 
intervention to use the so perceived as ‘less important village lands’ for wildlife protection. At 
the time, the prevailing local situation and the available information made the WMA’s core 
objective to reconstruct and restore the ecological integrity of wildlife corridor in the village 
lands, rational to both local populations3 and state and conservationist agencies. However, later 
on, changes in local socioeconomic situations made setting aside village lands for wildlife 
                                                 
3 However, two villages refuse for different reasons. One village refused because they were going to lose village 
income from tourism investment already existing in their village lands, and the other refused because they believed 
WMA was a back door approach to include their land into a national park. 
134 
 
corridors to become contrary to local population needs for increased access to agriculture and 
grazing lands. 
Thus, the precarious feedbacks of development on conservation, and the inflexible management 
regimes make the effectiveness of CBC which hinges on the community’s ‘self-policing’ to 
become unpredictable and unrealistic. The prevailing social relations and local politics compel 
local law enforcing agencies (VGS and village leaders) to become less strict on local rule 
breakers. This makes the realisation of the programmatic conservation interventions 
impossible. It implies that, in spite of the advancement in science and modeling technologies, 
perfection in landscape resources governance is not a one off invention. There is a need, 
therefore, to consider the different facets of the state-led conservation policies as a governance 
continuum (Lyall et al., 2009), because different socioecological aspects may challenge 
governance approach at different points or locality and time. Conservation interventions must 
use a pragmatist-interactionism approach (Welch et al., 2015) to address the problems of regime 
fit i.e. the capacity of a particular intervention to deal with resource subjective values and 
functionality at particular locality and time. The interventions need to put emphasise on iterative 
learning and forums for stakeholders’ negotiations to revitalise management regimes with 
empirical realities and potential limitations. The acknowledgement of limits to governance, 
therefore, shall not be seen as an acceptance of failure or incapacity to achieve success. Rather, 
as a wakeup call for promotion and adoption of adaptive management approaches that provide 
avenue for systematic and pragmatic review of access rules to accommodate the unfolding 
socioeconomic and environmental realities. 
Therefore, given the complexity of ecological systems, and the need to address multiple 
stakeholders’ interests, this disseration adopts a modifed Plummer and Hashimoto, (2011) 
framework for tailoring adaptive co-management (Figure 7) to assist policy makers and 
practitioners to pragmaticatically design and plan conservation interventions in a more sensible 
and realistic manner. The framework consists of two layers, the context and the socioecological 
resilience and sustainable trajectories can help resolve challenges originating from space 
specfic situations. The context represents the highly dynamic and inseparable charactericts of 
natural resources. It includes the landscape resources and social dynamics. Landscape resource 
dynamics encompasses the distinctive features of natural resources such as discreteness or 
connection, progression or temporal, and mobility and boundary. The social context, on the 
other hand, comprises culture and traditions, power and salience that operate on a certain space 
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and time. Further, the social and ecological context is embedded in wider issues of subjectivity, 
relativism, and functionality. In particular, embeddeness is an important consideration for 
adaptative co-management to addresses issues of resource fluidity, dependency, and 
psychological attachment. 
The sociecological and sustainable trajectories layer comprise ecological system functioning, 
population wellbeing and the proccesses that influence population actions toward the resources. 
Population wellbeing is a function of access to environmental services and goods. Therefore 
the multifunctionality of landscape resources can offer alternative development pathways to 
different stakeholders who frame and express interests and objectives differently (Sayer et al., 
2013). This can facilitate adaptive co-managemnet to resolve the problem of fit or the capacity 
of particular conservation intervention to address challenges related to locality. 
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Figure 7. A modified framework for adaptive co-management (Based on Plummer and 
Hashimoto, 2011; Sayer et al., 2013; Pretzsch et al., 2015 and Woodhouse et al., 2018) 
 
5.2.  A critical review of research methods and analytical generalisation of the results 
The conservation-development nexus encompasses complex socioecological systems 
associated with multiple drivers of change and feedbacks (Folke, 2006; Bennett et al., 2009). 
Therefore, in order to attribute livelihood outcomes to the WMA policy implementation, and 
filter out other nuisances, this study used the following methods: First, a case study approach 
or site-by-site assessment, this was important to understand space specific livelihood outcomes 
of implementing state-led conservation policies at the local level. The approach allowed the 
capture of the wider and most important political and institutional factors that influence policy 
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outcomes at the local level (see Flyvbjerg, 2006). Second, counterfactual techniques, where the 
study compared villages with and without the WMA intervention, and before and after the 
WMA intervention. In particular, this provided an opportunity for this study to filter out impacts 
that are not related to WMA policy implementation (see Ferraro, 2009). Third, a mixture of 
quantitative but largely qualitative methods. This was specifically important in capturing 
information and symbolic forms through which perceptions and meanings are experienced and 
expressed in conservation processes (see Creswell, 2009 and Pearce, 2015). 
Moreover, conservation actors are diverse, and so are their interests. Different individuals and 
groups of actors hold subjective perceptions of costs and benefits of conservation. Thus 
observing and listening to research participants’ stories and life experiences, opened access to 
highly sensitive information about contentious issues of land ownership, local conflicts, and 
criminalisation of access rights to conservation territories. The issues that are vital for 
understanding and managing rule compliance and equity. Additionally, although critics of 
ethnographic research approaches may argue that the techniques might produce discrepancies 
and incompatibilities in story lines (see Nightingale 2003), in this dissertation, the dissonance 
was however telling in multiple ways. It informed the study about local interests and what is at 
stake for different actors, making social conflicts and the politics of conservation visible. 
Furthermore, in order to reduce the various biases inherent in the study of conflicts, the study 
put emphasis on building trust with research interlocutors. Prior to the interviews, respondents 
were asked for their informed consent, ensured anonymity and given an option to opt out at any 
time. 
Further, analytical generalisation based on the results from a single case study is possible 
because of the following: First, the study uses a conceptual framework that can be equally 
applied to most localities and contexts. According to Yin (2009; 2010), analytical generalisation 
of a case study results is valid if the goal is to expand and generalise theory. This is exactly the 
case for this study, it does not attempt to infer statistical generalisation, rather, analytical 
generalisation through the expansion of the two theoretical concepts in section 5.1. Secondly, 
the case study was not randomly selected, rather purposefully following Flyvbjerg (2006), who 
argues for research to explore ‘black swan’ case studies to solve real societal problems. Black 
swan is a highly unlikely incident or event with three principal characteristics: i) it is 
unpredictable; ii) it carries massive impact; and, iii) after the fact, people create an explanation 
that makes the incidence appear less random, and more predictable, than it actually was (Taleb, 
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2007). Burunge case is a black swan in the following sense: it is one of the first operational 
WMA in Tanzania and attracts more tourism investment than most other WMAs in the country. 
Therefore it is exceptional. It also carries major impact because its funding initiators rationalise 
and promote it as the best example of community based wildlife management approach, and 
the proliferation of WMAs in Tanzania is largely rationalised based on Burunge ‘success’ (see 
WWF, 2014; AWF, n.d.). Burunge case is also arguably one of the most heterogeneous WMAs 
in terms of the mix of ethnicities and languages, livelihoods and land use practices. 
Thus, as a black swan case, result from Burunge case shed light on what to expect on other 
WMAs with varied tourism potentials and less ethnic diversity. Among many other things, it 
demonstrates that in areas with lots of tourism income potentials, one should expect to see 
increased interests for state control and elite capture and vice-versa. Pertaining to ethnic 
diversity, it shows that, the less the diversity the less the chances of observing land-use conflicts 
that emanate from ethnic-based livelihoods strategies. Largely because less heterogeneous 
communities are likely to have more or less similar interests and attitudes toward landscape 
resources. 
5.3. Outlook 
The main body of this dissertation presents challenges of CBC, pinpointing to the causes and 
potential solutions. The lack of successful exemplars or stories is not an oversight, but rather 
an attempt to narrate the complex and highly dynamic issues of the conservation-development 
nexus without making explanations that would present short lived success cases as less random, 
and more predictable than they really are. Moreover, the widely publicised success stories such 
as the Graskop, Makuleke, Richtersveld community-based wildlife conservation projects in 
South (see DEAT and GIZ, n.d.) and Burunge in Tanzania, are told by their funders. The South 
African government and GIZ for example, used the three success stories to justify the 
proliferation of community-based wildlife conservation by using “the similar methods and 
techniques to promote rural development and extend conservation to all provinces in South 
Africa” (see DEAT and GIZ, n.d.:2). This was also the case for Burunge, where AWF and 
WWF’s self-assessment success story were used to develop ‘WMA guide book’ and rationalise 
proliferation of WMAs in others areas of Tanzania. The reported success, however, is largely 
based on increased densities of wildlife (Lee and Bond, 2018), rather than population wellbeing 
or distributive rights. The precarious feedbacks of improved conservation and increased 
wildlife population such as wildlife raids on crops and wildlife are also merely mentioned. 
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This tendency of state and donor agencies to ignore the multiple factors and feedbacks in 
integrated conservation and development projects deter poor countries to achieve development 
goals and find alternative and better approaches for wildlife conservation (Newmark and 
Hough, 2000). There is need therefore for independent research and continuous monitoring of 
both ecological and socioeconomic outcomes to avoid justification of coercive conservation 
regimes based on short-term or unsustainable conservation outcomes. In lieu of this, the 
empirical results and the theoretical lessons, this dissertation put forward the following 
recommendations for development, policy, and research. 
First, state and conservation actors need to understand that policy promise to benefit rural 
people is one thing, but if those benefits do not trickle down to the household level, there will 
always be animosity. Conservation policies therefore should consider, and clearly address 
issues of resources ownership, benefit sharing, and rights and responsibilities. State and other 
actors shall focus on translating the rhetoric rooted in national and global conservation-
development agenda, to return ownership of land and natural resources to local people, into 
national laws. State laws must recognise customary use rights, and empower rural people to 
manage natural resources. Pertaining to benefits sharing, in particular, conservation policies 
should put emphasis on distributive rights. Conservation investments need to provide an anchor 
for rural people to participate in trade, secure job opportunities, and more importantly, use the 
returns from the investment to improve infrastructure and social services at local level. 
In regard to rational governance, conservation interventions need to embrace, and strategically 
utilise knowledge generated through local practices and experiences, and science and modern 
technologies, to align growth strategies with land and ecosystems management. State agencies, 
transnational conservation and development NGOs, and local institutions should focus on 
building structures and mechanisms that will facilitate the identification of comparative 
advantages of each level of institution, stakeholder and/or groups of actors in generating and 
mobilising knowledge, and coordinate planning and implementation of conservation activities. 
To this end, state and NGOs shall focus on capacity building and facilitation of local institutions 
and communities to gain knowledge and negotiating skills on issues pertaining to land tenure 
security, land use planning and management, and contract engagements. 
Furthermore, conservation interventions on human-dominated landscapes should consider 
competitive advantage of the targeted landscapes in order to make conservation benefits 
outcompete other forms of land use. The interventions should not only focus on restoration and 
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reconstruction of ecological systems but also strive to improve the lives of rural people by 
promoting livelihoods strategies that have less or no detrimental effect on biodiversity such as 
livestock grazing (see Schieltz and Rubenstein, 2016) and ecotourism. In areas where 
agriculture is more profitable, growth must encourage value-added strategies through 
processing of agricultural products to increase profit and diversify job opportunities at local 
level. Conservation policies should also provide safety nets to minimize risks to farmers and 
pastoralist when exclusion of some customary livelihoods strategies such as agriculture and 
extractive utilisation of natural resources is inevitable or when agriculture and livestock 
production become unprofitable due to wildlife raids on crops and livestock. State-led 
conservation policies should offer avenues for compensation schemes, where part of revenues 
generated in conservation activities would be used to compensate local populations for damages 
caused by wildlife. State agencies should also promote crops which are less prone to wildlife 
predation such as sesame, and planting of small woodlots for poles and fuel wood. 
In conclusion, this dissertation calls upon research to focus on, and iteratively continue to, 
explore social and environmental relations and changes to find better, less coercive, less 
exploitative, and more sustainable ways of governing natural resources. It is important to begin 
with the understanding of local values and opportunities, and learn from elsewhere experiences, 
to design and adopt conservation policies that would work at local level. Specifically, the 
research shall dwell on the site-by-site investigations to find best exemplars for policy design 
and adjustments, and identify competitive advantage for land use, which will foster rational 
governance in land use and natural resources management. 
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7. Appendices 
Appendix 1 Household survey questionnaire 
 
A. Identification 
1. Identification and location of household. 
1. Household name and code *(name) (HID) 
2. Village name and code *(name) (VID) 
3. District name and code *(name) (DID) 
4. Name of respondent *(name) (RID) 
5.     Date of interview Day Month  Year 
7. GPS reference point of household 
(UTM format) 
 
8. Distance of the household from the 
centre of village (in minutes of walking 
and in km) 
1. 
 
min 
2. 
 
km 
 
B. Household composition 
1. Who are the members of the household? 
 
1.Personal 
Identification 
number 
(PID) 
* Name of household member 2. Relation to 
household 
head
1)
 
3. Year 
born
2) 
(yyyy) 
4. Sex 
1=male 
2=female 
5. 
Education3) 
1  Household 
head = code 0 
   
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
11      
12      
13      
14      
1) Codes: 1=spouse (legally married or cohabiting); 2=son/daughter; 3=son/daughter in law; 
4=grandchild; 5=mother/father; 6=mother/father in law; 7=brother or sister; 8=brother/sister in law; 
9=uncle/aunt; 10=nephew/niece; 11=step/foster child; 12=other family; 13=not related (e.g., servant). 
2) One may ask about age, and the calculate ‘year born’ when entering data. 
3) 1=No formal education; 2=Primary education; 3=Secondary education; 4=Vocational training; 5=College 
(Diploma/Certificate); 6=University (Degree) 
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2. We would like to ask some questions regarding the head of this household. 
1. What is the marital status of household head? 
 
 
 
Codes: 1=married and living together; 2=married but spouse working 
away; 
 
 3=widow/widower; 4=divorced; 5=never married; 9=other, 
specify: 
  
2. How long ago was this household formed?  
years 
3. Was the household head born in this village? 
If ‘yes’, go to 5. 
 
(1-2) 
4. If ‘no’: how long has the household head lived in the village?  
years 
5. Does the household head belong to the largest ethnic group/caste in the village?  
(1-2) 
 
C. Land 
1. Please indicate the amount of land (in acres) that is currently owned by the household including land that 
you have rented in/out. 
Category 1. Area 
(acre) 
2. Ownership 
(code-tenure)1 
Main products grown/harvested 
in the past 12 months; Max 3 
(code-product)2 3. Rank1 4. Rank2 5. Rank3 
Forest: 
1. Natural forest      
2. Managed forests      
3. Plantations      
Agricultural land: 
4. Cropland      
5. Pasture (natural or planted)      
6. Agroforestry      
7. Silvipasture      
8. Fallow      
9. Other vegetation types/land uses (residential, 
bush, grassland, wetland, etc.) 
    
10.  Total land owned (1+2+3+…+9)      
11.  Land rented out (included in 1-9)      
12.  Land rented in (not included in 1-9)      
1) Ownership code: 1. State, 2. Community, 3. Private, 4. Open access 5. Other, specify. 
2) Product code: 1. Fire-wood/charcoal; 2. Timber/poles or other wood; 3. Vegetables; 5. Fruits 4. 
Medicine; 5. Forage/fodder; 6. Thatch grass, 7. Honey, 8. Ropes, 99. Other specify. 
 
2. Do you think the land owned by the household is enough? (If yes skip to section 4) 
    1=Yes; 2=No 
 
3. If no, indicate category of land which is not enough (e.g. agricultural, enumerator read category from the 
table above) 
 
4. Where can you get more land if needed? (cycle all responses) 
1=From village officials for free 
2=From village officials but pay 
3=From family and friend for free 
4=From family and friend for free 
5=Buy from other villagers 
6=Other, specify 
 
5. If buy from other villagers, how much per acre?              [                            ] 
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6. If get from village official but pay, how much per acre?  [                            ] 
 
7. If get from village officials for free, describe the process? 
 
8. Compare now and 10 years ago, when is it easy to get land? 
    1=now, 2=before, 3=don’t know 
 
9. If before, why? 
    1=few people, 2=no rules, 3=there were rules but not enforced, 4=other, specify 
 
 
10. Did the household clear any forest during the past 12 months? If ‘no’, go to 17. (1-2) 
  
11. How much forest was cleared? (acres) 
12. What was the cleared forest (land) used for? 
Codes: 1=cropping; 2=tree plantation; 3=pasture; 4=non-agric uses 
(Rank max 3) 
1.Rank1 2.Rank2 3.Rank3 
13. If used for crops (fill in crops in swahili), which principal crop 
was grown? max 3 
1.Rank1 2.Rank2 3.Rank3 
14. What type of forest did you clear? 
(code forest: 1. Natural forest, 2. Managed forest 3. Plantation)   
15. What was the ownership status of the forest cleared? 
(code tenure: 1. State, 2. Community, 3. Private, 4. Open access 5. 
Other, specify)   
16. How far from the house was the forest cleared located? Km 
17. Has the household over the last 10 years cleared forest? If ‘no’, go to 19.  
1-2 
18. If ‘yes’: how much forest (approx.) has been cleared over the last 10 years? 
Note: This should include the area reported in question 11. acres 
19. How much land used by the household has over the last 10 years been 
abandoned (left to convert to natural re-vegetation)? acres 
 
D. Assets and savings 
1. Please indicate the type of house you have?  
1. Do you have your own house? 
1)
  
2. What is the type of material of (most of) the walls? 
2)
  
3. What is the type of material of (most of) the roof? 
3)
  
4. How many m
2 
approx. is the house? m
2
 
1) Codes: 0=no; 1=own the house on their own; 2=own the house together with other household(s); 3=renting 
the house alone; 4=renting the house with other household(s); 9=other, specify: 
2) Codes: 1=mud/soil; 2=wooden (boards, trunks); 3=iron (or other metal) sheets; 4=bricks or concrete; 
5=reeds/straw/grass/fibers/bamboo; 99=other, specify: 
3) Codes: 1=thatch; 2=wooden (boards); 3=iron or other metal sheets; 4=tiles; 99=other, specify: 
 
 159 
 
2. Please indicate the number and value of implements and other large household items that are owned by the 
household. 
 1. No. of 
units 
owned 
2. Total value (current 
sales value of all units, 
not purchasing price) 
3. Time purchased (year purchased for 
none WMA villages) or ask 1 Before 
WMA; 2. After WMA for WMA 
villages. 1. Car/truck    
2. Tractor    
3. Motorcycle    
4. Bicycle    
5. Handphone/phone    
6. TV    
7. Radio    
8. Cassette/CD/ VHS/VCD/DVD/ 
player 
   
9. Stove for cooking (gas or electric 
only) 
  
10.  Refrigerator/freezer    
11.  Fishing boat and boat engine    
12.  Chainsaw    
13.  Plough    
14. Shotgun/rifle    
15.  Wooden cart or wheelbarrow    
16. Furniture    
17. Water pump    
18. Solar panel    
99. Other    
 
3. Please indicate the savings and debt the household has.  
1. How much does the household have in savings in banks, credit associations 
or 
savings clubs? 
 
2. How much does the household have in savings in non-productive assets such 
as 
gold and jewelry? 
 
3. How much does the household have in outstanding debt?  
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E. WMA/Forest resource base  
1. How far is it from the house/homestead to the 
edge 
of the nearest WMA/natural or managed forest 
that you have access to and can use? 
1. … measured in terms of distance? km 
2. … measured in terms of time (in 
minutes 
of walking)? 
 
min 
2. Does your household collect firewood? If ‘no’, go to 7. (1-0) 
3. If ‘yes’: how many hours per week do the members of your household spend on collecting 
firewood 
for family use? (adult time should be reported; child time = 50 % of adult time) 
 
(hours) 
4. Does your ho sehold now spend m re or less time on getting firewood than you did 10 years 
ago?  Codes: 1=more; 2=about the same; 
3=less 
 
5. How has availability of firewood changed over the past 10 years? 
Codes: 1=declined; 2=about the same; 3=increased If code ‘2’ or’ 3’, go to 7. 
 
6. If declined (code ‘1’ on the 
question above), how has the 
household responded to the 
decline in the availability of 
firewood? Please rank the most 
important responses, max 3. 
Response Rank 1-3 
1. Increased collection time (e.g., from further away from 
house) 
 
2. Planting of trees on private land  
3. Increased use of agricultural residues as fuel  
4. Buying (more) fuelwood and/or charcoal  
5. Buying (more) commercial fuels (kerosene, gas or 
electricity) 
 
6. Reduced the need for use of fuels, such as using improved 
stove 
 
7. More conservative use of fuelwood for cooking and 
heating 
 
8. Reduced number of cooked meals  
9.  Use of improved technology  
10. Increased use of non-wood wild products (ex. reeds)  
11. Restricting access/use to own forest  
12. Conserving standing trees for future  
13. Making charcoal  
99. Other, specify:  
7. Has your household planted any woodlots or trees on farm over the past 10 years? 
If ‘no’, go to next section. 
 
(1-0) 
8. If yes: what are the main purpose(s) of the trees 
planted? 
Please  rank  the  most  important  purposes, max 3. 
Purpose Rank 1-3 
1. Firewood for domestic use  
2. Firewood for sale  
3. Fodder for own use  
4. Fodder for sale  
5. Timber/poles for own use  
6. Timber/poles for sale  
7. Other domestic uses  
8. Other products for sale  
9. Carbon sequestration  
10. Other environmental services  
11. Land demarcation  
12. To increase the value of my land  
13. To allow my children and/or 
grandchildren to see these trees 
 
99. Other, specify:  
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G. Crisis and unexpected expenditures 
1. Has the household faced any major income shortfalls or unexpectedly large expenditures during the past 12 
months?  
Event 1. How 
severe?
1)
 
How did you cope with the income 
loss or costs? Rank max. 3
2)
 
 2. Rank1 3. Rank2 4. Rank3 
1. Serious crop failure     
2. Serious illness in family (productive age-group adult unable to 
work for more than one month during past 12 months, due to 
illness, or to taking care of ill person; or high medical costs) 
   
3. Death of productive age-group adult     
4. Land loss (expropriation, etc.)     
5. Major livestock loss (theft, drought, etc.)     
6. Other major asset loss (fire, theft, flood, etc.)     
7. Lost wage employment     
8. Wedding or other costly social events     
9. Payment for sale of hh products arrive later than expected     
10.  Delayed income from forest products     
11. Fine from environmental regulation agency     
99. Other, specify     
1) Codes severity: 1=no crisis; 2=yes, moderate crisis; 3=yes, severe crisis 
2) Codes coping:
 
 
1=Harvest more forest products 
2=Harvest more wild products not in the forest 
3=Harvest more agricultural products 
4=Spend cash savings 
5=Sell assets (land, livestock, etc.) 
6=Do extra casual labour work 
7=Assistance from friends and relatives 
8=Assistance from NGO, community org., 
religious org. or similar 
9=Get loan from money lender, credit 
association, bank etc. 
10=Tried to reduce household spending 
11=Did nothing in particular 
12=Spent savings / retirement money 
13=Reduced number of meals taken 
14=Borrowed against future earnings 
15=Sold food that would otherwise be used for 
household consumption 
16=Rented out land 
17=Started new business 
18=Changed to different type of livestock 
19=Harvested premature crops. 
20=Changed cropping patterns or types of crops 
planted 
99=Other, specify: 
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H. WMA/Forest services 
1. Has the household ever received any cash or in kind payments related to the following forest 
services?  
Principal purpose 1. Ever 
received? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
2. If yes, amounts (values) received 
(if nothing, put ‘0’) 
Year Amount Year Amount Year Amount Year Amount 
1. Tourism          
2. Carbon projects          
3. Water catchments 
projects 
         
4. Biodiversity 
conservation 
         
5. Others, specify:          
6. Tree planting          
7. Timber concessions          
 
I. Household Participation 
We want to measure perception, attitudes and views toward existing WMA. 
1. Do you consider your village (community) to be a good place to live? 
         1=Yes; 2=yes; 3=partly; trust some and not others 
 
2. Do you in general trust people in the village (community)? 
         1=Yes; 2=yes; 3=partly, trust some and not others;  
 
3. .Can you get help from other people in the village (community) if you are in need, for example, if 
you need extra money because someone in your family is sick? 
         1=Yes; 2=yes; 3=can sometimes get help, but not always;  
 
4. How well-off is your household today compared with the situation before WMA/ (10 years ago for 
none WMA villages) 
1=less well-off now; 2=about the same; 3=better off now (If 1 or 3, go to 5. If 2, go to 6). 
5. If worse- or better-off: what is the main reason for the change? Please rank the most important 
responses, max Reason: Change in  
 
1=off farm employment 
2=land holding (e.g., bought/sold land, 
eviction) 
3=forest resources 
4=output prices (forest, agric,…) 
5=outside support (govt., NGO,..) 
6=remittances 
7=cost of living (e.g., high inflation) 
8=war, civil strife, unrest 
9=conflicts in village (non-violent) 
10=change in family situation (e.g. loss 
of family member/a major bread-
winner) 
11=illness 
12=access (e.g. new road,…) 
13=increased/reduced land area for agric. 
production 
14=religious awakening (i.e., found religion, 
converted to a new religion, born again or 
saved) 
15=started a new business/lost or less business 
16=livestock (gain or loss) 
17=material assets, incl. house (gain or loss) 
18=increased regulations 
20=education / increased knowledge 
21=more engaged in marketing/trade 
22=political stability 
23=crop failure/raiding 
24=changed drinking habits (started/stopped 
drinking alcohol) 
25=changes in natural resources (fish, etc.) 
26=working for themselves (no longer under a 
patron) 
27=more time to work 
28=Joined cooperative 
29=Forced to travel for family matters 
30=Fire destroyed everything 
31=Change in job 
99=other (specify) 
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6. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life over the past 12 months? 
           1=very unsatisfied; 2=unsatisfied; 3=neither unsatisfied or satisfied;  
            4=satisfied; 5=very satisfied 
 
7. Has the household’s food production and income over the past 12 months been sufficient to cover 
what you consider to be the needs of the household? 
1=Yes; 2=No; 3=reasonable (just about sufficient) 
8. Compared with other households in the village (or community), how well-off is your household? 
          1=worse-off; 2=about average; 3=better-of 
 
9. What do you understand about WMAs?  ( Rank according to respondent response) 
1. Community participation                     [           ] 
2. Benefit sharing                                     [           ] 
3. Resource conservation                         [           ] 
4. Others                                                   [           ] 
5. Don’t know                                          [           ] 
 
10.  Did .....? (ask question from the table) 
1.Personal 
Identification 
number 
(PID) 
2. Name  
 
3.Sex  
1=male 
2=female 
4. 
Village 
meetings 
1=Yes 
2=No 
 
5. If 
yes, 
how 
many 
times in 
the last 
12 
month 
6. Did .. 
speak in the 
meeting 
1=Yes 
2=No 
 
7. Did.. 
participate 
in WMA 
in the last 
12 month 
1=Yes 
0=No 
 
8. If yes 
how? 
1. Fire line 
2. Fire 
extinguishing 
3. Patrol 
99. Other   
9. 
Was.. 
paid? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
 
 
10. If 
yes, 
how 
much 
1    
 
      
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          
 
10. If attended the village general meetings what did you discuss about? (cycle all respoenses) 
1=Resource use conflict                
2=Investment contracts               
3=Benefit sharing mechanisms       
4=Approval of annual plans and budgets   
5=Resource conservation              
99=Others (specify) 
 
11. Have you discussed about the operation of WMA/forest in village assembly? 
             1=Yes;  2=No; 3=Don’t know 
 
12. Are you aware of any project in your village that has benefited from income from the 
WMA/forest income (if yes, mention project)  
              1=Yes;  2=No; 3=Don’t know 
 
13. Are there poaching incidences in this village? 
            1=Yes;  2=No; 3=Don’t know  
 
14. If yes in the last year, how often did you have poaching incidences in this village? 
            1=More than three times 
            2=Thrice                  
            3=Twice                  
            4= Once                
            5=Never happened    
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15. In your opinion are poaching incidences increasing or decreasing? 
            1=Increasing                            
            2=Decreasing                       
            3=Don’t know  
 
16. Have your household member ever experienced any disputes and conflicts related to wildlife 
management in this village? (If no go to 18) 
            1=Yes                                     
            2=No   
17. If yes, what type of disputes and conflict are related to wildlife management in your village? 
(cycle all response) 
 
            1=Village boundaries                       
            2=Wild animal attack                   
            3=Destruction of crops by wild animals       
            4=Misunderstanding between Villagers and investors  
            5=Disagreement on benefit sharing mechanism     
            99=Others (specify)                             
 
18. Since establishment of WMAs what are the potential productive activities that WMA broughtr 
bring to the village? (cycle all response) 
1=None 
2=Cash crop farming                      
3=Food crop production                 
4=Small business (food-vending,)      
5=Wage employment                        
6=Horticulture                      
7=Handcrafts for sale                    
8=Water vending                           
9=Game meat business                 
10=Tourist guide                           
99=Others, specify    
 
19. Has the WMA had any impact on the condition of the wildlife in your area? (cycle all response) 
            1=Increase abundance (in situ)         
            2=Provides reproduction grounds      
            3=Stop habitat destruction              
            4=Bringing species back 
            99=other, specify 
 
20. In the last 12 month, how often did you have fire incidences in this village? 
            1=More than three times                                       
            2=Three times                              
            3=Two times                                 
            4=Once                                 
            5=Never happened 
 
21. In your opinion has WMAs been beneficial to you or to your area? 
          1=Yes 
          2=No                                                        
          3=Don’t know                                         
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22. If yes, what benefits? (cycle all response) 
            1=Increased incomes                    
            2=Reduced poaching incidences and practices   
            3 =Conserves resource for future generations  
            4=Reduces conflicts             
            5=Improves livelihood          
            6=Provides access/security to resources (property rights)  
            99=Other 
 
23. Do you think the system of sharing the benefits accrued from WMAs is fair? 
          1=Yes 
          2=No 
 
24. Overall, how has WMA impacted your livelihood?   
            1=Decreased                    
            2=No changes                                       
            3=Increased                     
            4=Don’t know 
 
25. Overall, do you think that WMA has been good or bad for businesses? 
           1=good 
           2=Bad 
           3=Don’t  know   
 
26. In your opinion, what are some of the problems with WMA?  (cycle all response) 
           1=Too many regulations              
            2=Regulations not well enforced 
            3=Reduce benefit                        
            4=Causes conflicts                    
            5=Erodes traditional authority    
            6=Inequity                                   
            7=Don’t  know   
           99=Other                                    
 
27. Have you/or any other member of the household been harassed because of WMA/forest 
resources? (If no go to 30) 
          1=Yes 
          2=No 
 
28. If yes, who harassed you/member of your household? 
          1=scouts/guards 
          2=VNRC members 
          3=village government leaders 
          4=District officials 
          5=Other specify 
 
29. Have ever been caught for breaking WMA/forest laws? (If no go to next section) 
          1=Yes 
          2=No 
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30. If yes what happened? (cycle all responses) 
         1=fined and paid fine 
         2=fined but did not pay the fine 
         3=nothing, was allowed to walk freely 
         4=bribed officials 
         5=products were confisticated 
         6=tools were confisticate 
         7=both tools and products were confisticated 
 
31. If paid fine how much? 
 
32. If bribed officials (enumerator probe and document the details) 
 
33. Have you or any other member of the household been a member or leader of WMA/VNRC 
committee of patrol/scout? 
          1=Yes 
          2=No 
34. If yes, who and what was his/her position 
 
35. For how long has ..................been member or leader of WMA/VNRC committee of patrol/scout? 
 
Section B Household Quarterly surveys (Q1-Q2)  
A Direct forest income (past 6 month income from unprocessed forest p roducts) 
1. What are the quantities and values of raw-material wildlife/forest products the members of your 
household collected for both own use and sale over the past 6  month?  
Note: Income from plantations is defined as forest income, while agroforestry income is categorized 
as agric. income (F), and the quantities of unprocessed forest products used as inputs in making 
processed forest products should only be reported in section B, table 2, and not in the table below. 
1. 
Forest 
produ
ct 
(name) 
2. 
Collecte
d by 
whom?1 
Collected 
where? 
5. 
Quantit
y 
collecte
d (7+8) 
6. 
Uni
t 
7. 
Ow
n 
use 
(incl
. 
gifts
) 
8. 
Sold 
(incl. 
barter
) 
9. 
Pric
e 
per 
unit 
10. 
Type 
of 
marke
t 
(code- 
market
) 
1
1. 
Gros
s 
valu
e 
(5*9
) 
12. 
Tran- 
sport/ 
marketin
g costs 
(total) 
13. 
Purc
h. 
input
s 
& 
hired 
labour 
14. 
Net 
incom
e 
(11-12-
13) 
3. 
Land 
type 
(code
- 
land) 
4. 
Owne 
rship 
(code- 
tenure
)               
              
              
              
              
              
              
1) Codes: 1=only/mainly by wife and adult female household members; 2=both adult males and adult 
females participate about equally; 3=only/mainly by the husband and adult male household members; 
4=only/mainly by girls (<15 years); 5=only/mainly by boys (<15 years); 6=only/mainly by children (<15 
years), and boys and girls participate about equally; 7=all members of household participate equally; 
8=none of the above alternatives; 9=person employed by and living with the household. Note: Answers 
in columns 3 and 4 should be consistent with land categories reported in village questionnaire and in the 
annual household questionnaire. 
Code market: 1=district market; 2= market for major consumption goods; 3= market where agric. 
products are sold; 4= market where forest products are sold 
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B. Forest-derived income (income from processed forest products) 
1. What are the quantities and values of processed forest products that members of your 
household produced during the past month? 
1. 
Product 
(Name) 
2. 
Who in 
the 
house 
hold did 
the 
work?
1)
 
3. 
Quantity 
produced 
(5+6) 
4. 
Unit 
5. 
Own 
use 
(incl. 
gifts) 
6. 
Sold 
(incl. 
barter) 
7. 
Price 
per 
unit 
8. 
Type 
of 
market 
(code- 
market 
9. 
Gross 
value 
(3*7) 
10. 
Purchased 
inputs & 
hired 
labour 
11. 
Transport 
marketing 
costs 
12. 
Net 
income 
excl. 
costs 
of 
forest 
inputs 
(9-10-11)             
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
1) Codes: 1=only/mainly by wife and adult female household members; 2=both adult males and adult 
females participate about equally; 3=only/mainly by the husband and adult male household members; 
4=only/mainly by girls (<15 years); 5=only/mainly by boys (<15 years); 6=only/mainly by children 
(<15 years), and boys and girls participate about equally; 7=all members of household participate 
equally; 8=none of the above alternatives. 
 
2. What are the quantities and values of unprocessed forest products used as inputs (raw material) to 
produce the processed forest products in the table above? Note: Avoid double counting with section B: 
only products used as inputs are recorded in the table below, and these quantities should not be included 
in what is recorded in section B. 
1. 
Processed 
(final) 
products 
(Name) 
2. 
Unprocessed 
forest 
product used 
as input 
(code- 
product) 
3. 
Quantity 
used 
(5+6) 
4. 
Unit 
5. 
Quantity 
purchased 
6. 
Quantity 
collected 
by 
household 
Collected where? 9. 
Who in 
the house- 
hold 
collected 
the forest 
product?
1)
 
10. 
Price 
per 
unit 
11. 
Value 
(3*10) 
7. Land 
type 
(code- 
land) 
8. 
Ownership 
(code- 
tenure) 
           
           
           
Note: The products in column 1 should be exactly the same as those in column 1 in the table above. 
Note: Columns 7,8,9 should be left blank if no collection by household. Column 10 (price) 
should be asked even if only from collection, but if not available, see the Technical Guidelines 
on valuation. 
Note: Answers in columns 7 and 8 should be consistent with land categories reported in village 
questionnaire and in the annual household questionnaire. 
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C. Wild animals 
1. How many wild animals did your household catch exclusively from the wild during the past 6 
month? 
1.Type 
of animal 
(local 
names)* 
Collected where? 4. Total 
catch 
(5+6) 
5. Own 
use 
(incl. 
gifts) 
6. Sold 
(incl. 
barter) 
7. Price 
per 
animal 
8. Gross 
value 
(4*7) 
9. Costs 
(inputs, 
hired 
labour, 
marketing) 
10. Net 
income 
(8-9) 
2. Land 
type 
(code- 
land) 
3. 
Owner-
ship 
(code- 
tenure)           
          
          
          
          
Note: Answers in columns 2 and 3 should be consistent with land categories reported in the village 
questionnaire and in the annual household questionnaire. 
 
D. Wage income 
1. Has any member of the household had paid work over the past 6 month? 
Note: One person can be listed more than once for different jobs.  
1. Household member (PID) 2. Type of work 
(code-work) 
3. Days worked 
past month 
4. Daily wage 
rate 
5. Total wage 
income (3*4) 
     
     
     
 
E. Income from own business (not forest or agriculture) 
1. Are you involved in any types of business, and if so, what are the gross income and costs related to 
that business over the past 6 month? Note: If the household is involved in several different types of 
business, you should fill in one column for each business. 
 1. Business 1 2. Business 2 3. Business 3 
1. What is your type of business?
1)
    
2. Gross income (sales)    
Costs: 
3. Purchased inputs    
4. Own non-labour inputs (equivalent market value)    
5. Hired labour    
6. Transport and marketing cost    
7. Capital costs (repair, maintenance, etc.)    
8. Other costs    
9. Net income (2 - items 3-8)    
10.   Current value of capital stock    
1) Codes: 1=shop/trade; 2=agric. processing; 3=handicraft; 4=carpentry; 5=other forest based; 
6=other skilled labour; 7=transport (car, boat,…); 8=lodging/restaurant;  9=brewing; 10=brick 
making; 11=landlord/real estate; 12=herbalist/traditional  healer/witch doctor; 13=quarrying; 14= 
contracted work (cleaning/maintenance); 15=renting out equipment; 19=other, specify: 
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F. Income from agriculture – crops 
1. What are the quantities and values of crops that household has harvested during the past 6 months?  
1. Crops 
(Name) 
2. Area of 
production 
(acre) 
3. Total 
production 
(5+6) 
4. Unit (for 
production) 
5.Own use 
(incl. gifts) 
6. Sold 
(incl. 
barter) 
7. Price 
per 
unit 
8.Total 
value 
(3*7) 
        
        
        
 
2. What are the quantities and values of inputs used in crop production over the past 6 months (this 
refers to agricultural cash expenditures)? 
Note: Take into account all the crops in the previous table. Note: See codes-list (section 3.2) for 
additional codes. 
1. Inputs 2. Quantity 3. Unit 4. Price per unit 5. Total costs (2*4) 
1. Seeds     
2. Fertilizers     
3. Pesticides/herbicides     
4. Manure     
5. Draught power     
6. Hired labour     
7. Hired machinery     
8. Transport/marketing     
9.    Payment for land rental     
  99.  Other, specify:     
    
 
 
G. Income from livestock 
1. What is the number of ADULT animals your household has now, and how many have you sold, 
bought, slaughtered or lost during the past 6 months? 
1. Livestock 2. 
Beginning 
number 
(3 months 
ago) 
3.Sold 
(incl. 
barter), 
live or 
slaughtered 
4.Slaught- 
ered 
for 
own 
use (or 
gift 
given) 
5. Lost 
(theft, 
died) 
6. Bought 
or gift 
received 
7. New 
from 
own 
stock 
8. End 
number 
(now) 
(2-3- 
4-
5+6+7) 
9. Price 
per 
adult 
animal 
10. 
Total 
end 
value 
(8*9) 
1. Cattle          
2. Buffalos          
3. Goats          
4. Sheep          
5. Pigs          
6. Donkeys          
7. Ducks          
8. Chicken          
9. Horses          
10. Guinepig          
11.  Rabbit          
12.  Turkey          
13.Guineafowl          
99. Other, 
specify: 
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2. What are the quantities and values of animal products and services that you have produced during 
the past 6 months?  
1. Product/service 2. Production 
(4+5) 
3. Unit 4. Own use 
(incl. gifts) 
5. Sold (incl. 
barter) 
6. Price per 
unit 
7. Total value 
(2*6) 
1. Meat 
1)
       
2. Milk 
2)
       
3. Butter       
4. Cheese       
5. Ghee       
6. Eggs       
7. Hides and skin       
8. Wool       
9. Manure       
10.  Draught power       
11.  Bee hives       
12.  Honey       
13.  Curdled milk       
14.  Soap       
19.  Other, specify       
1) Make sure this corresponds with the above table on sale and consumption of animals. 
2) Only milk consumed or sold should be included. If used for making, for example, cheese 
it should not be reported (only the amount and value of cheese). 
 
3. What are the quantities and values of inputs used in livestock production during the past 6 months 
(cash expenditures)?  
1. Inputs 2. Unit 3. Quantity 4. Price per unit 5. Total costs (3*4) 
1. Feed/fodder     
2. Rental of grazing land     
3. Medicines, vaccination and 
other veterinary services 
    
4. Costs of maintaining barns, 
enclosures, pens, etc. 
    
5. Hired labour     
6. Inputs from own farm     
99.  Other, specify:     
 
4. Please indicate approx. share of fodder, either grazed by your animals or brought to the farm by 
household members. 
Type of grazing land or source of fodder  3. Approx. share (%) 
1. Land type 
(code-land) 
2. Ownership 
(code-tenure)   
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H. Other income sources 
1. Please list any other income that the household has received during the past 6 months. 
1. Type of income 2. Total amount received 
past 3 months 
1. Remittances  
2. Support from government, NGO, organization or similar  
3. Gifts/support from friends and relatives  
4. Pension  
5. Payment for forest services  
6. Payment for renting out land (if in kind, state the equivalent in cash)  
7. Compensation from logging or mining company (or similar)  
8. Payments from FUG  
99. Other, specify:  
 
2. On average how much do you spend on…….for the past six month? 
    1. Health               [                       ] 
    2. Education         [                       ] 
    3. Clothes             [                       ] 
    4. Other specify    [                       ] 
I.  Enumerator/researcher assessment of the household 
1. Based on your impression and what you have seen (house, assets, etc.), how well-off do you 
consider this household to be compared with other households in the village? 
Codes: 1=worse-off; 2=about average; 3=better-off   
2. How reliable is the information generally provided by this household? 
 Codes: 1=poor; 2=reasonably reliable; 3=very reliable   
3. How reliable is the information on forest collection/use provided by this household? 
Codes: 1=poor; 2=reasonably reliable; 3=very reliable   
4. If the forest information is not so reliable (code 1 above), do you think the information 
provided overestimate or underestimate the actual forest use? 
Codes: 1=underestimate; 2=overestimate; 3= no systematic over- or underestimation; 4=don’t  
know.    
 
Thank you 
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Appendix 2. Formal and Informal interview guide 
A: General information 
1. Population size, trends, ethnic composition in the village/WMA village 
2. Available social services in the villages forming such as Hospitals/Health 
Centers/dispensaries, education/schools, transport and communications roads (land 
lines/internet/markets etc.) 
3. Available resources such as wildlife, village forest, minerals, water sources, etc. 
4. Main economic activities i.e. agriculture, businesses, pastoralist etc. 
5. Available investments in the village/WMA i.e. tented camps/lodges/hotels/etc. 
6. Number of investors in the village/WMA areas 
B: Governance 
1. Conservation efforts: how do community participate in conservation activities in the 
village/WMA areas? 
2. Are there any incidences of poaching and fire outbreak in your village/WMA? 
3. Presence of CSOs and CBOs 
4. Who manages the daily activities of WMA/forest your village? 
5. How are members of the CBO/village natural resource committee (VNRC) elected/chosen? 
6. How are the staff of the CBO office employed, i.e. who pays their salary and to whom do they 
answer to? (underlying research question; are they the willing servants of the villages or an 
autonomous local bureaucracy with their own agendas) 
7. How often does the CBO/VNRC council (or whatever it is called) meet? (Are there meeting 
minutes with signatures of participants/records of attendance? If so, check them to see how 
many (do not) participate. Are there meeting minutes? If so, it would be good to 
copy/photograph them so we can see what is (not) being discussed?) 
8. Are CBO office staff bureaucrats or village levels representatives? If there are professional 
bureaucrats in the CBO office, what are village based representatives supposed to do? Are they 
bringing issues and complaints from the villages? How does AA office deal with complaints? 
(Underlying research questions; Are physical distances a problem for participation in the 
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governance of the CBO? Does CBO council meetings discuss the distribution of effort between 
wildlife protection and community development or other important issues?) 
9. Who sits on the Board of Trustees? (check for “independence”, wealth, benevolence, 
stakes/hidden agendas) 
10. Are there safeguards to prevent corruption at WMA/CBO/VNRC level? What do you do to 
prevent people with bad motives to get elected into key CBO/WMA/VNRC positions? 
11. What are the perceptions about villagers among WMA/VNRC leaders (those we serve, 
ignorant/backward destroyers of the environment, other)? (underlying research question; do 
AA leaders see themselves as being different from (the majority of) villagers – do they see 
themselves as more environmentally aware, local experts) 
C: Finances 
1. What types of revenue does the village collect from natural resources?  
2. Describe how revenues from hunting and fototourism are reaching the CBO, directly or through 
wildlife department? If directly, how much does the CBO forward to the district or wildlife 
department (broken down into hunting and non-consumptive)? If indirectly, how much money 
is retained by wildlife department and the district? 
3. What share of total CBO/VNRC budget comes from fees and donors? (underlying research 
question; do CBO/VNRC leaders look more to the priorities of donors than those of villagers 
and how financially sustainable is the CBO/VNRC) 
4. What share of total CBO/VNRC budget spent on: administration, anti-poaching/patrol, wildlife 
abatement (control of wildlife damages), and community development? (underlying research 
question; do CBO/VNRC leaders look more to the priorities of donors than those of villagers) 
5. Is there a benefit sharing plan? What is the distribution of WMA revenues amongst villages? 
What forms of community development has been financed and how? Are there special 
arrangements to compensate a village with higher revenues if this village contributes more land? 
Can we see accounts and finances (over the whole year, possibly several years)? 
6. Relationship of CBO office (and WMA in general) to donors who finance the CBO and VGS. 
What are the conditions for getting donor money and manage WMA? 
7. How would things go/change if CBO/VNRC was running without donor money (self-sustaining 
through higher tourism revenues)? 
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8. Relationship between CBO office and village governments: can villages decide independently 
how to spend WMA revenues? Is there a formula how much money (hunting vs fototourism) 
can be spend by the village on what? How often does CBO report back to villagers about WMA? 
9. Describe the contract/agreement between the village and the operator? (Hunting or photo?) Are 
contracts renewed (with or without renegotiation?) after 3 years? 
10. How was the contract negotiated? Is the village government satisfied? Are villagers satisfied? 
Are there problems with the operator? Do they have wishes for the future/changes? 
D: Land use planning and management plans, rules 
1. Is it true that the resource zone management plan (RZMP) plays a preliminary role until a 
General Management Plan (GMP) is in place? Or do both (RZMP and GMP) apply in parallel? 
Does/can WMA GMP change over time? How? 
2. Is carrying capacity defined in village land use plans (VLUPs) and/or RZMPs? Do you know if 
village by-laws define how much/at what times/where livestock can graze? 
3. Are there special provisions in land use plans and management regulations for times of crises? 
4. Did/do village leaders want to change anything in the WMA land use plan? If so, what? Did 
village leaders try to do it already and was it accepted by the AA/wildlife department? If not, 
can the land use plan be changed? 
5. What are the rules and restrictions imposed through WMA on the village and villagers? 
6. Are there/have there been plans to reduce livestock numbers in the WMA? In the future? 
7. What rules do people agree/disagree with? 
8. What sorts of people are most likely to ignore or violate WMA/forest rules? 
9. What happens if people break rules? 
10. How many times did people get caught breaking these rules in the last 12 months? Which rules 
are most contested? Do you know how were VLUPs made? And RZMP? 
D: Wildlife conflicts 
1. Is wildlife damage a problem in villages? Is it a big problem? How was it in the past/before 
WMA? 
2. How many incidents of animals having killed or seriously injured people in the village in the 
past ten years? 
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3. When is wildlife crop damage an issue (probe for which months are considered risky?) 
4. Are households compensated for damage to crops and livestock? How? 
5. Do villagers do (are they allowed to) something to minimise damage (what are their strategies)? 
Is the village government supporting them here? 
6. Is there anything the villagers would like to be able to do to prevent damage? 
7. Impression of people about the role of WMA in their ability to avoid damage? Do they feel 
helpless or do they have agency/authority to prevent damage? 
8. Does the village receive a hunting quota for subsistence use from WMA/District etc.? If yes, 
what and how much can be hunted? Can the quota be sold? How was it before WMA/in the 
past? 
E: Displacements of people and/or activities (due to WMA) 
1. Have there been displacements of villagers or their assets due to WMA/forest? 
2. How was that dealt with by village government in terms of compensation, conflicts, etc.? 
3. Who was displaced and what happened to people who were displaced? 
4. Was there compensation? If yes, what kind of compensation? 
5. Probe for the quality of newly used land, access to water, grazing areas, housing etc. for people 
who were displaced. 
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Appendix 3. WMA access rules contestation/acceptability chart 
Products/service Restrictions are 
broadly accepted and 
adhered to 
Restrictions are obeyed 
by some/not always 
Restrictions are 
generally (but 
not openly) 
ignored 
Restrictions 
are openly 
contested and 
ignored 
Dry fuel wood collection         
Tree felling (poles for 
house construction) 
  
      
Collecting NTFPs         
Charcoal burning         
Livestock grazing         
Agricultural land         
Permanent settlements         
Temporary settlements         
Local hunting         
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